Molana Mohd. Qasim Nanautvi's Contribution to Islamic Thought With Special Reference to Al-Kalam

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ABSTRACT

A B S T R A C T

The wide range and highly rational and academic scope of his Kalāmi works remains so far a great challenge to dedicated study. There are very few among Muslim Scholars much less non-Muslim academicians who know of this fact even. At the completion of this work my genuin feeling is that I have done nothing than having seen and shown the tip of an iceburg. Assessments regarding details may differ but the fact of his being a rational giant and his interpretation of Islāmic faith being a harmonious rational whole is indisputable.

The Present study has been divided into two parts. The first part deals with the Qur'ānic basis and a brief history of 'Ilm al-Kalām, followed by a brief survey of Kalāmi thoughts in India before and during the 18th century. Then comes what is directly related and forms the immediate perspective and the more important part of the study. It includes a closer study of the 19th century with a biographical sketch of Maulāna Mohd.Qāsim, his Kalāmi response to missionary challenge, and finally the main features of his Kalāmi system and classification of his works.

The second part is fully devoted to the presentation of Maulāna Nānautvi's system of Al-Kalām. It

comprises of 8 chapters, each with 3 sub-titles (even more at times but these are left un-numbered).

Our struggle regarding realistically chapterising this study has been the most painstaking and time-consuming one. For the ultimate scope of Maulāna Nānautvi's al-Kalām could not be conveniently determined and realised without proper chapterization. This is so because of the fact that most of his works are devoid of any chapter-wise break-up, proper contents, titles, sub-titles and paragraphs. This necessitated in the first stage extensive notes and studies and then abridgements and summaries in certain cases and detailed list of contents in certain others not to speak of the problems faced due to the brevity of language and style and terminological difficulties while rendering his ideas into English.

The second part of this work is not a translation of the text. My aim was to transmit the ideas and not to translate the text. Nor it was necessary or advisable either. Thus, if a discussion appeared rather too lengthy, I preferred to abridge that - skipping several lines or pages even - but still keeping strictly to his statement. However, I did not

try to elaborate upon in case an idea seemed to need that. I stopped almost half way his book (Taqrīr-e-Dilpazīr = T.D.) where his theological al-Kalām came to an end and his philosophical al-Kalām began. Although I have spared not a drop of perspiration, any omission, commission, mistakes or even blunders cannot be ruled out, and it will be only obliging for me if these are frankly pointed out.

Although the scope of his Kalāmi thought is much wider if we include in it such of his discussions as time and space, motion and change, distance and dimension etc. which he deals at length in respect of divine attributes and essence. Nonetheless since these problems are essentially related to philosophy proper and as such deserve to be treated separately, therefore we have rather confined ourselves to his 'theological al-Kalām' rather than extend this study to his 'philosophical al-Kalām'. We have also left over such discussions in the process as are mainly related to a separate field of al-Kalam, i.e. comparative religion, e.g. refutation of Tanāsukh (transmigration of souls) and sonhood of Jesus Christ.

Kalāmi thought of Maulāna Mohd. Qāsim Nānautvi seems to have special relevance to the modern times' academic values of rational view, scientific outlook and objective criticism. Maulāna Mohd Qāsim is generally known as the founder of Dārul 'Uloom of Deoband rather than for his intellectual and rational contribution towards understanding Islām. The present study is an humble effort to determine and bring to the limelight the rational scope of his Kalāmi thought.

The real worth of his Kalami thought lies not only in its rational value, but greater still in the totality of its harmonious whole. Although his Kalāmi ideas are scattered in his various works yet the most important, systematic and complete in this sphere among them is Taqrīr-e-Dilpazīr and as such it forms the basic source in this study. We have tried our best to derive from his other works and point out in them whereever to relevant discussions. This is, however, perhaps one of the most difficult task in his works for anyone pursuing an in-depth study.

It is rather paradoxical to realise that Maulana Mohd. Qasim has been cast to oblivion as much for his

contribution to Islamic thought - particularly al-Kalam - as he is well-remembered for his founding Deoband Institution. One of the reasons, generally stated in the learned circles of Deoband itself for his books remaining un-attended is that the language of his writings is a little too difficult for the average scholars even.

This, however, is not the fact. Ironically it is the subtle reasoning, scientific approach and the logical sequence of his arguments - revealing in the process the fallacious grounds of certain misconceptions or distortions, regarding a truth - which are rather discouraging for the escaping attention. Not the language - which is fluent, easy and spontaneous in general. Exception may be made of a few places, however, where the brevity of style or abundant use of technical terms seem to conspire against easy comprehension and fluency of style, particularly in the case of his treatise Āb-e-Hayāt or some sections of Taqrīr-e-Dilpazīr, Hadīth al-'Imā and Qibla Numā.

Another reason of neglecting his rationalistic genius in outer circles on academic grounds is related to a misconception of the academic worth of his contri-

bution. Generally classed as Munāzirānah or polemical, his works have been ignored by the less informed as the product of a debalist environment created by the aggressive Missionaryism and revivalist Hinduism. Shaikh Mohd. Ikram writes :

> "Maulana Mohd Qasim did not live long enough. Whatever time of this borrowed life he was granted, much of that too was spent in polemical debates and other commotions. He never had time enough in the true sense of the word to write and compile. The few short expositions that he left behind carry a pre-dominantly debatist element."[1]

The above statement like several other statements contained in the book about Maulana Mohd Qasim is far from the facts - indicating only an unauthentic and a casual treatment of the subject. As for his writings the Maulana in spite of his rather brief span of life wrote more than 25 books running into over 1500 printed pages - even if we exclude the unprinted

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1. Mawj-e-Kauthar, pp.199-200.

pages as well as his orations and speeches reported by others such as Mubāhitha-e-Shāh Jahānpūr, Brahi-e-Qasmiyyah and Guftugu-e-Madhhabi etc. as we shall shortly see.

As regards "Pre-dominantly a debatist element" - the statement reflects a partial truth and technically refers the motivating force only. For in the first place, the above mentioned and certain other of his books are partially a debator's pride no doubt. For instance, Intisār al-Islām and Qibla Numā, written by himself contain replies to 11 objections to Islamic faith and Shari'āh raised by Pandit Dayanand Saraswati, the founder of Arya Samaji cult. These books however, are not fully a debator's exposition. Both comprise of two answers to each question, which are in fact two different levels of treating the same subject. The first of each set of answers certainly is in the nature of a 'tit for tat' necessitated by the implies disdain in the question or the inner folly of the objection itself. The second answer in reality represents a much higher level, particularly in Qibla Numa where the debator or polemic is left far below and Mutakallim par excellent takes over.

Equipped though with a thorough knowledge of Islamic sciences, the Maulana yet hardly refers an ayah of Qur'an or Hadith of the Prophet in his Kalami expositions. On the other hand, he builds up his theorization on the basis of inferences drawn from his systematic reflections. This is a continued and equally spontaneous process of subtle reasoning - initially difficult to understand but for another characteristic of his writings : his unique exemplification and extremely vivid illustrations. To this aspect we shall return shortly after.

But to call him Mutakallim is to bring him down from his true and still higher place of the Philosopher of Islamic faith. He is a philosopher not in the general sense of the word, but a philospher who has knit together the ingredients of Islamic faith in a rational whole. No doubt when he spoke or wrote on questions Islamic beliefs in response to some query or challenge, he appeared a Mutakallim. But when he theorises the issues of Islamic faith one by one into a harmonious whole in the perspective of his broad vision, equitable treatment, piercing mind and above all his surprisingly subtle and yet clear reasoning,

he seems to outshine the brightest scholars of Islamic history, and deserves to call a Kalami philosopher rather than a Mutakallim.

The postulates of his interpretation of Islamic faith system are grounded in pure reason and rationalism. As such their appeal is not confined to Muslims only but they have a potential appeal to non-Muslims also. His colleague and friend Maulana Yaqub says : "The Maulana's frame of mind was naturally and essentially philosophical. Therefore to his mind came inadvertently only philosophical thoughts - even small things awakened in him the broadest philosophical principles capable to solve many such other issues."[1]

One of his disciple Hakim Mansoor 'Ali Khan gives his assessment of Nanautvi in the following words :

> "I have seen Maulana Mohd Qasim Nanautvi very well. I have also listened to his speeches and reflected on his ideas and personal merits.

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1. S.A. Palanpuri, pp.27-28.

His mind was even higher than the mind of those who were the compilers of philosophy. He had such a power to prove every problem of Shari'ah and to refute every issue of philosophy, contradictory to Islam through rational arguments that I have never seen another scholar of this calibre with such a power of reasoning and such a force of expression."[1]

Reason and rationalism in the Western World has been the inner spirit of all progressive thought termed as 'Modernism' which is often confused with Westernism. If seen in sociological perspective, this scientific outlook and rational approach characterised by modernism, which was due to dominate all academic developments throughout the world, needed a re-assessment of religious view also. In the case of Christianity it was the same old dilemma experienced by it earlier in medieval times also, which had produced but a dogmatic rationalization known as scholasticism, which had hardly anything to do with universal reason.

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1. Hakim Mansoor Ali Khan, Madhhab-e-Mansur, Vol.2, pp.176-78.

In the case of Islamic faith however, it presented no paradox or self-contradiction. For reason and religion in Islam are no two different things. This is even true in respect of Islamic faith and its corollaries. However it needed a genius capable of differentiating the real from the falacious, the right from the wrong and the good from the bad.

It was destined for Maulana Mohd Qasim Nanautvi to come up with this need of reassessing and re-interpreting the concepts of Islamic faith in a rational frame-work capable of being appreciated even by the un-believers.

His rational expositions can be devided mainly into three categories :

(1) Questions of Shari'ah. Many hundred of pages written by him are related to questions of Shari'ah involving an explanation of their rational bases such as the question of Riba (usuary) in India, the issue of Ridak, the commentary on last sections of Bukhari, the exegesis (Tafsir) of certain Surahs of the Holy Qur'an etc.

(2) Kalami discussions or rational statement of the issues of Islamic faith. It may be subdivided further into two kinds :

a) Single issues of faith, where the rational bases of a particular question or objection is brought out and explained.

b) Theorization of Islamic faith as a whole. This is where the ultimate genius of Maulana Mohd Qasim comes into full light and Islam as a 'reasoned faith' is profoundly explained.

Most of thess discussions which came under the last mentioned two categories are generally scattered in various books and Rasail. It is, however, painstakingly difficult to find out the discussion of a particular problem or question in these otherwise logically arranged writings. Still more difficult perhaps is the effort to get a broad spectrum or complete framework of his rational thought. This is because of the fact that most of his writings are without chapterization and sub-titles and other well-defined indications.

It was Imām Ghazzāli (1058-1111 AD) who raised al-Kalām to its highest level in the defence of Islām

against philosophy . Still greater contribution of Ghazzali, however, was that he laid the basis of a rational view of Islamic Faith which was essentially positive. But this positive view of al-Kalam is generally over-shadowed by his more elaborate and vocal refutation of philosophy, for which he is better known.

The time for a positive contribution in al-Kalam initiated by Ghazzali was not to come before the advent of 18th and 19th centuries when Shah Waliullah of Delhi and Maulana Mohd Qasim of Nanautah respectively revivified al-Kalam and gave it a new respectability and acceptance. They broadened its scope from the traditional view of rational defence of Islam to a more positive rational frame-work of Islam - where reason can be seen at work on both levels :

i) the comception of Islam as a society as elaborated by Shah Waliullah,

ii) the conception of Islam as a Faith as detailed by Maulana Mohd Qasim.

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C O N T E N T S

PART TWO : Contribution to al-Kalām :

ISLĀM —— THE RATIONAL FAITH

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T R A N S L I T E R A T I O N

Transliteration of Arabic Words and Names into Latin Characters.

Arabic Letter	Transliteration
ء	ʼ
ب	b
ت	t
ث	th
ج	j
ح	ḥ
خ	kh
د	d
ذ	dh
ر	r
ز	z
س	s
ش	sh
ص	ṣ
ض	ḍ
ط	ṭ
ظ	ẓ
ع	ʻ
غ	gh
ف	f
ق	q
ل	l
م	m
ن	n
و	w
ه	h

Short Vowels

فتحه	a
ضمّه	u
كسره	i

Long Vowels

آ	ā
اُو	ū
اِی	ī

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بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

F O R E W O R D

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I had seen during my early years at Deoband a number of discussions and efforts towards the need of editing and

publishing the works of Maulāna Nānautvi due to their special relevance to modern stress on reason and rationalism. I owe my initial interest, however, in his works during last few years to the repeated and brotherly motivations of Hakīm Sa'ūd Rashīd of Gangoh (a practising physician - Hakīm Ajmeri of Bombay) to study Maulāna Nānautvi's works and undertake a research on some aspect of them. A further incentive came from the learned discussions of Professor Amjad Ali in which he pointed out the basic importance of al-Kalām in Islāmic Sciences.

The ultimate realisation however of the relevance of Kalāmi thought to our day, dawned upon me while going through the Kalāmi expositions of the Maulāna himself. This required however a sort of concentration which was not possible with my usual duties and homely engagements - hence my decision to avail of Leave For Academic Pursuit for full one year, from Sep. 2, 1987 to Sep. 1, 1988.

It must be acknowledged that all this could still not have materialized but for the kind and continued co-operation of Miss Shāista 'Azīzālam, a calibrous student of Ph.D. who has recently submitted her M.Phil. dissertation (Role and Status of Women in Qur'an) under my supervision in the Department of

Islāmic Studies. Her unceasing co-operation in taking dictations, checking references and proofs etc. for hours together is not a debt to be repaid in any form of thankfulness, much less in words.

No less indebted I am to my children, particularly my elder daughter, Fāiza Sabāhat (12½ yrs) who at the cost of her sporting-time with dolls, sat with me for weeks and months innocently and patiently writing down my dictations - too high-sounding at times for her age to spell out even.

In this regard, I must give expression to my heartly-felt thankfulness to my brother's son, Mohd Fārūq Qāsmi, a student of M.Th. here (presently in U.S.A. on a teaching invitation from the Islāmic Centre of Orlando, Florida) who has been as helful and co-operative variously in this work as he has been interested in it.

It will be shere injustice - even ingrateful of me - not to mention my wife, 'Āisha Zeba, who provided me, to her complete disadvantage, with the mental peace and homely relief without which no external aid could have done any good.

In the end I must also express my deeply-felt thankfulness to Professor Akmal Ayyubi, Chairman, Department of

Islāmic Studies, for his kind encouragements and ready co-operation throughout this period.

My special thanks are due to Mr. Mohd. Akhlaque who, besides rough and fair typography of the manuscript, spared me very kindly many troubles by shouldering all responsibility of technical nature.

Last but not the least are those who go here un-named, yet their hearty encouragements, help and co-operation through word or deed has brought me inspiring moments of satisfaction and relief.

Aligarh, 10.9.1988. M. AZAM QASMI

PART - ONE :

PERSPECTIVE AND PERSONALITY

INTRODUCTION

1) Concept of Knowledge in Islām
2) al-Kalam and Mutakallimun
   a) Emergence of al-Kalam : Causes
   b) Early Sects
3) The Qur'an and the Mutakallimun
4) Mu'tazilism and Ash'arism
5) Scope of al-Kalam

INTRODUCTION

1. CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE IN ISLAM:

It is curiously interesting for a student of Islamic history to notice that the fountain of all rational thought in Islam has been its basic Faith, the most cardinal constituent of which are the concepts of Tawhid and Risalah. No less curious is the other realisation that the rich variety of all Islamic learning is directly or indirectly traceable to the incentives provided by the Holy Qur'ān — the word of God. This is why the authenticity of all rational, or ideological exposition throughout Islamic history has resided chiefly in its Faith as embodied in the Holy Qur'ān.

The cause of this curious observation is not hard to trace : reason and faith in Islam from the beginning have complemented[1] each other rather than contradicted. This is in clear distinction to the general view held in modern days that religion holds good only beyond the purview of reason.

In Qur'ān the urgings to a pursuit of inquisition and knowledge, incentives to promote reason and thought

1. S. Muzaffaruddin, Islamic Thought and Sources, p.35.

and the emphatic dictinction between the knowledgeable and the ignorant, are inter-spersed in almost every narrative of moral consequence and in the stresses of the uncompromising concept of oneness of God. The life of the Prophet of Islam and his "beautiful manners" (al-Uswah al-Hasanah) only reinforced the cause of reason and truth.

The foundation of rational Islamic thought practically was laid down as early as the revelation of the very first Āyah[1] of the Holy Qur'ān, the very first word of which was in the form of a divine injunction : Read, (Iqra'). This was a direct commandment to proceed on the path of knowledge. What was, however, more important still, was the basis of all learning and the ultimate objective of all knowledge. The next few words clearly lay down this basis and explicitly set forth the objective in the broadest terms :

"Read ! in the name of your Sustainer Who created"[2]. These words with their surprising brevity stress that the awareness of God, the Sustainer, is the basis of all training and instruction, while the knowledge of this Creation as a means to cognition of the Creator is the

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1. S. Muzaffaruddin, p.29
2. al-Qur'ān, 96:1

ultimate objective. The knowledge in Islam thus is not an end in itself but a means to the cognition of truth.

This broad framework of Islamic concept of knowledge came through the course of later medieval centuries in most of the Muslim lands and communities, to be confined to pursuing mainly the theological studies — which alone were considered as the basis and objective of all real knowledge. This limited and narrow view practically excluded from the scope of human reason and inquisition, all study of this Creation as the manifestation of divine wisdom. Moreover this confined view also precluded from its purview, the study of man — the supreme creature perhaps. Lately, however, the situation is changing for the better and the Muslim mind is in the process of re-Islamization of its vision.

The early phase of Islam witnessed for more than three centuries an overall development of learning, representing the broad Islamic outlook in conformity with the Qur'ānic Concept. This can be seen in the fact that the continued pursuit of knowledge in the very first century of Hijrah gave momentum to a process of strati-

fication of learning which became more specialised and discipline - oriented, in the forms of <u>Hadith</u>, <u>Tafsir</u>, <u>Fiqh</u>, <u>Sirah</u> and History, <u>Rijal</u>, <u>Kalam</u>, Arabic Grammar and literature in the following centuries.

A variety of questions, problems and controversies were always there to urge and induce the learned into deeper and further investigation. In addition to those disciplines which sprang forth spontaneously from Islam and the Muslim society itself, this milieu of inquisition soon introduced the Muslim mind with the rather more exotic and temporal subjects of learning like philosophy, medicine, astronomy, mathematics, logic etc.[1]

<u>Classification of Reasoning and al-Kalam</u>:

Reasoning to enquire the knowledge of God, has been divided by Muslim scholars broadly into two categories — exoteric and esoteric - depending on the external or internal method.. The former method is based on affirmation while the latter on negation. Likewise the object of the former method is acquisition of knowledge of God whereas the aim of the latter is attainment to God.[2]

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1. Umar Farrukh, <u>Tarikh Fikr al-Arabi</u>, (Beirut, 1962), pp. 183-88.

2. S. Muzaffaruddin, p.4.

In the exoteric method of reasoning we keep on affirming a cuase for every phenomenon we can think of, then affirming a cause for that cause also and so on. The affirmation of causes one after the other continues till we reach the Final Cause which has no cause for its existence. The self-existing cause is called God.

On the other hand, the esoteric method seeks to eliminate every phenomenon of existence which is faulty and defective. This process continues till a stage of existence is reached which is free from all defects. This Perfect and Independent Being is named God.[1] The esoteric method has been still more enlarged through intuitionalism under the name of Tasawwuf.

The exoteric reasoning method was further classed as :

i) Hikmat (Philosophy Proper)

ii) al-Kalām (Rationalism)

The latter then can be sub-devided into :

a) Mu'tazilism (Reasonism)

b) Ash'arism (Revelationism).[2]

1. Ibid, pp.4-5.

2. Ibid.

Hikmat or philosophy's objective is to attain to truths concerning fundmental questions of life, world, soul and God — through rational and universally acceptable arguments whether these arguments and inferences conform to religious dogmas or not. The Hukamā (Muslim philosophers) however, maintain that philosophical truths and inferences invariably conform to the principles of Islam.[1]

On the other hand the purpose of al-Kalām is to attain to truths in a way compatible with the laws of Islam. The Hukama (Muslim philosophers) also reach the same goal with the difference that they do not proceed with this presumptioon from the beginning as the Mutakallimun do. The difference between Mu'tazilism and 'Ash'arism is that the former gives prominence to reason and the latter to revelation. Hence, we have differentiated between them as Reasonism and Revelationism.[2]

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid, pp.5-6. Muzaffruddin has differentiated between the rational methods of Mu'tazilah and Ashā'irah as Rationalism and Scholasticism respectively. But both of the terms involve many complications. Therefore, I have replaced them by Reason-ism and Revelation-ism, which seem more appropriate.

2. ILM AL-KALĀM AND MUTAKALLIMUN:

Meaning and Historical Origin:

The word al-Kalam during the Abbasid period began to be widely used. It does not seem to have been used in the Umayyad period in the sense of an independent discipline. In those days, however, any sentence or saying bearing logical or rational style - be it verbal or in writing - was technically called among the Arabs as Kalām, particularly in the field of theology while the speaker of it was known as a Mutakallim. Gradually, in place of individual sayings this word came to be applied to the whole system.[1]

In this regard generally two explanations are given. Ibn-Khallikan writes "Due to there being great controversy regarding Kalām (word) of God during the Abbasid age and related as it was to Islamic Faith, therefore, it came to be called al-Kalam."[2] But this does not appear to be correct explanation. Shahrastani gives the better and correct explanation, "Either that the word (Kalām) of God became a subject of great controversy, therefore it became

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1. De Boer, Tarikh-e-Falsafa-e-Islam, Urdu Tr. by S.Abid Husain, p.41.

2. Shibli Naumani, Ilm al-Kalām, pp.35-36

the name of all such controversies also. Or that this discipline was invented to face and refute Philosophy, therefore, the name of logic - a branch of Philosophy - was given to this subject, as Mantiq (logic) and Kalām are synonyms in Arabic language."[1]

The basic difference of approach between Mu'tazilah and Muhaddithūn gradually changed the basic connotation of al-Kalām, which in this controversy of reason and revelation came to be applied generally to Mu'tazilah. Hence, the dislike of this word among the circles of Muhaddithun.[2]

As for the principles governing this branch of Islamic learning - Ilm al-Kalām -, Shahrastāni (d. 1153 A.D.) defines al-Kalām and its objects as follows :

> "The subject of Ilm al-Kalām is the principles and doctrines (usūl) whereas the subject of Ilm al-Fiqh is the subsidiary issues (Furu'). Thus, every thing which is rational and is reached through reflection and reasoning belongs to the principles, while everything which is grasped

1. Shahrastāni, al-Milāl w- al-Nihāl, pp.32-33
2. Ilm al-Kalām, pp.36-38.

> through analogy and reckoning belongs to the subsidiary class."[1]

The subject of Ilm al-Kalām, according to Ibn Khaldun, is,

> " the rational argumentation through reasoning to defend or keep up the belief system of Shari'ah so that doubts may be removed and bid'āt (innovations) may be eliminated."[2]

Causes of Emergence of Ilm al-Kalam:

The evolution of society and polity as well as the development of learning and thought in Islam was bound to give rise to controversies also.

During the life-time of the Prophet (P.B.U.H.) and the first two caliphs, no controversy - political or otherwise - could gain strength capable of cracking the lines of the believers.[3] But the subsequent Muslim differences, particularly in political life, effected irrepairable cleavages in their ranks. It is rather difficult to say

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1. Shahrastani, al-Milal w- al-Nihal, p.51.
2. Ibn Khaldun, Miqaddima, p.466.
3. Ahmad Amin: Duha al-Islam, V.III, pp.1-2; Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddima, p.463.

whether the sword led to the raging controversies or the controversial issues resulted in the drawing of swords. However, it can be said with certainty that the use of sword confirmed and sanctified political sectarianism.

No doubt it turned out the greatest single factor in creating a milieu of theological controversies and polemical debates which made possible the emergence of the science of reason or Ilm al-Kalam.[1] However, many other factors and historical forces were working together in this direction which, in spite of their importance, were not as visible.

Various factors — internal and external both — contributed in the development of Ilm al-Kalam. The internal factors relate mainly to the holy Qur'ān, the nature of Islam and Muslim themselves. The external factors were the influences which came from different religions and cultures other than Islam.

Internal Factors:

a) In addition to its call towards unity of God and prophecy etc., the Qur'an addressed itself also to the

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1. Fajr al-Islam (Urdu Tr.) V.II, pp.710-20.

religions prevailing during its period of revelation, and rejected and refuted many of their ideas. Such as those who denied Godhead and prophecy and said : " nothing can destroy us except the time "[1]. The Qur'ān refuted them with various arguments.

In the same way it also challenged and rejected the ideas of Mushrkūn. For instance, those who believed in the godhead of stars, the sun or the moon.[2] Likewise those who speak of Godhead in Jesus Christ were rejected and refuted at various places in Qur'ān.[3]

The Qur'an likewise refuted those who believed in and worshipped the Idols, and associated them with God. Similarly, those who did not believe in the Day of Resurrection,[4] have been warned of their ultimate and eternal doom. Moreover, God commanded the Prophet to go ahead with his message and argue with them keeping the best of manners.[5]

It was in the nature of things then that the Muslim 'Ulama also took the same route and argued with their

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1. al-Qur'ān 45:24
2. al-Qur'ān 6:76
3. al-Qur'ān 3:59
4. al-Qur'ān, 21:104.
5. al-Qur'ān, 16:125

opponents in accordance with the kind of argumentation directed towards them. They even had to renew and revise their rational views under the weight of changing questions and emphasis etc. All these helped Ilm al-Kalam to emerge.[1]

b) Islam in the beginning was a simple and strong Faith where the eyes were directed to the basics of Islam. But as the Muslims became free from their conquests and prosperity came to them from all around, they settled down thinking and theorising in different sphers of interest. The emerging issues of faith began to be tinted with academic and philosophical colouring. Questions like which of the two — pre-destination or free will — is ultimately the Islamic concept, or how to harmonize between the two concepts both of which occur in the Qur'ān, became a focus of thought and debate.[2] In the same way in the Qur'an, there are two kinds of verses : Muhkamāt and Mutashābihāt. The former are clearcut whereas the latter are ambiguous in their meaning. Although the Qur'ān itself has stressed [3] that the meaning of the latter kind of verses is not known but to God alone, yet theese verses became in

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1. Duha al-Islam, V. III, pp.1-2.
2. Cf. al-Qur'an, 2:6; 4:165 . See
. Duha al-Islam, V.III, pp.2-4; Ilm al-Kalām, p.21
3. al-Qur'an 3:7.

the course of time a focal point of controversy between the literalists and the rationalists.[1]

c) Political Controversy : perhaps the greatest of the controversies produced by the internal conditions of Muslim society was the issue of Khilafat. The Prophet had not left any clear instructions as to who will succeed him as the leader of the community or what would be the mechanism governing the issue of succession.[2]

Today we shall regard it as a pure political problem. It was so because Islam did not restrict the Muslims to a definite form of government only. The only restriction for the Muslims was to keep in view before taking any decision the common weal of the community.[3] Thus, if there appeared any controversy in the selection or election of a Khalifah it was obviously a political difference.

During that period things were not as clearly defined as today. The parties did not take this kind of pure political form. All issues were coloured with a strong religious tint and every political party soon

1. A.A. Duha al-Islam, V.III, p.3.

2. Umar Farrukh, Tarikh Fikr al-Arabi, pp.145-46; Ilm al-Kalam, pp.25-27

3. Tarikh Fikr al-'Arabi, pp.145-46.

turned into religious sect. It adopted or was given a name pointing to its sectarian faith instead to its political origin,[1] like Shia, Khawarij, Murjiah etc.

In place of arguing on the basis of the consequences of their actions in respect of public interest or harm, they argued in terms of Kufr and Imān, paradise and hell.

In fact the early sects were political parties each of which was sure that the truth lies with it. One party was confident that Ali was the best of people so as to be the Khalifah of the community, the other saw that Mu'âwiyah was the most suitable Muslim for this purpose, still another was of the view that neither this nor that — rather there was no need of any Khilafat. If at all, then, the best of men should be chosen, though he be a negroid Muslim. A forth of these parties did not enter this controversy fearing that it would only strengthen the raging conflict.[2] In this way these political controversies shortly afterwards changed into sectarian faiths and provided the early bases of Ilm al-Kalam.

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1. Duha al-Islam, V.III, pp.4-5.

2. These parties respectively were the Shias, the Umayyads, Khawarij and Murji'ah.

d) Added to this was another important factor. As is seen in every war-fare, there were certain clever and artful individuals who took full advantage of the fact that the slogan of defence of Faith facinated the people more than the slogan of public welfare. Such persons then made the best of this situation and provoked the sentiment which led to drawing of the swords in the name of Faith.[1] Thus, those who did not have any fear of God went ahead to even fabricate Hadiths in case they did not find any thing which suited their ends.[2] Therefore, the political difference was the greatest among the factors responsible for religious dissension and for promoting the sectarian trends. It was transformed into theological controversy regarding the very definition of Iman and Kufr, Kabīrāh and Saghirah as well as the position of the one who committed a Kabirah. These controversies were carried from the principles on to the corollaries of faith and law - producing ultimately an independent sect which differed from others in principle and detail both.[3]

External Factors:

a) A number of those who embraced Islam during

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1. Duha al-Islam, V.III, pp.6-7; Fajrul Islam (Urdu Tr.), V.II, pp. 717 & 758-60 & pp. 602-13.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

and after the period of Muslim conquests hailed from different religious and cultures like Jews, Christians, Zoroastraians, Sābīs, Hindūs, the materialists etc. These people had the training of their earlier religions and culture ingrained in their heart and mind as they were brought up in their respective societies. Among those who had replaced their faith by Islam were raised questions and problems which derived strength from their former faith.[1] Among them were many scholars also who gave these questions and problems an Islamic look as they interpreted them in Islamic light. This is how we find in books dealing with sectarian beliefs, such views as are totally alien to Islam, like the views of Ahmad Ibn Hā'it or that of Ahmad Ibn Ayyub bin Mānūs concering transmigration of souls or the views about Jesus Christ, having the semblance of Christians Faith.[2]

b) Another important factor was the study of the rationalist basis and arguments of the non-Muslim opponents for polemical purposes. This can be seen in the case of Mu'tazilah whose chief objective was not only to propagate Islam but also reject and refute the argumentation put

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1. S. Muzaffaruddin, p.7.
2. Shahrastāni, Kitab al-Milal w-al-Nihal, pp.76-79

forward by their opponents or non-Muslim scholars in the defence of their faith. This led the Mu'tazilites towards studying extensively the view, beliefs and arguments of their religions and religious sects. These polemical debates and studies raised new questions and required deeper contemplation, providing thereby wider grounds for the development of Ilm al-Kalām.[1]

At the same time it should be realised that some of the religions particularly Judaism and Christianity were already equipped by Greek philosophy. Felon the Jew (25 BC - 50 AD) was among the first who tried to philosophize the Jewish religion at Alexandria. Likewise Clemon the Alexandrian (Born 150 AD) and Oregeon (185-254) pioneered to blend Christianity with neo-Platonism and a number of Nestorian Christains followed their path.[2] The Mu'tazilite contact with Nestorians compelled them to study their rational basis. This became an important reason for the growth of Islamic rationalism.[3]

c) In order to keep with their opponent on rational grounds the Mutakallimun were forced to study Greek philosophy and logic. Thus, a number of Mu'tazilites

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1. Duha al-Islām, V.III, pp.7-8.
2. Duha al-Islām, V.III,p.8; Tarikh Falsafa-e-Islām, pp. 22-24, 40-41.
3. Ibid.

during the Abbasid period such as al-Nazzam, Abu al-Huzail al-Allaf and others studied Aristotle and refuted him on many questions. Many of the Mu'tazilites are seen during this period using terms like essence, contingence, motion, generation, the sole essence etc. which came directly from Greek Philosophy and became part and parcel of the debates among the Mutakallimun.[1]

All these factors - inernal and external ultimately made possible the emergence of Ilm al-Kalām and established it as an independent discipline. Therefore, to say that it is a pure Islamic learning which is not influenced by Greek and other philosophies will be to deny the historical growth of this discipline. Similarly, to regard Ilm al-Kalām as having been born of Greek philosophy will be equally wrong as Islām itself is the source and pivot of this discipline.[2] Moreover, the argumentation of Mutakallimun is essentially based on the verses of Qur'ān and on its interpretations.

The truth, therefore, is that al-Kalām is a discipline mixed by both of these elements. But the Islamic identity in that is far more powerful than the Greek identity which is related more to the form and phraseology.[3]

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1. Ilm al-Kalām, pp.36, 40; Shahrastāni, pp.67-74.
2. Duha, V.III, p.9.
3. S. Muzaffaruddin, p.37.

The Muslims during the early period of Islam did not entertain any controversies. They seldom indulged in debates in so far as the tenets of Islam were concerned.[1] This harmony of Faith and practice however, could not continue for long. The expansion of Islam and new converts from different societies led to give rise to many questions and discussions which caused discords and dessensions. The Muslim scholars sensed the gravity of the situation and responded to the emerging needs. As a result a number of sciences came into being such as commentary, jurisprudences, theology grammar, rhetoric etc. All this learning was directly and closely connected with the Holy Qur'ān, and turned out very helpful to the Muslim people to understand the implications and the meaning of the Qur'ān. But then at the same time it also opened the door of academic and other controversies. The political interests and alignments were highly nourished on academic development. As a result increasing political dissent found its best expression in sectarian debates.

The Early Kalami Sects:

Shahrastani (1083 - 1153 A.D), sums up the main issues of controversy in respect of Islamic faith in the following

1. Duha, V.III, p.14.

four points :

(1) Human Will, Whether man has liberty of choice and volition or not, i.e. freedom in the choice of his actions.

(2) Attributes of God, i.e. whether God has attributes or not and if so whether they are part of his essneces or different from it.

(3) Beliefs and actions, i.e. whether human actions are part of his faith or separate from it.

(4) Reason and Revelation, i.e. whether the human reason is subject to revelition or otherwise, which of them is the critarion of truth.[1]

The first of these questions was closely connected with Muslim political life and therefore, it became the cause of serious debate and rift, for it raised the question of freedom of choice. There was even before the advent of Islam wide-spread belief in Fatalism or Pre-destinarianism that every-thing is pre-determined and man lives and does - be it good or bad - as a tool in the hands of God.[2]

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1. Muzaffaruddin, pp.11-12; Shahrastani, al-Milal w- al-Nihal, a quoted by Muzaffaruddin, pp.11-12.
2. Muzaffaruddin, p.13.

On the other hand, another section of humanity, though a relative minority, believed in the absolute liberty of human action holding that God has given man power and freedom and it is up to him to use or misuse them.[1]

Both of these theories have their own merits and demerits and represent extremes or contradictory positions. But there may also be an intermediary course between the two extremes. The Qur'an confirms and verifies the unlimited powers of God and at the same time recognizes partial freedom and responsibility of human individual.[2]

Those who are wel-versed in Islamic learning or who have familiarised themselves with Islamic spirit cannot fail to grasp the Qur'ānic idea. The apparent conflict of Qur'ānic verses, however, led some in Islamic history to stress what was in fact their own inclination towards Fatalism or Human Liberty and not the Qur'ānic idea.[3] In between the two kinds of Qur'ānic verses, e.g. :

> "And He pardons whom He will
> and punishes whom He will,
> inasmuch as God is a Supreme Being." 2:49

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid, pp.13-14.
3. Cf. between verses 24:45, 2:49, 16:77 and the verses 10:108, 4:4, 13+27.

and

> "So whoever follows the right path, does so for his own good, and whoever goes astray, bears on himself the responsibility (of going astray)." 10:108

there emerges a third view, distinct from both extremes. That God is beyond all doubt the Supreme Sovereign, but human beings too have been given some discretion so as to be able to make choice between good and evil, harmful and beneficial, right and wrong.[1]

The school of thought known as <u>Jabr</u> or pre-destinarianism was founded by Jahm bin Safwan who held that man has no freedom of will and liberty of volition and action. He is absolutely helpless. The other view of a sub-sect of Jabriyyah according to Shahrastani is relatively moderate : that man has got ability which is however, not effective. Obviously the Jabriyyah ignored and based their stand on the verses asserting absolutism of Divine Will.[2]

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1. Ibid, pp. 15-16.
2. Shahrastnai, pp.108-112.

The Qadriyyah represented the opposite view and based it on Qur'ānic verses related to human freedom of discretion, ignoring the other verses about the divine sovereign powers. As a school of thought, it was initiated by Ma'bad al-Jahani. The extremists in this school held that man has unqualified discretion in the choice of good and evil and right and wrong.[1] Ma'bad al-Jahani had to pay dearly for his views and was executed in 80 A.H. (699 A.D) at the instance of Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān. The school was carried forward afterwards by Ghilān al-Dimashqi who further expounded that Īmān neither increases nor decreases. He also spoke like Ma'bad, about Qur'ān as created word of God. He was stopped short of his theorizations by Umar bin Abdul Aziz and ultimately executed at the behest of Hishām bin Abd al-Malik in 724.[2]

After a prolonged polemical war, the two schools of Jabr and Qadr finally merged with each other at the instance of the former regarding the question of free-will. Henceforth the Jabriyyah however was better known as Mushabbihah or Resemblists, ie. those who resembled attributes of God to

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1. Ibid, p.20
2. Umar Farrukh, pp.152-53.

those of man.[1] The Qadris withstood all repressive measures to become finally the Mu'tazilah or reasonists of Islamic history.

Basra and Kufah during the Umayyad period had become the centres of Ahl al-Rai' [2] from whose ranks emerged most of the Mutakallimum. It should ke kept in mind that in the first place, there was no difference between Muhaddithun Ahl al-Rai or Murji'ah. It was only in the second place that according to their Ijtihād (personal judgement) they took to a particular outlook known as rai', irja etc. Basra came under greater lime-light due to the presence there of Imam Hasan Basari. The Imam was well-versed in Islamic learning. He was as ascetic in trend as rationalistic in his speculation. He was respected greatly in Basra and large number of people assembled around him in the great mosque of Basra every day to listen to his lectures.

One day, when the Imam was about to answer a question put to him regarding the position of a man committing a major sin, one of his disciples Wāsil bin 'Atā came forward

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1. Muzaffaruddin, p.21.

2. Ahl al-Rai' (people of Opinion) were those who relied on Qiyas (analogy) and decided cases of Fiqh through the exercise of their rai' (personal opinion in the light of Shari Qiyas, however is the fourth and final source of Fiqh afte Qur'an, Hadith and Ijma.

and said : " Such a man is neither a believer nor an un-believer, but he should be ranked in an intermediate stage. "[1] Having said this Wasil seceded from his teacher's circle and began to express his own views. The Imam then said ' Itazala 'Anna ' (He seceded from us). From then on, Wāsil and his circle were named as Mu'tazilah and their views as Mutazilism (Secession).

The main participants thus among whom Kalāmi debates during Umayyad period dragged on were Khawārij, the Shi'as, Qadriyyah and Jabriyyah. About the last decades of Umayyad period the Jabriyyah lost their identity to Qadriyyah,[2] but the trend of Jabr (Fatalism) persisted in other forms. Like-wise, Qadriyyah views were also dissolved only to take the new form of I'tizāl.[3] Just as in between Khawarij and Shias was the moderating position of Ahl al-Sunnāh w- al-Jamā'ah regarding the issue of Khilafat and Imamat, in the same way, on the issue of Fatalism and Free-will, was the position of Murji'ah in between Qadriyyah and Jabriyyah.

Murji'ah has been derived from 'Irja' - postponement (of judgement). In the raging controversy of the position

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1. Umar Farrukh, p.156.
2. Muzaffaruddin, p.21.
3. Ibid, p.22.

of a man committing a major sin, the position of the Umayyad Caliphs vis-a-vis the Shi'as, Hashimites and the Khawārij or the position of the controversy between pre-destinarianism and free-will, the stand of Murji'ahs was that of postponement of all judgement till the Day of Judgement.

They held for instance that Imān or Faith is the verification at heart whereas translating it into action is not an essential part of the definition of faith. Hence all Muslims seem to have perfect faith whether they act accordingly or not. We must postpone then the judgement till the Last Day.[1]

In other words they preferred for themselves an impartial position in respect of all burning questions and controversies. One of the important reasons of this attitude on their part was that the Murji'ahs generally belonged to the class of serious academicians who did not want to involve themselves in such controversies as might result in a crisis between them and the rulers.[2]

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1. Duha, V.III, pp.316-19. As a corollary to this they also held as against Mu'tazilah and Khawārij that Imān does not increase or decrease and that the one who committed a major sin would not deserve eternal hell, for after all he was a believer.

2. Ibid, pp.324-27.

In the political controversies, their stand was (i) we accept and obey Banu Umayyah rulers for they are the Caliphs. (ii) we do not fight them because we believe that however great a sin may be it does not extrude a Mu'min from Imān. As long as a man is Mu'min, killing him is not lawful.[1]

3. QUR'ĀN AND MUTAKALLIMŪN:

Different Styles:

At this stage we must pause for a while to appreciate the characteristic style of the Mutakallimūn vis-a-vis the style of the holy Qur'ān. In fact they have a rationalistic style which does not seem to agree with the style of the Qur'ān, the Prophet and that of the Companions.[2] Equally the rationalistic style of the Mutakallimūn does not appear to complement or reconcile with the reasoning style of the philosophers. This is because a Mutakallim looks up to the universe in order to argue for the existence of God. His investigation mainly aims at discovering evidence for the

1. Tarikh Fikr al-'Arabi, p.151.
2. Duha al-Islām, V.III, p.15.

actions of the Creator. This is not in the case of philosophers who reflect over the creation and causality without any pre-conceptions, and try to correlate the chain of causes to reach a final conclusion, be it whatever it may.[1] In other words the stand of a Mutakallim is that of an advocate who investigates to secure evidence to prove his case. However, the position of a philosopher is like that of a judge who weighs all evidence available and reaches a final conclusion - his judgement.[2]

i) The Style of Qur'ān: The holy Qur'ān trusts in its message on human nature rather than human reason. Every human individual has in his nature ingrained the belief of the existence of a Supreme Power — the Creator of this World, who keeps it moving too. In this feeling or awareness or faith, all human individuals whatever their differences regarding the names and attributes of God, stand on equal footing, with no distinction of primitive and modern ignorant or educated.[3]

The holy Qur'an therefore, addresses all humanity trusting the human nature. The Qur'anic address and appeal

1. Ibn Khaldūn, p.466.
2. Ibid, p.18.
3. Duha al-Islām, V.III, p.11

is based on reinforcing and revitalizing this human sentiment. It aims to reform and purify it from all that has contaminated this sentiment, such as superstitions, irrational beliefs, partnership in Godhead, incarnation etc.[1]

God Almighty therefore is not only the Creator of man but of everything in this natural phenomena, we know and understand it or not. He is the cause of all existence, all life and all order manifesting itself in this Creation.[2]

The Holy Qur'ān throughout keeps up this style in its call of <u>Tawhīd</u>. In this regard the Qur'ānic arguments are mainly based on what it familiar and comes naturally to us. For example, it is not possible that one territory may be ruled simultaneously by two rulers. The Qur'ān makes it a basis of <u>Tawhīd</u> and declares that had there been more than one God the whole of this universe would have been but ruined.[3] In the same way the Qur'ān points to the unified whole of this creation where all the created beings or phenomena comply to the dictates of a unitarian system. Thus, there is nothing in this creation which does not bow

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1. Ibid.
2. al-Qur'ān 22:73; 80:24; 86:5; 3:191.
3. al-Qur'ān 21:22.

down to God and recite His hymns, though we may not understand the language of these hymns.[1] The might and wisdom of God have thus been explained and verified by the Qur'ān.

This style obviously takes care of the nature of man and nourishes the divine idea lying at the core of his heart, which aknowledges this call and often heeds to it also - even the heart of an athiest. This is indeed a style - characteristic to Qur'ān - which has its appeal not only for the common people but also for the scholarly and the enlightened. The holy Qur'an in its arguments does not rely on logical exposition,nor it makes use of such philosophical terms as essence and contingency. Nor it presents us to any intellectual dilemma or illogical dogmas. The Faith obviously is not meant for scholars alone or the masses only. The Qur'anic appeal thus is not limited to particular section of human beings.[2] It covers the humanity at large.

However, there are scattered in Qur'ān such verses also which present total ambiguity or apparent contradiction. For example, there are verses which clearly stress pre-destination whereas certain other verses seem to emphasize human

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1. al-Qur'ān 17:44
2. Duha al-Islam, V.III,p.13

free will. Therefore, the question arises how to harmonise between them or what is the ultimate direction of such verses. Moreover, there are verses which speak of divine face or hands or foot or divine throne etc. At the same time there are other verses which speak of God being far above from all conception of matter and form. Again the question is raised how to bring about harmony between them. Such verses have been termed by Qur'an itself as Mutashābihāt (the ambiguous). They became a subject of comtemplation and debate.[1]

As for the early Muslims they had complete faith in them and verified them without much questioning. They were sure that debating the possible meaning of the Mutashābihāt was not in the best interest of Muslim community. Nor the common people have the capacity to understand the deeper implications. Therefore, the best way for the Muslims at large is to believe in them in general.

A tradition of the Prophet reported by 'Ali says, " Speak to the people at the level they can understand. Do you want to falsify God and His Prophet ? "[2] Rabīah al-Rāi' was once asked the meaning of Istawā 'Al al-'Arsh. He

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1. Shibli Naumani: al-Kalam, p.276; Duha, V.III, pp.15-16. Ibn Khaldūn, p.462.

2. Duha al-Islam, V.III, pp.14-15.

replied, " The meaning of Istawā (sitting) is obvious, the state is incomprehensible. The prophecy is by God, the Prophet is responsible for preaching the message, and we are under obligation to verify. "[1] Likewise Mālik ibn 'Anas was asked the same question and his reply was, " The meaning of Istawā is plain. The state of it is incomprehensible, the faith in it is obligatory and the question about it is an innovation (bid'ah) "[2] This school of thought was headed during the Abbasid period by Ahmad ibn Hambal and during the later period by Ibn Taimiyyah who was the foremost among the leaders of this school.

ii) Style of Mutakallimun: But the style of the Mutakallimun, basically differed from this approach. Initially they believed in God and His word as revealed to the Prophet. However, here the similarity ends. They wanted to reinforce this faith by logical and intellectual arguments. Thus, they changed the position from the human sentiment and nature to speculation and reasoning in the phenomena of creation. To put it briefly the Mutakallimūn transported the whole thing from the heart to the mind.

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1. Ibid, p.15.
2. Ibid

Although they believed in Mutashābihāt as did others, yet they rearranged the Qur'ānic verses which speak of pre-destination and of free will and verses which speak of God in human terms or in terms of incorporeal Being. This they did with a view to harmonise between these conflicting verses. Thus, their main effort was to reconciliate rationally between reason and revelation. This rationalist approach led them to form independent opinions with regard to each question.[1] In this way the most important sphere of Ilm al-Kalam came to be recognised as interpretation of the holy Qur'an.

In the nature of things, this interpretation led some of them to take the stance of pre-destinarianism while others to take the stand of free-will. The Umayyads in their effort to vindicate their position of caliphate, hardly desirable for the large majority of Muslims, patronized generally the school of Jabr (pre-destinarianism) to the shere disadvantage of the opposite school. This is why these polemical controversies appear so marked in their intensity.[2]

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1. Muzaffaruddin, pp. 13-32; Fajr al-Islām (Urdu Tr.), V.II, pp.795-806: Duha, V.III, pp.15-16.

2. Muzaffaruddin, pp.18-19; 21, 30-31.

iii) al-Kalām and Muslim Philosophy: It must be mentioned here that between Ilm al-Kalām and Muslim Philosophy, there is a basic difference in so far as the growth of the two is concerned. The development of al-Kālam was rather gradual and it includes a number of issues which grew up in its historical folds. Some people raised a question, others differed and both attracted many others to their stand, giving rise to a new sect and so on. Thus, the question was raised about the one who committed a Kabīrah - as to whether he was a Kāfir or a Mu'min ? The Khawārij regarded him a Kafir, but the Mu'tazilah kept him in between the two extremes of Kufr and Īman.[1] In the course of time, new problems and questions emerged and new solution for them were evolved. This was not confined to al-Kalām only, the same holds true of Islamic jurisprudence, Arabic grammar etc.[2]

But the Muslim philosophy does not show this gradual development. Rather it presents almost a complete picture from the beginning. This is because the Muslim philosophers inherited Greek philosophy as a developed system which made possible for them to cut short the distance of gradual deve-

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1. Duha al-Islam, V.III, p.20.
2. Ibid.

lopment.[1] Thus, to this system of philosophy they added their own contribution of correlation, commentaries and independent opinion. Their main achievement was an effort of harmonization between Greek philosophy and issues of Islamic Faith.

This is why it is rather difficult to name the philosophy with which al-Kindī, al-Fārābi and Ibn - Sīna etc. were engaged as Islamic philosophy. Equally that is why Ilm al-Kalām is to be counted as an Islamic Science, as the basis and issues of faith in al-Kalām mainly come from Islam itself or more exactly from the Holy Qur'an.[2] This explains the resentment of Muhaddithūn during the early centuries against the 'Mutakallimun' - particularly the Mu'tazilah - whose faith came from Qur'ān no doubt, but their especial stress on reson and rationalism opened the door of un-restricted speculation. It weakened their relation with the holy Qur'ān and Sunnah, and brought them closer to Greek system of thought.[3] It must be recognized however, that they were essentially the champions of Qur'ān rather than philosophy - Greek or otherwise.

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1. De Boer, Tarikh Falsafa-e-Islām (Urdu Tr.), p.27
2. Ḍuha al-Islām, V.III, p.20
3. Umar Farrukh, p.260.

The hostile relations between Muslim philosophers and Mutakallimun are related essentially to this difference of approach - for instance between Ibn Rushd and Ghazāli.

4. MU'TAZILISM AND ASH'ARISM:

A - Mu'tazilism (Reasonism):

Mu'tazilah's doctrines on which are based all their views and polemical discussions are mainly as follows:

1) Principle of Tawhīd: God is one, single and Eternal and that He has no attributes, as it contradicts the divine unity. As a corollary of this principle, they denied the attribute of Kalām (word of God). Hence, their view that Qur'ān is not eternal but created.[1]

2) Principle of Adl: God is Just only and cannot be unjust so as to enjoin for evil and then punish for that. Therefore, man is free in his actions and choice and hence he merits punishment and reward.[2]

3) Principle of Wa'd and Wa'īd: i.e. divine promise and threat. This principle as is apparent is related with

1. Muzaffaruddin, pp.40-42; Duha, V.III, pp.22-44.
2. Umar Farrukh, pp.164-65; Duha, V.III, pp.44-64.

the principle of 'Adl (equity).[1]

4) Principle of 'Aql (Reason): The judgement of reason has priority over revelation in case of conflict.[2]

5) Principle of Intermediary position: (al-Manzilah Bain al-Manzilatain): According to this principle a Muslim committing a major sin,[3] is neither a Mu'min nor a Kāfir. He is in between Kufr and Imān.

These were the five basic principles on which was built up the edifice of Mu'tazilism which according to them distinguished the truth from non-truth. It appears that all these principles came to be evolved not at one time and by a single man. Wāsil bin 'Atā, however, pointed to all five of them as " the principles ". Nazzam later reduced them to three, i.e. the principle of Tawhid, Adl, Wa'd and Wa'id.[4]

Towards the close of the Umayyad period the Mu'tazilite school gained strong ground, particularly under Yazid II, the son of Walid II (743 - 44 A.D.).[5] In 750 A.D., the Umayyads were replaced by the Abbasid dynasty and the Persian influence

1. Duha, V.III, pp.61-64.
2. Ibid, pp.64-67; Umar Farrukh, pp.164-65.
3. Umar Farrukh, pp.163-65.
4. Ibid, p.164.
5. Muzaffaruddin, pp.30-31.

became pre-dominant in the Abbasid Court and the Muslim Society. The second Caliph Abu Jafar al-Mansoor (754-776) was rather liberal and advocated freedom of thought and the doctrine of free-will. He was however, not a Mu'tazilite in the true sense of the word, though Mu'tazilism was indirectly aided by him when he arranged for the translation into Arabic of certain philosophical works from Greek language.[1]

The influence of Mu'tazilah views continued to widen under the patronage of the Burmakids.[2] Unlike his father, Haroon al-Rashid did not favour rationalist views though he was forced to change his policy towards <u>al-Kalām</u> under the pressure of circumstances, as cited above.

It was about this time that <u>al-Kalām</u> found strong support through the learning of Abu al-Huzail al-'Allaf and Ibrāhīm bin Sayyar al-Nazzām. The former wrote a number of books on the refutation of Zindiqs, Dualists and Materialists. He was known for his vast knowledge of religious learning and eloquence.[3] Likewise al-Nazzām, a pupil of Abu al-Huzail, was well-versed in his knowledge of Greek philosophy and

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1. Ibid, p.31.
2. Ilm al-Kalām, pp.40-41.
3. Ibid, pp.38-40.

scriptures of other religions.

During the reign of al-Mamun, i'tazal (i.e. Mu'tazil-ism) was raised to the status of state-religion and the door of philosophical discussion was pushed wide open. Mu'tasim and Wathiq after al-Mamun continued the patronage of this rationalistic school. Afterwards, however, almost all the Abbasid Caliphs were opposed to Mu'tazilah school and gradually therefore it was doomed to extinction inasmuch as its propagation and popularity was concerned. On academic level, however, a number of Qur'ānic commentaries were produced in the fourth and fifth centuries of Hijrah on the basis of Mu'tazilite principle. The only Tafsīr of Mu'ta-zilite surviving from this period is al-Kashshāf of Zamakhshari (d. 1119). He is the first to give way to rhetorics in Tafsīr.[1] In this it is held in great esteem.

B - 'Asha'rism (Revelationism):

Contrasted to Mu'tazilism was Asha'rism which came into being as a reaction to the former. The section among the Muslim scholars, generally referred to as Muhadddithun was opposed in principle to the rationalistic school of Mu'tazilah. In

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1. Ibid, pp.47-48

addition to their stress on revelation and strict adherence to Qur'ān and Hadīth they held that the Mu'tazilite principles due to the pre-dominance of reasonism were rather abstract to understand for the common Muslims.[1] They feared that this trend would only lead the Muslim masses to think that religion is not as binding as it is considered, and they would rid themselves of its control. This will only promote irreligious even immoral outlook and practice. There is no denying of the fact that the apprehension was not altogether unfounded. In fact the rationalistic approach of Mu'tazilah might have satisfied a small elite among the Muslims, but it was too abstract for the Muslims at large.[2]

Added to this was another factor. The reign of persecution initiated by Abbasid al-Mamun for promoting 'Itizal and suppressing all other thought antagonised the Muslim divines still more. The Muslim public who found more solace amidst the Muhaddithun and other divines also looked towards the Mu'tazilah with dislike. The Abbasid Caliph al-Mamun might have been an advocate of rationalism and free thinking, but eventually he became himself the greatest cause and means of intolerence and suppression of all freedom of thought.[3]

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1. Muzaffaruddin, p.53
2. Ibid
3. Ibid, pp.52-53.

A third factor towards making a reaction imminent was the emergence of a group of rationalist schools known as Ikhwān al-Safā or Brethern of Sincerity. Their object perhaps was to harmonize among various conflicting schools of thought in Islām and other religions as well[1] as they worked and held discussions in full secrecy to avoid displeasure of one school or the other. With their objective of reconciling reason with revelation they composed a number of treatises — fifty-one in total — on burning topics of their day.[2] They managed to circulate them among Muslims of various views and schools. Their rationalist approach aimed at harmonizing between the "conservatism of the theologians and the abstractism of the Mu'tazilites to a point where they could meet".[3]

These three factors taken together prepared the ground for a reactionary movement, which was initiated by Imām Abu al-Hasan 'Ali al-Ash'ari. Himself a disciple of the renowned Mu'tazilite teacher al-Jubbai, he declared his renunciation of Mu'tazilism while about 40 years of age and became the champion of the cause of Muhaddithūn.[4] Al-'Ash'ari (874-942 AD) had assimilated and mastered all Mu'tazilite learning and

1. Umar Farrukh, pp.293-94
2. Muzaffaruddin, pp.53-54
3. Ibid
4. Umar Farrūkh, p.249.

logic, which he directed afterwards against Mu'tazilah themselves. About the same time, two other Muslim scholars of jurisprudence were treading the same path as al-'Ash'ari was. They were Ahmad al-Ṭaḥāvi (d. 940) in Egypt and Abu Mansūr al-Māturidi (d. 944) in Samarqand. But Imām al-'Ash'ari far exceeded them in fame and influence both.[1]

1) He declared that the attributes of God are neither included in His Essence nor excluded. Rather they are co-eternal with Him. This was in fact an intermediary course between Mu'tazilah who denied divine attributes, and the Sifātiyyah who spoke of independent attributes.[2]

2) Human beings live a pre-destined life. The good and evil both belong to the will of God. The Ash'arites substituted human free-will by Kasb i.e. human power of earning or acquisition of what is pre-destined.[3]

3) That the holy Qur'ān and every part of it is uncreated and eternal.[4]

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1. Umar Farrukh, p.250.
2. Muzaffaruddin, p.57; Ibn Khaldun, pp.462-65
3. Umar Farrukh, p.252.
4. Ibid.

4) That all the duties commanded belong to revelation and as such are binding.[1]

5) That all things concerning ghaib (the unknown) like paradise, hell, Sirāt etc. given through the divine word for belief are true and exist as stated.

6) That Khilafat is a responsibility and a matter of Muslim choice.[2]

7) That faith is a verification at heart. Thus, who verifies at heart the unity of God, the prophecy and its message, his faith is all right. A verbal affirmation and practice of the pillars of Islām is but sub-ordinate to this faith.[3]

Ilm al-Kalām did not find much ground in Spain where the study of philosophy and logic was rather dangerous.[4] Ibn Hazm Zāhiri (994-1064), however, gave a new turn to al-Kalām here. It was through him that Spain got the unique

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, p.253.
4. Umar Farrukh, pp.439-40.

distinction that Hadith and al-Kalām both were brought together.[1] He wrote more than 400 books which run in about 80,000 pages. He has been held as one of the few greatest geniuses and most fertile minds of Islāmic history. In al-Kalām, he wrote two books. One on a comparative study of the Old and New Testament. The other is entitled al-Fasl fi al-Milal w- al-Ahwa w- al-Nihal.[2] This is the first - ever book written on the subject of comparative religion dealing with the principles of faith of different religions and then refuting them on rational level.[3]

Decline of al-Kalām:

The development of al-Kalām from almost the end of the third century of Hijrah onwards is mainly the story of 'Ash'arism which had consolidated the stand of the Muhaddithun and the Muslim divines. It became also a source of satisfaction for the Muslims in general.[4] The culmination point of Ilm al-Kalām was reached finally in Imām Ghazzāli, in whose writings the very framework of Ilm al-Kālam was almost entirely changed.[5] For although he supported the 'Ash'arite

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1. Ilm al-Kalām, p.50
2. Ibid. ; P.K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, p.558
3. Ilm al-Kalām, p.50
4. Umar Farrukh, p.252.
5. Ibid, p.249.

doctrines yet he was of the view that it does not reveal the truth. Therefore, he wrote a number of books in which he explained the problems of Faith in a way different form that of 'Ash'arites, e.g. Jawāhar al-Qur'ān, Ma'ārij al-Quds, Maḍnūn etc.[1]

This new methodology and trend of al-Kalām after Imām Ghazzāli was carried forward by Muhammad bin Abd' al-Karīm Shahrastāni (1087-1153) who rose to the eminence of being called Afḍal al-Ulama. He renowned himself in hadīth, Fiqh as well as in Ilm al-Kalām in which he wrote a number of books. In the field of al-Kalām he wrote al-Milal w- al-Nihal in which he discussed elaborately the history of religious sects in Islām as also the history of Hukama (philosophers) particularly, the Greek philosophers.[2]

He was followed in this field by Imām Fakhr al-Din al-Rāzi (1149-1210 A.D.). Just as he was considered an Imām (leader) in Tafsir, Fiqh etc, so he was considered an Imām in the field of reason and philosophy, perhaps even greater.[3] His greatest contribution in al-Kalām like

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1. Ilm al-Kalām, p.58
2. Ibid
3. Umar Farrukh, pp. 441-42

Ghazali lies in the field of the refutation of philosophy. The most renowned among his books is the commentary of the Qur'ān popularly known as al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, in which the questions of faith and its many important problems have been rationally explained.[1] He names those who harmonize between revelation and reason, as Hukama-e-Islām and mentions them in esteem.[2]

The last important scholar in the field of al-Kalām was Abu' al Ḥasan 'Ali Saif al-Dīn Āmdi (1154-1234 A.D.). Although many others after him wrote a number of books in al-Kalām but often the problems of philosophy have been mixed up with questions of al-Kalām and both of these subjects have mostly been derived from Rāzi and Āmdi.[3]

The great calamity that befell the Muslim world in the form of Tartar invasion and devastations, brought a sudden end to all development of al-Kalām also. However, the growth and development apart, the propagation of 'Ash'arite system of thought continued till it was disseminated so widely in the Muslim World that all other systems were totally eclipsed.

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1. Ilm al-Kalām, pp.60-61
2. Ibid, pp.63-65.
3. Ilm al-Kalām, p.70; Ibn Khaldun, p.466.

5. SCOPE OF AL-KALĀM:

Qur'ān : the Source of al-Kalām:

This historical development of al-Kalām seems to give currency to the impression, that al-Kalām was initially the product of internal strife while in its wider dimensions was the result of Muslim mind's friction with non-Islāmic ideas.[1] This is true in so far as the historical growth of theological discussions is concerned.

It does not however, holds good inasmuch as the rationalist trend itself is concerned. This rationalist tendency is inherently present in Muslim society through its relation with the Holy Qur'ān. The rational view of Qur'ān is explicit even in such themes of Islamic Faith as unity and justice of God, prophecy, reward and punishment, individual accountability etc, not to speak of the Qur'ānic rational view of moral excellence, equality, piety, democratic spirit, acquisition of knowledge, status of women, laws of inheritence etc. At the same time it does not ignore the practical realities of human society in matters of rights and duties.

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1. Ilm al-Kalām, pp.19-20.

Were it not for this trend of reason and rationalism ingrained in Qur'ānic verses even in matters of faith, it is difficult to imagine that in a hundred years or so, after the Prophet, al-Kalām should have emerged as a rich and independent subject. More important still, as a subject al-Kalām tends to resume its importance and role variously according to the changing trends. This can be seen from the Qadris and Murji'ah of the very first century of Hijrah to al-'Ash'ari (d.943), to Ibn Hazm (d. 1064 A.D.) to Ghazzāli (d. 1111) to al-Rāzi (1210) to Ibn Taimiyyah (1263) to Shah Waliullah (d. 1761) to Maulana Mohd. Qasim (d. 1880) etc. to name only the more illustrious. ʿIlm al-Kalām being the direct product of the Qur'ān's inherent rational outlook, it therefore, must not break away or divert from this divine source in word and spirit both. Or else it is bound to lose its authenticity as it happened in case of Mu'tazilah etc. If viewed in its totality, reason in Qur'ān is the synonym of truth, inasmuch as the cognition of truth essentially depends on the right direction of reasoning. The holy Qur'ān seeks not to dictate but points out the true course of reason.[1] A close scrutiny of the words Hidāyah (guidance) al-Sirāt al-Mustaqīm (the guided path), Haq (truth) and other Qur'ānic

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1. Shibli Naumani, al-Kalam, p.176.

terms imply invariably the rational truths - starting from the concept of Tawhīd down to the implications of a life of Taqwā (precaution = God fearingness) and Akhlaq-e-Hasanah (moral excellence).

An important thing to notice here is that reason in Qur'ān is never delinked from moral conception. In other words moral awareness with human reason forms the basis of Qur'ānic rationalism, or using modern phraseology, the world-view of Islām.

The Positive al-Kalām:

As we can see debateism initially started from a discussion of political issues. In the second place these discussions were widened to sectarian rationalization. In the third place this rational approach developed to the level of rational defence of Islām. Allama Shibli says,

> "Broadly speaking historical al-Kalām has been divided into two main categories which have their own different objectives:
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> 1) The first is that which was essentially caused by the internal strife and sectarian conflicts.

These conflicts spread far and wide ... and much of internal strength was wasted away in consequence.

2) The second category of al-Kalām was that which was brought into existence in order to counter the challenge of philosophy.

Till the time of Imām Ghazzāli, both of these trends of al-Kalām were distinct and separate. The tradition of blending the two trends was established by Ghazzāli. Imām Rāzi greatly contributed to develop this tradition. The later writers however, mixed up the issues to such an extent that philosophy, the principle of Faith and al-Kalam became almost indistinguishable."

The above classification of al-Kalām is evidently a historical fact. But this observation has obviously omitted the fact that Imām Ghazzāli also laid the foundation of a third category of al-Kalām : The positive rational statement of Islāmic Faith. This positive approach is not related essentially to any defensive view of Islam, be it the refutation of philosophy or any other faith or ideology.

It was Imām Ghazzāli (1058-1111 AD) who raised al-Kalām to its highest level in the defence of Islam against philosophy.[1]

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1. Umar Farrukh, p.395.

Still greater contribution of Ghazzāli, however, was that he laid the basis of a rational view of Islamic Faith which was essentially positive. But this positive view of al-Kalām is generally over-shadowed by his more elaborate and vocal refutation of philosophy, for which he is better known.

This third category of al-Kalām mainly seeks to explain the inherent rational basis of Islamic beliefs. In this sense it is certainly the most positive approach towards understanding the Islamic Faith-system and its under-current of rationalism. In fact it is this category of al-Kalām which contributed during the last two hundred years or so a very positive interpretation of Islāmic Faith and society.

Stagnation or Re-evaluation:

From the fourth century of Hijrah the rapid growth of al-Kalām witnessed a gradual decline leading into a period generally classed as a period of total stagnation after Ghazzāli and Rāzi. It was not the special case of al-Kalām only, but this decline was common to almost all branches of Islamic learning.

It would be conceded perhaps that the standstill to which all growth of Islāmic learning had come, denotes not as much the stagnation of Muslim thought as it denotes an attempt at self-assessment, pointing to the need of reorganising, reassessing and re-evaluating all Islamic learning contributed so far. Stagnation appears but only a sarcastic and sweeping term for the centuries that elapsed by after the fall of Baghdad - in view of this period's tremendous academic output in Arabic and other Muslim languages such as Persian, Turkish, Urdu etc. There is no dearth either, though less frequently, of many an original contribution in this period, if only 'original contribution' is not confined to mean discovering a new continent. A rediscovery of the vast treasures of Islāmic learning throught incessant academic work on details, elaborations, annotations, chronological or other classifications, comparisons, critical assessments etc, as has been the case during the preceding centuries, deserves by no means to be called 'stagnation'. A continuous academic tradition through centuries may be compared and classed in its various phases as brighter or less bright but it hardly merits being designated as stagnant or degenerated.

The disintegration of the institution of caliphate, however nominal and debased it might have turned, was indeed

the termination of a great political tradition. The harmony of Islāmic mind, and the totality of Arabic as the Islamic language was shattered. The grip of an invisible binding force that was capable of brining unity and harmony to diverse views and outlooks, races and generation, territories and languages was let loose all of a sudden.

The hegemony of the Arabic language had come to a final halt. The Persian and the Turkish replaced Arabic in many works of religious and other learning. The new trend gradually led to the appearance of new Islāmic languages and the new Muslim outlook that derived its strength as much from territorial and geographical interests as from wider Islamic outlook. This can be seen in the shift of emphasis from mainly the religious sciences to mainly the secular spheres of learning (Ma'qulat).

Al-Kalām as an Islamic science was the greatest victim in all this. So much so that even a philosopher - historian like Ibn Khaldun (d. 1405 A.D.) saw no relevance of al-Kalām any more. He says, "Al-Kalām for our age has become only futile, for the atheists and the innovators are found no more, while the rational arguments of ahl al-Sunnāh have already been

compiled. Now there is left no room for al-Kalām except in regard of Tanzīh (divine incorporealism)."[1]

The time for a positive contribution in al-Kalām initiated by Ghazzāli was not to come before the advent of 18th and 19th centuries when Shāh Waliullah of Delhi and Maulana Mohd Qasim of Nanautah respectively revivified al-Kalām and gave it a new respectability and acceptance. They broadened its scope from the traditional view of rational defence of Islām to a more positive rational framework of Islām - where reason can be seen at work on both levels :

i) the conception of Islām as a society as elaborated by Shāh Waliullah,

ii) the conception of Islām as a Faith as detailed by Maulana Mohd Qasim.

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1. Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddima, p.466.

CHAPTER - I

ISLAMIC THOUGHT IN INDIA

1) Before 18th Century
2) 18th Century : Shah Waliullah and al-Kalam
3) 19th Century : The Debacle and the Dilemma

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C H A P T E R - I

ISLAMIC THOUGHT IN INDIA

:18th and 19th Centuries

1. Before 18th Century:

The Muslim contact with the Indian sub-continent dates back to a much earlier period than the conquest of Sindh by Mohammad Bin Qasim in 711 A.D. However, these Muslims were generally traders who established their colonies on the south-western coastal line and contributed in the process of Islamization of the area.

The conquest of Sindh opened the door for Muslim scholars also to come and settle in the conquered territory. From this period have come down many names of Muhaddithūn and Fuqhā but it does not reveal much regarding the academic activity of the period, except that there was a special interest in Hadith from the beginning.[1] During the Abbasid period the province of Sindh became independent and gradually was sub-divided into small principalities. In this period the condition prevailing there, were far from satisfactory. Many Hindu tribes who had accepted Islam reverted

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1. Samā'ni in his Kitāb al-Ansāb mentions of Muhaddithīn of Debal, Mansūrah etc. Other historians like Maqdisi also mention many scholars of Hadith, though without much information. See Mohd Ikram, Ab-e-Kauthar, pp.35-40, Lahore, 1975.

back to their old faith, not to speak of the political turmoils and conflicts that had become common and frequent. The renowned Muslim historian al-Masudi (d. 956) mentions that Sindh in his days had become the play-ground of the Qarāmitah. Their persecutions were brought to an end only when Sindh was annexed by Sultān Mahmūd (998-1030 AD) of Ghazni.[1] Under these conditions there could hardly be any development of Islamic sciences in Sindh which for many was still a land of Idolators.

The greatest Muslim scholar to come to India about the turn of 11th century was al-Birūni (973-1048), who stayed during the Ghaznavid days for a long time in India. He studied Indian culture, learnt Sanskrit language and finally wrote his famous book of Indian History. He was probably the first eminent Muslim scholar to come to India who was also well-versed in philosophy and al-Kalām. He is reported to have had frequent debates with Ibn Sīna.[2] However there appears no evidence from this period of any exposition or treatise in the field of al-Kalām.

Disinclination Towards al-Kalām and its Causes:

During the Sultanate period (1206-1526) many Muslim

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1. Shaikh Mohd Ikram, Ab-e-Kauthar, p.67.
2. Ibid, pp.66-70.

scholars, some of them highly eminent, mainly decorated the royal court or its administration of Qada and Ifta. Some of them have left their contribution too. Mainly of historiographical, juridical or sufistic nature, these works hardly even mention al-Kalām as a subject of Islāmic learning.

It should not be taken to mean that the rationlist trend here was simply absent. Far from that the educational syllabi before 18th century had larger number of books based on rational sciences (Ma'qulāt) than texts based on religious sciences.[1] However, religious thought had come to be confined by a narrow view of Fiqh. There was almost no room for seeking a rational answer to a question of faith.[2] The intermittent appearance of a Kalāmi trend in royal courts and minds was mainly and closely related with political purpose and imperial ambitions as is amply from contemporary writings.[3]

This was partly due to the fact that Ilm al-Kalām itself had come to a final halt with the fall of Baghdad (1258 AD)

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1. S. Mahboob Rizvi, Tarikh Darul Uloom,Deoband, pp.85-86; Aziz Ahmad, An Intellectual History of Islam in India,pp.1-5.
2. Aziz Ahmad, Op.cit, p.5; It is rather ironical to know that Harun Rashid the Abbasid Caliph who had initially put ban on Ilm al-Kalam had to relax his order on hearing from a Raja of Sindh that a learned scholar ought to be sent there who could prove that Islam spread by argument and reason and not by sword. Ilm al-Kalam, pp.41-42.
3. Ab-e-Kauthar, pp.155-57; 408-9.

throughout the Muslim world. Partly it was also due to the fact that the Muslim rulers in India being Turks and Afghāns were not much interested in Islāmic learning except in so far as it was necessary to produce Qādīs and Muftīs for the administration.[1] The stress on Sūfism from the beginning became an added discouraging factor. The so-called Ma'qūlāt (the secular learnings) of which we hear frequently in books of Indian History and Tadhkirāhs mainly served to equip the students to find an access to the Royal Court or to win financial support in the administration.

Contrasted to this was the wide recognition for Sūfi saints who were often held in great esteem even by the rulers. They contributed largely in propagating Islam in the Indian sub-continent. [2] The Indian temprament found greater inspiration in spiritual philosophy than in rational faith.[3] All this had created a rather hostile trend against al-Kalām.[4]

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1. Rud-e-Kauthar, pp.556-57.
2. Ibid, pp.563-64.
3. T.W. Arnold, Preaching of Islām, p.254.
4. Aziz Ahmad, An Intellectual History of Islam in India, p.3

An important cause of this antagonistic attitude towards rationalism in India was that the rulers often wanted rationalistic or Kalāmi debates to serve their political ambitions, the most glaring example of which was the Din-e-Ilahi cult of Akbar, mainly evolved to stabilize and perpetuate the Timurid rule in India.[1] Earlier still, there are evidences that 'Ala'uddin Khalji and Mohd Tughlaq[2] also had, had ambitious ideas of this kind, which were sensed by certain courtiers who wisely and artfully managed to suppress them.[3]

Since the days of Muslim Empire Hanafite Fiqh, the broadest of juridical system in Islām, became and remained the basis of Shariāh in India. Likewise astronomy, logic, philosophy along with Arabic and Persian Literatures were part of the educational syllabi, whereas hadīth and Tafsīr held only a secondry position.[4] Inspite of all this, al-Kalām did not find any place here except to the extent of certain texts as part of the curriculum.

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1. Cf. Abd al-Qadir Badayuni, Muntakhab al-Tawarikh, V.II, p.301; Mohd Miyan, Shandar Madi, V.I, p.71; Rud-e-Kauthar, pp.85-87.
2. Ab-e-Kauthar, pp.155-57; 408-9.
3. Sayyid Gesu Draz narrated that Mohd Tughlaq also like Aluddin Khalji wanted to found a new religion. He says further that once Outlugh Khan was unusually sent for by Mohd Tughlaq. On his return he told that after a little hesitation the king said,"Suppose someone gets up to say, may God forbid, that the Prophet Mohammad was not a messenger of God, by what argument shall we and you convince him then?" Farishta writes about the same king,"He verified traditions only those which agreed with reason." Ab-e-Kauthar, pp.408-9.
4. Rud-e-Kauthar, pp.556-58.

A very important development as a result of Islamic influence in India was the emergence of Bhagti Movement. It was a revivalist trend of Hinduism deeply influenced by such Islāmic tenets as unity of God and equality of human beings. It sought to review and re-explain Hindu Faith - during 15th and 16th centuries.[1] There is no doubt that this revivalist movement paved the way for the emergence of the idea of a common religion (Dīn-e-Ilāhi) in Akbar's mind.[2] Similarly it created ultimately an environment which necessitated the evolution of the Sufistic theory of Wahdat al-Wujūd into the philosophy of Wahdat al-Shuhūd,[3] wrongly considered by many as contradictory to Wahdat al-Wujūd.

The esoteric theory of Shaikh Mujaddid Sirhindi is based on spiritualistic trend rather than the rationalistic tendency. Wahdat al-Shuhud seeks to explain the spiritual stages of the concept of Tawhīd. It represents spiritually higher stage than which is attaintable by Ibn 'Arabi's Wahdat al-Wujūd.[4] The latter stops short at the stage of

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1. Ab-e-Kauthar, pp.465-66.
2. Rud-e-Kauthar, pp.318-25.
3. Ibid, p.315.
4. Ibid, pp.315-17.

of self-annihilation (Fanā) whereas the former seeks the higher stage of perpetuation (Baqā). In other words, the stage of Baqā represents the final and true differentiation between the Creator and the created.

2. 18th CENTURY : SHAH WALIULLAH AND AL-KALĀM:

In the writings of Shaikh Abdul Haque of Delhi and Shaikh Sirhindi (1564-1625), we can see the beginning of a rationalist trend which was ultimately to emerge and find full expression in the writings of Shāh Waliullah.

Shāh Waliullah of Delhi (1704-1761) was a man of phenomenal scholarship and vision. Allama Shibli says,

> "The intellectual decline witnessed among Muslims after Ibn Rushd and Ibn Taimiyyah — even in their own times — had not left room to hope that there would appear someone with such intellectual calibre again. But the Heavens wished to show wonders that in this late era when Islām seemed to breathe its last, birth was given to a man like Shah Waliullah whose accomplishments over-shadowed the achievements of Ghazzāli, Rāzi and Ibn Rushd even."[1]

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1. Ilm al-Kalām, p.87.

He critically examined and assessed sciences like Tafsīr, made a new classification of the books of Hadīth and frankly pointed out the historical mistakes and wrong approaches wherever these had crept in those disciplines. He came out with his unsparing and critical views regarding the political and social conditions prevailing over the country.[1] He drastically censured the class of 'Ulama many of whom thrived on the stipends granted for nothing by the royal court or the nobility, due to their superficial or hypocritical devotion to the cause of knowledge and faith.[2]

The most remarkable among the books of Shāh Waliullah is Hujjat al-Allāh al-Bālighah. In this Shāh Waliullah has brought forth the inner rationalism of the commandments of Sharī'āh. He explained the wisdom of Islāmic injunctions as embodied in Qur'ān and Hadīth.

In fact Shāh Waliullāh has evolved al-Kalām anew. The historical al-Kalām of early Islāmic centuries mainly dealt with single problems such as unity and essence of God, fatalism and free-will, Khalque-Qur'an, the position of a

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1. Ulama-e-Hind ka Shāndār Mādi, V.II, pp.6-28.
2. Ibid.

man committing a major sin etc. During the Umayyad and Abbāsid days, even the greatest of Muslim rationalists did not go beyond this piece-meal treatment of conceptual problems which had gripped the Muslim mind. Before Shāh Waliullāh only Imām Ghazzāli had realised this for the first time and tried to look at the system of Islāmic Faith in its totality. But Ghazzāli was too pre-occupied with the refutation of Greek philosophy to pay full attention to this totality.

Thus there was no more than a suitable ground for Shāh Waliullah to build upon. It was Shāh Waliuliah who realised very clearly that it is not the single aspects of Islāmic Faith which need elaboration on rational level. Rather, it is the complete view of Islāmic principles of faith, polity, economy and society which needs to be explained so that their rational coherence and practical value may be unveiled.[1]

Thus he did not touch upon the old problems of <u>al-Kalām</u> at all. Nor he tried to revive the questions of

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1. M.M. Sharif, (ed.) A HISTORY OF MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY, Vol. II Wiesbeden (art. SHAH WALLIULLAH DIHLAWI BY ABDUL HAMID SIDDIQUI, 1966, PP 1558 & 1577

Greek philosophy or refute them. On the other hand he criticized the Mu'tazilah and other Mutakallimun for introducing futile issues in al-Kalām.[1]

His main accomplishment lies in stating and expounding the philosophy of Islām as a way of life, bringing to the fore the real bases of Islāmic world-view. The main achievement of Shāh Waliullah lies, "in the major individual effort at intellectual synthesis and systematization —, an uprecedented Tatbīq of the whole range of Islāmic knowledge."[2]

His Kalāmi approach is mainly rooted in pragmatic value of Islām. In his critism of the social evils that had marred Muslim political life and economic prosperity, he has been frank and unsparing. He has elaborately shown after having explained the rational considerations of Islāmic injunctions, that they are meant mainly for human development and success. Whenever these rational principles have been ignored human societies greatly suffered. He compared the evils of Muslim society with those of Romans' and Iranians' which led them to their final ruin.[3]

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1. Rud-e-Kauthar, pp.582-83:
2. Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India, Deoband: 1860-1900, p.36.
3. See Hujjatullah al-Balighā, V.I, Chapter, Iqāmah al-Irtifāqāt.

Shāh Waliullah therefore, was not only a Mutakallim of the first order but indeed was the founder of a new and meaningful al-Kalām.[1] However, it needs be realised that Shāh Waliullah was deeply influenced by the prevailing decay and degeneration of Muslim society. This necessitated a greater stress on the practical value of Islāmic injunctions and principles than on showing rational foundations of Islāmic faith. This is why Shāh Waliullah does not involve himself as much in rationalistic analysis of Islāmic faith as he takes pains in explaining the broad framework of Islām as a rational way of life in this world. He treats the faith-structure of Islām relatively briefly. Nevertheless the issue of faith that he has treated at length is that of Ālam-e-Mithāl (parallel world of incorporeal existence). This is a very important discussion with which he opens the book.

This aspect — rational basis of Islāmic Faith — was to be taken up at length later on by Maulana Qasim Nanautvi,[2] who is our subject of study here.

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1. Rud-e-Kauthar, p.583.
2. Maulana Mahmūd al-Hasan (Shaikh al-Hind) says:"I used to attend Maulana Nanautvi's lectures after having studied Shāh Waliullah's books, and questioned him on problems which I found most difficult in those books. He gave away in the first instance what was the last answer in Shāh Waliullah. I experienced this many times". See Arwāh-e-Thalātha, Hikāyat No.34.

After Shāh Waliullah, his grandson Shāh Muḥammad Ismāʿil (Shaheed) made an effort to knit together and abridge Shāh Waliullah's philosophy in a coherent form, as various aspects of it were scattered in different books. This abridged version entitled as Abaqāt, however, is too brief to reveal the full context and significance of Shāh Waliullah's rational view of Islām. The relatively greater attention to his political views seems to have brushed aside his broad and unified interpretation of Islām's material and spiritual life.

3. 19th CENTURY : THE DEBACLE AND THE DILEMMA:

Muslim Dilemma: The period of 19th Century is perhaps the most important period of Muslim history in India. This is because the Muslim Society during this period experienced the greatest dilemma in every sphere of their life. The process of decline of the Tīmūrid Empire in India was to complete in 1857, when even the nominal rulership of the so-called Mughals was finally dissolved. It was the same process which had started about the time Shāh Waliullah was born.[1]

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1. Ulama-e-Hind ka Shandar Madi, V.II, p.2.

After Aurangzib who died in 1707, the Mughal throne became a stage where a number of puppet-performers were brought and repalced. The turmoils of this century were numerous and most devastating, the more important were as under :

1) "The controversy of Shi'āh-Sunni origin which remained suppressed during Aurangzib's life-time, surfaced now with its full intensity, giving rise to widely ranging conspiracies. Consequently within 50 years (1707-1757) ten Mughal kings were installed or dismounted from the throne of Delhi. Only four of them died a natural death. All the rest were murdered or blinded."

2) "Provincial governors became independent and the Mughal sovereignty became only nominal."

3) "Various powers in all four corners of the country consolidated their positions, like Marathās in the South, Rūhelas in the North-East, the Jāts in the South-West and the Khalsa in the North-West. The confrontations of these powers made the whole country a battle field. They raided and invaded Delhi several times and to ensure their success, invited Nādir Shāh Durrāni and Ahmad Shāh Abdāli, who invaded India and devastated Delhi repeatedly[1] (1739,1748, 1757, 1760)."

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1. Ulama-e-Hind ka Shandar Madi, V.II,pp.1-3,48-70; Barbara Metcalf, Op.cit, pp.20-21.

The Mughal rulers were reduced to being mere puppets first under powerful countiers and later under the widening political influence of the British rule. The British Over-lords had established their positions by the close of the 18th century.[1] Their constant advance was to the increasing disadvantage of not only the Muslim rulers here but the Muslim society at large.

It must be recognised however that the political rise of the British in India was made possible due to the increasing inner conflicts and weaknesses. The ills —— social, religious and political —— that had crept in, clearly pointed to the moral and spiritual sickness which was eating into the vitals of this society. Nevertheless, the educational and other mechanism of the Muslim society was still intact. It was this mechanism, however defective it might have become, which made possible the freedom-struggle of 1857. To say that political disarray, or an ill-organised Military effort was the chief cause for which this freedom struggle flopped is to look only to the one side of the picture. The moral, religious, political, economic, indeed every aspect of Muslim society at that time presented a bleak

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1. Ibid, pp.73-79.

and gloomy picture. Even that defective mechanism of Indian Muslims was finally shattered in 1857.[1]

The Muslim educational institutions were closed down, the Muslim Auqāf were taken over by the British Government, the Muslim scholars were forced to take refuge wherever they could find. Many of them were hanged or killed at the slightest of doubt. A number of the Muslim gentry were jailed and executed. The policy of the British Government during post-1857 years was to encourage all Indian Communities other than Muslims and to provide facilities for their education and employment. They were readily inducted in Government jobs whereas the doors were tightly closed on Muslims.[2]

Added to this was another Muslim dilemma. A large number of Christian Missionaries invaded the Indian scene. They openly challenged Islām and publicly raised objections to Islāmic faith as well as the Prophet of Islām. The Muslims with their lack of education and means, felt deeply annoyed and perplexed as there was none to come to their aid. The problem of the Muslim society at the time was two-fold. They had been deprived of all political and economic

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1. Shāndar Māḍi, V.II, pp.32-33, Lahore, 1977. 'Ulama-e-Haq, V.I, pp.17-40.
2. Mauj-e-Kauthar, pp. 74-76.

ground. At the same time they had lost all moral and spiritual foundations. On top of all this, they were now being humiliated as Muslims, and lured to the rulers' faith - Christianity. It was indeed a difficult time for the Indian Muslims.

A member of British parliament, Mr. Brooke writes about Muslim educational institutions in his Memorandum presented to the parliament.

> "all these places as were the centres of learning where student came to join from distant places have become now desolate with no education at all."[1]

W.W. Hunter who was entrusted by British Government to prepare a report on the causes of Muslim discontent in the decades following the uprising of 1857, says,

> "In our educational system there is no provision for religious education of Young Muslims. It is rather totally against their interest."[2]

Sayyid Mahbood Rizvi says;

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1. Munāzir Aḥsan Gilani, Hindustāni Musalmāno kā Nizām-e-Tālim-o-Tarbiyat, Vol.1, p.392.
2. Our Indian Musalmāns, p.252.

"Delhi, which had been the centre of all learning and sciences, where in the preceding century Shāh Waliullah had initiated a new educational system in which study of Hadīth ultimately got its due place - was totally ruined. In the rebellion of 1857 known as Mutiny, a large number of Muslim scholars fell a victim to the vindictive sentiment of the Englishmen. This revolution brought in its folds great calamities for the Muslims. The Muslim Trusts which were the main source of income for the Muslim Educational Institutions were all impounded by the British Government and an educational system sanctified by hundreds of years was entirely destroyed."[1]

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1. Tarikh-e-Darul ʿUloom, Deoband, p.138.

CHAPTER - II

MAULĀNA MOHD QĀSIM NĀNAUTVI

1) Biographical Sketch
2) Deoband Movement
3) Missionary Challenge Rebutted

C H A P T E R - II

MAULĀNA MUHAMMAD QĀSIM NĀNAUTVI

1. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH:

Maulāna Muhammad Qāsim Nānautvi was born in Sha'ban or Ramadān 1248 AH (1832 AD) at Nanauta - a small town 16 miles west of Deoband and about 80 miles north of Delhi. Eight generations earlier, his fore-father Maulāna Muhammad Hāshim who had close contact with Emperor Shāhjahān, was granted a Jāgīr at Nānauta. By descent, the family line is traced to Hadrat Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, the 2nd Caliph (632-634 AD). The town in district Sahāranpūr) is still known for its Siddīqi families.[1]

He received his early education at Nānauta and Deoband. Afterwards he was called at Sahāranpūr by his maternal grand-father. He studies there Arabic language and grammar.[2]

In 1843 Maulāna Mumlūk 'Ali (d. 1851) the renowned "teacher of the teachers"[3] of Delhi College and father of

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1. Maulāna Muhammad Yaqūb, Sawaneh Qāsmi, pp. 1-4.
2. Ibid, p.2
3. Among his students were such luminaries as Sir Sayyid, Maulana Mohd.Qasim, Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi etc. About his erudition, Sir Sayyid Says:"He had such a perfect capacity and ready recall of rational and traditional sciences and their texts that if by some stroke of misfortune, suppose, the treasury of the world were to be emptied of these books, it would have been possible to reproduce them from his memory." - Athar al-Sanadid, p.70.

Maulāna Muhammad Yāqūb Nānautvi, took him along with his son to Delhi.

For some years he studied along with Maulāna Yāqūb and Maulāna Rashīd Ahmad Gangōhi, who had joined them two years later. Maulāna Mumlūk'Ali taught them privately at his residence where they stayed. His genius began to show up at this stage. The difficult books like Sadra, Shams, Bāzigha etc were recited by him just like a Hāfiz (Memorizer) of Qur'ān recited the Holy Book.[1] All this was not without understanding the subject. But since certain students doubted if at all he understood the Arabic texts which he so fluently recited, the learned teacher said, "No students can continue before me without understanding." The same applied to Maulāna Rashīd Ahmad Gangōhi. Both became friends since those days and remained so to the last. They studied Hadīth together from Shah Abd al-Ghani (1819-1878), a disciple of Shāh Mohd. Ishāq and a central figure in the field of Hadīth after the migration from Delhi of Shāh Mohd. Ishāq. About the same time both of them together made Bai'ah (Spiritual desciplehood) to Hāji Imdādullah of Thana Bhawan and covered different stages of it under him.[2]

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1. Maulāna Yāqūb, pp.6-7
2. Ibid.

Afterwards Maulāna Mamlūk 'Ali admitted Maulāna Qāsim, in the Delhi College where he was a teacher of oriental learning. He asked the teacher of mathematics not to object his conditions and instructed Maulāna Qāsim to study geometry by himself. Shortly afterwards his exceptional capacity in this began to be discussed within the campus. On solving certain difficult geometrical problems, presented as test to him by one of the teachers, he became all the more known. At the stage of final exminations, however, in spite of all persuasions, he left the college without appearing at the examination. The English Principal[1] of the college and others felt very sorry for this. Sir Sayyid writes about him,

"There are many people still alive who have seen Maulvi Mohd. Qāsim receiving his education in Delhi at a very early age. He studied all the books from Maulāna Mamlūk 'Ali. His manners and general disposition were all too symbolic of God-fearingness, piety and good-naturedness. From his student days, he was known for his exceptional intelligence, broad-views and a very piercing power of reasoning. In the same way he was also known for his pious-

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1. The then Principla of Delhi College was Mr. Tailor who was killed in 1857. See Tarikh-e-Darul Uloom, V.1, p.103.

ness and deep religiousness in the learning circle of the College."[1]

In Delhi after completing his education, he joined the famous publishing house, Matba' Ahmadi of Maulāna Ahmad 'Ali Muhaddith Sahāranpūri as a proof-reader. It was about this time that Maulāna Ahmad 'Ali who was then writing the commentary of Sahīh al-Bukhāri and only 5 or 6 last sections were remaining, entrusted the work to Maulāna Mohd. Qāsim. Maulāna Muhammad Yāqūb writes :

"At that time some people who were not aware of the genius of Maulāna Qāsim objected that the commentary-writing of such an important book has been entrusted to such a young man.[2] Maulana Ahmad 'Ali replied, 'I am not so silly as to do this without having realised everything.' Then he showed the commentary to them. The people then realised. These sections in Bukhāri are specially difficult, particularly due to having regular regard towards supporting the Hanafite school of Fiqh, disproving the objections put by Imām Bukhāri himself against the Hanafite view. Now anyone can see for himself how wonderful a commentary he has written."[3]

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1. Aligarh Institute Gazette, 24 Apr., 1880, pp.467-68
2. Maulāna Qāsim was then hardly 22 or 21 years. See discussion on it in Tarikh Darul Uloom, V.I, pp.109-12.
3. Maulāna Mohd. Yāqūb Nānautvi, Sawāneh Qāsmi, 1894,p.9.

He was married in 1853. In those days the war of Cremea between Turkey and Russia was going on and the Indian Muslims prayed every day for the victory of the Turks. Maulāna Mohd. Qāsim gave away all the jewellery of his wife in Sultani donation.[1]

In May 1857, the Meerut regiments raised the banner of freedom and shortly afterwards the whole Northern India rose in revolt against the British rulers. All law and order almost suddenly disappeared. On the arrival of general Bakht Khan in Delhi (2 July 1857) the 'Ulamā assembled in Jami' Masjid of Delhi and declared Jihād. The Fatwā (religious decree) of Jihād issued by the 'Ulamā had signatures of Mufti Sadruddin Āzurda, Maulāna Mohd Nadhīr Husain and Maulāna Rahmatullah of Kerāna, the last being the famous polemic who had come here as a representative of Hāji Imdādullah, the celebrated divine of Thāna Bhawan with wide-ranging following among Muslims and 'Ulāma both including the king and the royal family.

Maulāna Mohd Qāsim played an important role in mobilising popular as well as royal support to the cause of Jihād. Through Nawab Sher 'Ali Khān of Muradabad, he made an effort

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1. Munāzir Ahsan Gīlāni, Sawāneh Qāsmi, V.I, pp. 510-11.

to persuade Bahādur Shāh Zafar that: "The king should try to purify Delhi from the Britishers by utilizing his force, whereas we shall proceed towards Delhi by fighting the British power from Thāna-Bhawan and Shāmli. This would make possible that Delhi was freed finally."[1]

After having Thāna Bhawan evacuated from the British force, Hāji Imdādullah was selected as the Imām (ruler of the Muslims) and Maulāna Qāsim and Maulāna Rashīd Gangōhi were appointed his chief advisers. Hāji Imdādullah for a few days sat down to decide civil and criminal cases according to Islamic law.[2] Volunteers for Jihad were recruited and the Tahsīl of Shāmli, which was fortified like a fort was then invaded by them and finally occupied. This raid was led by Maulāna Mohd. Qāsim and Maulāna Rashīd Ahmad Gangōhi. Among the besieged, 113 people were killed.

In the mean-time the British forces re-occupied Delhi (14 September 1857). The occupation of Shāmli had enraged the English men greatly. The Collector of Muzaffar Nagar, Mr. Edwards was ordered to attack Thana Bhawan in order to crush the Jihādi stronghold. The Mujāhidin reversed the first three attacks. They could not however withstand the

1. Munāzir Ahsan Gīlānī, Sawāneh Qāsmi, V.2, pp.136-36.
2. Shaikh Mohd. Ikrām, Āb-e-Kauthar, p.195.

fourth one and had to vacate the field. Hāfiz Mohd, Ḍāmin, a close friend of the leaders, was also martyred.[1] After their re-occupation the British badly destroyed the town and raged many stately residences in order to avenge their defeat.[2] Maulāna Mohd. Qāsim was also wounded in this fight by a bullet in the leg. The British government initiated a reign of terror and a campaign of presecution and arrest. Hāji Imdādullah kept shifting his hide-outs before he secretly migrated to Mecca. Maulāna Gangōhi was arrested and jailed, but was released after six months. Maulāna Mohd. Qāsim however, could not be arrested in spite of many attempts, though he refused to remain hidden within four walls saying that the Prophet, while migrating to Madīnah did not hide himself beyond three days. In the following year the Government declared general pardon but Maulāna Mohd, Qāsim remained throughout his life a suspect in the eyes of the Government.[3]

He visited three times al-Hijāz for Hajj purpose. He performed his first pilgrimage in 1860. It was on board the ship that he memorized the Qur'ān. Whatever of the Holy

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1. Abdur Rashīd Arshad, Bis Bade Musalmān, p.119
2. Anwarul-Hasan Shairkoti, Anwār-e-Qāsmi, pp.283-93. Lahore, 1969; Ishtiaque Husain Quraishi, 'Ulama in Politics, pp.202-03, 210, Karachi, 1973.
3. Mohd. Miyān, 'Ulama-e-Hind ka Shāndār Mādi, p.328. Cf. Encyclopaedia of Islam (Urdu), V.19, Op.cit, p.506; Z.H. Farooqi, The Deoband School, and demand for Pakistan, pp.21-22.

Book he memorized each day, he recited it in the Taravih prayers at night. In the following year again in Ramadan he completed the memorization of the rest of the Holy Qur'an.

He returned via Bombay in December 1861 and joined the publishing house, MatbaMujtabai of Munshi Imtiāz 'Ali in Meerut, for the same job which he had selected for himself.[1] He remained there fore more than a year. During his liesure time he used to teach Sahih Muslim and the Mathnavi of Maulana Room. A notable work during his stay in Meerut was the proof reading of the Himael Sharif (al-Qur'an in more portable size), which was printed in 1286 A.H. by Matba' Mujtabai, Delhi. It is still counted as a good model for clarity and precision.[2]

In addition to his other academic and educational pre-occupations, Maulana Mohd Qasim was an active reformer and preacher of the re-marriage of widows. He presented a practical example of this by arranging re-marriage of his own widow sister. In the same way he actively preached for giving out the legal share of daughters in inheritance. Moreover he stressed in his writings and speeches and carried zealously the reform of futile customs and ceremonies.

It was about this time that he corresponded with Sir Sayyid. He wrote more than one letter in response to

1. Munshi Imtiaz Ali was a perfectionaist calligrapher of his day. He had received instruction in Naskh & Nasta'liq style from Bahadur Shah Zafar. See Encyclopaedia of Islam(Urdu) Lahore, 1986,V.19, p.507, Art.Maulāna Mohd. Qāsim.

2. Shairkoti, Anwār-e-Qāsmi, pp.213-16.

Sir Sayyid's queries who wanted to know if at all there was any fault in the principles on which were based almost all of his writings.[1] Maulāna Mohd. Qāsim pointed out academically in reply the faulty aspects of Sir Sayyid's principles (15 in all) one by one. He replied Sir Sayyid's doubts and objections politely, expressing nevertheless his unhappiness over the latters liberalism in matters of Hadīth and Faith. This correspondence was later published under the name Tasfiyah al-'Aqāid. Notwithstanding this, their relations throughout remained pleasant and sincere and both admired each other.[2]

A general misconception however seems to prevail that their relations and efforts were antagonistic to each other. In reality the gap separating them was not that of narrow-mindedness and liberalism as is often superficially regarded. It was in fact that of reformist choice and emphasis. In the words of Professor Ziaul Hasan Faruqi, "Maulāna Nānawtvi was an enlightened 'ālim and in no way opposed to the acquisition of modern sciences by the 'Ulamā. What he stood for was the preservation and propagation of 'Uloom-e-Naqliyyah" (transmitted Islamic sciences). Nor equally Sir Sayyid was opposed to the acquisition of Islāmic learning.

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1. Tasfiyah al-'Aqaid, p.5, Karachi, 1976.
2. When Sir Sayyid established Aligarh School, the names of Maulāna Mohd. Qāsim and his colleague Maulāna Yāqūb were included in the school's advisory board. The Maulāna however expressed his inability with appologies. See Bis Bade Musalman, pp.127-28.

Commenting on the conditions of Deoband's Madrasa in the year 1289, Sir Sayyid writes in Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq (dated 1 Jamad al-Thani, 1290).

"It appears that the Madrasa is not functioning on its own or the sympathy of the Muslims. It is rather dependent on the person of one man. Moulavi Mohd. Qāsim is indeed a a very great man and a born saint in fact. The whole district Sahāranpūr and Meerut hold him in reverence."[1]

In 1880 Sir Sayyid wrote on Maulāna Qāsim's passing away an elaborate condolatory note expressing his deep affection and shock, :

"Maulāna Qāsim was peerless in this world. He might have been inasmuch as academic knowledge is concerned slightly less than that of Shāh Abd al-'Azīz, but in all other things he outstone him. In his simplicity, piety and loveability he was no less than Shāh Mohd. Ishāq if not more than him. Indeed he had angelic character and qualities."[2]

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1. Bis Bade Musalmān, pp.125-26
2. Aligarh Institute Gazette, (24 Apr. 1880), pp.467-68.

The Maulāna performed his 2nd hajj in 1870 and the third in 1877, in which a number of his disciples, colleagues and those who loved him, accompanied him.[1] During his all the three pilgrimages, he had also the satisfaction of seeing and staying with his spiritual mentor Hāji Imdādullah who had migrated to Mecca (hence his epitet Muhājir Makki) in 1860.[2]

It was during the return journey from his last Hajj that he was taken ill in Jeddah. He suffered with fever, cough and respiratory trouble which turned into a chronic disease. His efforts however for the progress of Dārul ʻUloom and against the Christian and Ārya Samāji challenges continued even in the wake of his debilitating sickness. In spite of all Ūnāni and allopathic treatment, his condition continued to deteriorate. Finally, on 4 Jamād al-Ūla 1297/15 April, 1880 he breathed his last. He was buried in a piece of land made available for this purpose at the spot as a trust.[3] It is not far from the main buildings of the Madrasa and the town of Deoband.

Among his pupils, whose number runs into hundreds, the most distinguished were Maulāna Mahmūd al-Hasan of

1. Tārīkh Dārul 'Uloom, V.I, p.119
2. In the wake of his arrest orders, Haji Imdadullah, remained underground at various places for two and half years after 1857's calamity. Finally in January 1860 he migrated to Hijāz. See 'Ulamā-e-Hind ka Shāndār Māḍi, V.4, p.333.
3. Maulāna Mohd, Yāqūb, Op.cit, p.27.

Deoband, better known as Shaikh al-Hind, Maulāna Fakhr al-Ḥasan of Gangoh and Maulāna Ahmad Hasan of Amroha. These brilliant academicians and other lesser-lights with their own disciples rendered valuable services to the cause of Islamic sciences.[1]

2. DEOBAND MOVEMENT:

The Muslims were at the cross-road in their dilemma between what is urgent for them and what is important : Economic and political betterment or moral and religious upliftment. Both of these aspects required immediate attention and total devotion.

The first[2] response to this dilemma came from Deoband, where a group of 'Ulāma decided to establish the institution which came to be known as Dārul-'Uloom of Deoband. The Muslim defeat at the political front coupled with the anti-Muslim policy of the British Government and the open challenge to Islām by the missionaries had forced these 'Ulama to think and take care in the first place of preserving Islāmic Character and culture through dissemination of Islāmic learning.

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1. Faqīr Mohammad Jehlumi, Hadāiq al-Hanafiyyāh, p.493(Lucknow).
2. The second response was the emergence of Aligarh Movement initiated by Sir Sayyid, a few years later. It took care of the desparate conditions of Muslim community and devoted itself to providing social and economic confidence through modern education.

"The sword and spear were replaced now by the pen and the tongue."[1]

Thus, Deoband did not only become a renowned seat of Islāmic education but in fact it was the centre of a strong education and political movement also. Among the founding fathers of Deoband Seminary were Maulāna Zulfiqār Ali of Deoband, Maulāna Qāsim of Nānautah, Hāji Ābid Hussain of Deoband, Maulāna Fazlur Rahmān of Deoband and Maulāna Rashīd Ahmad of Gangoh. At that time these divines decided that in order to keep the religious awareness of the Muslims alive it is inevitable to establish an academic centre of religious education. In the light of this Maulāna Mohd. Qāsim and his chief colleagues as named above decided that this institution ought to be established at Deoband rather then at Delhi. Thus, the Masjid Chhatta, the meeting Centre of these 'Ulāma and divines in Deoband, became also the starting point of Deoband institution.[2]

Initially it was no more than a primary school or Maktab. One of the founders, namely, Hāji Abid Hussain was rather insistent on keeping it confined to that level only. It was however, Maulāna Mohammad Qāsim who patronized

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1. Ziaul Hasan Farūqi, The Deoband School, Op.cit, p.23.
2. Tārīkh-e-Dārul 'Uloom, Vol.I, p.142.

it from the beginning and conceived of it on a much larger scale and made it within a short time the centre of a great educational movement.[1]

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Deoband school was established in 1283/1867. Maulāna Qasim did not live long to see this institution turning into the largest University of theological studies in the sub-continent. He died at the age of forty-eight in 1880. Nevertheless during that brief period as a result of his ambitions, devotion, he saw the rapid progress and popularity of this institution.[2]

The objectives of the institution as elaborated in the old constitution are as follows :

"(1) Education of Qur'ān, Hadīth, Tafsīr, beliefs, Kalām and instruction of other useful related sciences and arts to provide the Muslims with complete religious information and to serve Islām through preaching and spiritual guidance.

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1. Cf. Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School, p.23,Calcutta, 1963; Arwah-e-Thalatha, Hikayat No.252, pp.189-91; Tarikh Deoband, pp.148-51.
2. Tarikh Darul 'Uloom, Vol.I, pp.189-91.

(2) To train the students in Islāmic morals and actions and to create Islāmic spirit among students.

(3) To propagate Islām and to preserve and defend it through speech and writing both. To awaken such morals and deeds among Muslims as were the distinction of the Salaf (companions of the Prophet of Islām).

(4) To avoid the influence of Government and to retain the independence of knowledge and thought.

(5) To establish Arabic Madrasas in order to disseminate religious sciences and affiliate them with Dārul Uloom."[1]

Maulāna Qari Mohd. Tayyeb, former Muhtamim of Dārul 'Uloom explained the main ingredients of Deoband's outlook as follows:

"First Religiousness : as Dārul 'Uloom is the source of religious dynamism and it is wholly bound to Islāmic constitution and laws.

Second, Independence : from all internal servitude in its administration of education and training, and in its

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1. Tārīkh Dārul-'Uloom, V.I, p.142.

financial matters. It is the first institution to which more than once the Government made offers of financial aid of lakhs of rupees but it refused to accept.

Third, Simplicity and Industry

Fourth, Moral Character : which is the spiritual legacy of its founders and elders.

Fifth, Academic and Educational Devotion : This is a characteristic which can be felt in the first instance by any one who visits here."[1]

The history of Darul 'Uloom during more than hundred years since its inception, indeed seems to verify this stand or outlook of Deoband school.

* * *

The basic idea of this educational movement was born of the fact that the doors of all wordly progress were closed on Muslim community under a repressive, hostile and alien rule. Now the only thing left at the Muslim's choice was the preservation of their faith, learning and culture.[2] The

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1. Ibid, p.144.
2. Ulāma-e-Haq, V.I, pp.37-41

question of Islamic identity through preservation of its faith and culture required immediate attention. The 'Ulama were of the view that unless positive attention was not paid to this grave question, the Indian Muslims in their ignorance and poverty would be gradually deprived of their religious character and Islāmic identity. The ultimate dissolution of the community then seemed imminent to the 'Ulamā of Deoband. The most urgent to them was to initiate a programme of Muslim education in religious learning and carry it out independently without government aid and interference.[1]

With this idea Deoband institution was founded. Under the conditions the 'Ulamā did not accept any financial grant or aid from the British Government. Nor they liked the idea of receiving any aid from the government, because it would entail government supervision that would mar the very idea of their independent struggle. They disliked government intervention not only because they wanted to pursue their own course of education, but, also because they had not still forgotten the wounds inflicted in 1857.

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1. Ibid, pp.49-53.

This fact is important in so far as the Deoband school of thought never severed its relation with the political struggle. This sentiment found expression time and again in various efforts aiming at ultimate freedom[1] of the country. In the beginning the goal was pursued in full secrecy, as would be seen in the Silken Kerchief Movement[2] of Shaikh al-Hind during the second decade of this century. But finally, the Deoband Movement aligned itself openly with the emerging freedom struggle in the country.

In 1913, Maulāna Mahmūd Hasan (Shaikh al-Hind) one of the chief disciples of Maulāna Mohd. Qāsim, initiated a secret movement which aimed at gaining the freedom of the country through certain revolutionary means. This secret scheme has been named in Rolt Commission Report as "Silken Kerchief Letters" which were being used to exchange secret information and messages. Incidentally, however, the scheme came to light and Shaikh al-Hind with some of his disciples was arrested and exiled to the island of Malta where he remained confined for several years. His couriers, Maulāna

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1. Ulama-e-Haq, Vol.I, pp.128-29; 134-37; 164-68;236-39; 295-304.

2. See for details Tehrik Shaikh al-Hind, by Mohd. Miyan, 1975, Lahore.

Mohd. Mansoor Ansari and Maulana 'Ubaidullah Sindhi working for a long time had to live in exilement.[1]

After his release from Malta, Shaikh al-Hind became a member of Jam'iyyat al-'Ulama which was established a year before - in 1919 mainly by his own disciples to ptomote the struggle for independence. It worked side by side with Indian National Congress. Muslim luminaries in Jam'iyyat al-'Ulama-e-Hind, almost all of them being old boys of Deoband, enthusiastically participated in the freedom struggle just as they had taken active part in the Khilafat Movement. In 1926, the Calcutta session of Jam'iyyat passed the resolution of complete Independence - 3 years prior to the same resolution of the Indian National Congress. All the participant members were graduates of Deoband.[2]

During his visit to Darul Uloom of Deoband in 1969, Khan Abd al-Ghaffar Khan while addressing the students said, "My relation to Deoband dates back to the days when Shaikh al-Hind was still alive. Sitting here at Deoband, we envisaged plans as how to expel the British from the country and how to free India from British subordination. In fact, this institution has rendered great services towards the freedom of the country."[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. Tufail Ahmad Manglori, Musalmano ka Roshan Mustaqbil, pp. 402,490, Nizami Press, Badaun, 1943.
3. Tarikh-e-Darul 'Uloom, V.I, p.512.

It is surprising to note that in spite of this political sentiment ingrained in Deoband Movement from the beginning, the educational and academic devotion and the reformist purpose were never compromised. The main founder of the institution Maulāna Mohd. Qāsim himself had levelled the ground for this sincere and silent effort. This he did also in the form of certain directive principles which he formulated as the basis of functioning of the Madrasa. These principles provide an insight into the fact that how a single institution, totally unaided by the Government, without any regular financial means and in an antagonised and tense environment, brought about a pleasant change and restored the lost confidence to an otherwise totally depressed community. Some of the more important of these principles are as follows :

1) "So long as there is no regular or definite financial source, this Madrasa will function successfully. But in case a definite source of income or any other regular financial means like a manufacturing house or a <u>jāgir</u> is made available for this madrasa, it appears then that this God-fearingness and hopefulness will slip out of the hands and the divine help will cease to come about, and conflicts will develop among those working here. It is therefore advisable that regarding income and construction, a sort of meanslessness should be kept up in view throughout.

2) Participation of the Government or that of the nobility-class in the affairs of this Madrasa also appears harmful for it.

3) Donations from those seem more beneficial who do not desire renown. This should be kept in mind while receiving donation, as this would provide for the Madrasa a stronger foundation to perpetuate.

4) The members of the consultative body of the Madrasa should always keep in mind the betterment and good prestige of the Madrasa and must not show adamence in their contention. If such a situation arises, it appears then that the very foundation of the institution will be shaken."[1]

These principles are a vivid example of the Ulama's main concern for the Muslim masses. They had not only total indifference towards the government but even towards the Muslim nobility. But to call it separatism as is in vogue or regard it as introversion will be no more than an argument without evidence. For these 'Ulama chose for themselves on the one hand the harder path of simplicity and dedication. On the other hand they adopted a course of action which

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1. Tārīkh-e-Dārul Uloom, Vol.I, p.153.

brought for them independence of activity, while it helped restore confidence and optimism among the Muslim masses. The 'Ulama kept away from the Government and the so called elite class. But their close and continued contact with the Muslim public was refreshing and rejuvenating.

The seat of learning at Deoband as mentioned above was in fact the center of an educational movement meant for the whole sub-continent. The founder himself took steps to promote Islamic learning at many other places also.[1] The Madrasa Shāhi of Murādabād, Manba' al-Uloom of Gulāvadhi in district Meerut, Madrasa Murādiya of Muzaffar Nagar, Madrasa Jami' Masjid of Amroha are some of the examples of such theological centres as were founded by Maulāna Muhammad Qāsim himself.[2]

> "All these Madrasas are still rendering valuable religious servies. The graduates of these Madrasas, spread over from China to Africa Coasts,and from Tarkestān to Sri Lanka, have done unforgetable service to preserve Muslim identity and Islamic learning. It also deserves mention here that the 'Ulamā and graduates of Deoband never bowed down before the British might or magnificence

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1. Encyclopaedia of Islām, Vol.19(Urdu), Article Maulāna Mohd. Qasim, p.509. See Also Tarikh-e-Darul Uloom, pp.464-76.

2. Palanpuri, p.17.

and never compromised with it. Rather the Dārul Uloom Movement actively worked against British rule. They devoted themselves to their work silently. The bright examples of truthfulness and honesty, religiousness and fear of God, sympathy and common weal for the Muslim community, Martyrdom and self-less struggle, which they have come out with, are enviable for the 'Ulamā and graduates of all Muslim countries. Many 'Arab lands even cannot present such precedents as have been presented within last hundred years or so by them in the form of active struggle for preserving the prophetic learning, teaching, dissemination and propagation."[1]

3. MISSIONARY CHALLENGE TO ISLĀM AND MAULĀNA MOHD. QĀSIM:

We have noted above that India was raided even beofre 1857 by Christian missionary zealots from various parts of Europe and America belonging to different Christian orders.[2] These missionaries, with open support of the Government, did not prefer to work silently or anonymously. On the contrary

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1. Translated from Urdu version of Encyclopaedia of Islām, Vol.19, (Lahore, 1986), Article, Maulana Mohd. Qasim Nanautvi, pp.509-10.
2. Tārīkh-e-Dārul Uloom, Vol.I, pp.477-81.

they began to fling objections and caste aspersions on Islām and preached Christianity through harrassment and temptation.[1] Muslims being the greatest political victims, also became the greatest target of their attacks on Islāmic Faith, and unfounded objections to the life of the Prophet of Islām.[2] It was an unfortunate development as it led to create an atmosphere of discontent and tension among the Muslims. It was realised even by the more equitable English men themselves. Another unfortunate development for Muslims which took place as a corollary of missionary activity was the aggressive challenge of Hindū revivalist movement of Ārya Samājis. Encouraged and supported by Christian Missionaries, the Ārya Samājis also began to challenge Muslims in terms of public objections and attacks on Islāmic Faith.[3]

As a result, more than one from amongst the Muslim 'Ulama came out in order to debate with the Christian eclasiastics and the Ārya Samājis. Among the more renowned in this group were Maulāna Rahmatullahof Kerāna, Maulāna Sayyid Abu al-Mansoor of Delhi and Maulāna Muhammad Qāsim of Nānautah.[4] The first two in this field specialised in

1. Tārīkh-e-Dārul Uloom, Vol.I, pp.480-83.
2. Ibid, p.479.
3. Intisar ul Islām, ed. by Mohd. Miyan, Deoband (1930),pp.3-10
4. Tārīkh-e-Dārul 'Uloom, pp.485-89.

Biblical Studies and as such debated successfully with missionaries and pointed out the historical inconsistencies of the existing versions of New Testament etc.[1]

Maulāna Muhammad Qāsim in addition to such debates chiefly distinguished himself in brining to the fore the inner and inherent rationalism of Islamic faith system.

In 1876 a Kabīr Panthi landed aristocrate, Munshi Piyārelāl and father Nolls arranged a public forum in Chāndāpūr (district Shāhjahānpūr U.P.) in order to evaluate the truth of Islām, Christianity and Hinduism. In this he invited Christian bishops, Hindu Pandits and Muslim scholars. He named this Assembly as Mela-e-Khudā-Shanāsi (Fare of Divine Cognition).[2]

Among the main participants of this assembly were Pandit Dayānand Sarasvati (d. 1882), Maulāna Mohd.Qāsim and the British Bishop of Shahjahanpur father Nolls.[3] "Although there were three parties, Hindus, Muslims and Christians to participate in this. In reality, however, the debate was between Muslims and Christians."[4] The Maulana here delivered

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1. Maulana Rahmatullah defeated father Funder in open public debate, who never afterwards dared to face him. The Maulāna wrote also on this subject his famous book,"Izhār al-Haq", which has been translated in various languages including English.
2. Guftugu-e-Madhhabi, pp.2-5, Bareilly.
3. Spelling not certain: Nolls - is made out from Urdu.
4. Ibid, p.5.

such a well-argumented speech in refutation of Trinitarianism and in affiration of unity of God that everyone - friends and foes - had to acknowledge it.[1] After the dispersal of the assembly, one of the Christian priests who wanted to see the Maulāna is reported to have said: "I have participated in many such meetings and talked to many Muslim 'Ulamā, but neither have I heard such speeches nor seen such a scholar --- If we were to accept a Faith, on the basis of a speech, then we would have accepted Islām for the speech of this man."[2]

This "Mela" was held once again in the following year, i.e. March 1877. It was attended in addition to the former participants, by Munshi Indarman of Muradabad and Christian father Scott, Pandit Dayanand, founder of Ārya Samāj, who raised objections on Islām. Maulāna Qāsim delivered his speech in

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1. Munazir Ahsan Gilāni, Sawāneh Qāsmi, Vol.2, pp.510-13; P. Hardy : The Muslims of British India, p.171.

2. Guftugu-e-Madhhabi, Op.cit, p.40. A reportage of this "Mela" containing the speeches of Maulāna Nānautvi, was published shortly afterwards by Mohd. Hāshim 'Ali, Manager, of Matba' Hāshmi, Meerut, and Mohd. Hayāt, manager of Matba' Diyāi, under the title Guftugu-e-Madhhabi (theological exchange) or Waqi'a Mela-e-Khudā Shanāsi 1293/1876. See Guftugu-e-Madhhabi, pp.2-3.

reply on existence, Unity of God, pre-destination and free-will, and distortions in Biblical script. As before his lectures turned out the hall-mark of the session.[1]

Afterwards, Pandit Dayānand started a campaign of hostile remarks against Islām. Consequently, the Muslims invited Maulāna Qāsim to Roorkee where the founder of Ārya-Samāj was carrying his anti-Islamic campaign. He did not come out however to face the Maulāna whom he had known well, and who had come to Roorkee against all expectations and medical advice, as he was seriously ill those days. Pandit Dayānand left Roorkee and shortly afterwards reached Meerut to carry the same anti-Islāmic propaganda there. But the Maulāna followed him there too and forced him again to take to flight.[2]

At both places he tried his best to talk to Pandit Dayānand publicly or privately but the latter preferred

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1. History of Darul Uloom Deoband, V.I, pp.118-19. The minutes of this second session of religious debate in Shāhjahānpūr were compiled by Maulāna Fakhr al-Hasan of Gangoh and published under the name "Mubāhitha-e-Shāhjahānpur" of 1877. See pp. 2-9, Matba' Qasmi, 1915, Deoband.

2. Intisār-al-Islām (Deoband, 1930), pp.1-9; P. Hardy, Ulama in Politics : The Muslims of British India, p.171.

avoidance and flight. Finally, the Maulāna asked his disciples Maulāna Fakhr al-Hasan, Maulāna Mahmūd Hasan (Shaikh al-Hind) etc. to reply in public speeches the hostile objections and remarks made by Pandit Dayānand.[1]

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1. Intisār al-Islām, pp. 1-9. Maulāna Nānautvi himself wrote answers to the objections on Islamic Faith made by Dayānand. Intisar al-Islam contains 10 of these objections and their two-tier answers. The 11th objection has been discussed separately at length in Qibla Numā. The book is highly subtle in its discussions.

CHAPTER - III

HIS KALĀMI SYSTEM OF THOUGHT

1) A Mutakallim or a Kalāmi Philosopher
2) Relevence and Mian Features of His al-Kalam
3) Classification of His Works

CHAPTER - III

HIS KALAMI SYSTEM OF THOUGHT

1. A MUTAKALLIM OR A KALĀMI PHILOSOPHER:

It is rather paradoxical to realise that Maulāna Mohd. Qasim has been case to oblivion[1] as much for his contribution to Islāmic thought - particularly al-Kalām - as he is well-remembered for his founding Feoband Institution. One of the reasons, generally stated in the learned circles of Deoband itself for his books remaining un-attended is that the language of his writings is a little too difficult for the average scholars even.

This, however, is not the fact. Ironically it is the subtle reasoning, scientific approach and the logical sequence of his arguments —— revealing in the process the fallacious grounds of certain misconceptions or distortions, regarding a truth — which are rather discouraging for the escaping attention. Not the language —— which is fluent, easy and spontaneous in general. Exception may be made of a few places however, where the brevity of style or abundant use of technical

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1. One of his comments about himself revealingly shows his love of seclusion and embrrassment from renown : "This knowledge spoiled me or else I would have given away my-self to such anonymity that none about me would have ever known." Tarikh Darul Uloom, Vol.I, p.116.

terms seem to conspire against easy comprehension and fluency of style, particularly in the case of his treatise Āb-e-Hayāt or some sections of Taqrīr-e-Dilpazīr, Hadīth al-'Imā and Qibla Numā.

Another reason of neglecting his rationalistic genius in outer circles on academic grounds is related to a misconception of the academic worth of his contribution. Generally classed as Munāzirānah or polemical, his works have been ignored by the less informed as the product of a debatist environment created by the aggressive Missionaryism and revivalist Hinduism. Shaikh Mohd. Ikrām writes :

> "Maulāna Mohd. Qāsim did not live long enough. Whatever time of this borrowed life he was granted, much of that too was spent in polemical debates and other commotions. He never had time enough in the true sense of the word to write and compile. The few short expositions that he left behind carry a pre-dominantly debatist element."[1]

The above statement like several other statements contained in the book about Maulāna Mohd. Qāsim is far from the facts - indicating only an unauthetic and a casual

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1. Mawj-e-Kauthar, pp.199-200

treatment of the subject.[1] As for his writings the Maulāna in spite of his rather brief span of life wrote more than 25 books running into over 1500 printed pages — even if we exclude the unprinted pages[2] as well as his orations and speeches reported by others such as Mubāhitha-e-Shāh Jahānpūr, Brahi -e-Qāsmiyyah and Guftugu-e-Madhhabi etc. as we shall shortly see.

As regards "Pre-dominantly a debatist element" - the statement refelects a partial truth and technically refers the motivating force only. For in the first place, the above mentioned and certain other of his books are partially a debator's pride no doubt. For instance, Intisār al-Islām and Qibla Numā, written by himself contain replies to 11 objections to Islāmic faith and Shari'āh raised by Pandit Dayānand Saraswati, the founder of Ārya Samāji cult.[3] These books however are not fully a debator's exposition. Both comprise of two answers to each question, which are in fact two different levels of treating the same subject. The first

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1. For example, the writer of Mawj-e-Kauthar says: "A lecture delivered at Roorkee, was published under the title Qibla Numa." This book,however was not a "lecture" but an independent exposition motivated though by the Ārya Samāji objection in Roorkee on the nature of Qibla in Islām.Moreover Shaikh Ikrām quotes without mentioning his source "It is wellknown that Maulāna Qāsim was employed in Deoband Institution at Rs. 50/-" - whereas all contemporary and other sources and biographies speak unanimously of his never having accepted that position. See Mawj-e-Kauthar,pp.199-200;Cf. Tarikh-e-Darul 'Uloom,Vol.I,p.116;Sawaneh Qasmi,Vol.I, p.536.
2. Many such unprinted pages are preserved in the personal library of Late Maulana Abdal-Mughni at Phalawda(Dist.Meerut) and other places. See Palanpuri, p.23.
3. Bis Bade Musalman, pp.131-34.

of each set of answers certainly is in the nature of a 'tit for tat' necessitated by the implied disdain in the question or the inner folly of the objection itself. The second answer in reality represents a much higher level, particularly in Qibla Numā where the debator or polemic is left far below and a Mutakallim par excellent takes over.

A Mutakallim or a Philosopher of Faith:

Equipped though with a thorough knowledge of Islāmic sciences,[1] the Maulāna yet hardly refers an āyah of Qur'ān or Hadīth of the Prophet in his Kalāmi expositions.[2] On the other hand, he builds up his theorization on the basis of inferences drawn from his systematic reflections. This is a continued and equally spontaneous process of subtle reasoning - initially difficult to understand but for another characteristic of his writings : his unique exemplification and extremely vivid illustrations. To this aspect we shall return shortly after.

But to call him Mutakallim is to bring him down from his true and still higher place of the Philosopher of Islāmic

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1. Shairkoti, Anwār al-Nujūm, p.28. To know his exceptional contribution and place in this field, see his Qāsim al-'Uloom, Masābiḥ al-Tarāviḥ etc.; Cf. his biographies : Sawaneh Qāsmi, Vol.II & III, and Anwār-e-Qāsmi, Vol.I

2. Palanpuri, Op.cit., p.19.

faith. He is a philosopher not in the general sense of the word, but a philosopher who has knit together the ingredients of Islamic faith in a rational whole. No doubt when he spoke or wrote on questions Islāmic beliefs in response to some query or challenge, he appeared a Mutakallim. But when he theorises the issues of Islāmic faith one by one into a harmonious whole in the perspective of his broad vision, equitable treatment, piercing mind and above all his surprisingly subtle and yet clear reasoning,[1] he seems to outshine the brightest scholars of Islāmic history, and deserves to to called a Kalāmi philosopher rather than a Mutakallim.

The postulates of his interpretation of Islāmic faith-system are grounded in pure reason and rationalism. As such their appeal is not confined to Muslims only but they have a potential appeal to non-Muslims also. His colleague and friend Maulāna Ya'qūb says : "The Maulana's frame of mind was naturally and essentially philosophical. Therefore to his mind came inadvertently only philosophical thoughts - even small things awakened in him the broadest philosophical principles capable to solve many such other issues."[2]

One of his disciple Hakīm Mansoor 'Ali Khan gives his assessment of Nanautvi in the following words :

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1. Anwār al-Nujūm, pp.11, 23-28; Tārīkh-e-Darul 'Uloom, Vol.I, p.113; Madhhab-e-Mansūr, Vol.2, p.178.

2. S.A. Palanpuri, pp. 27-28.

"I have seen Maulāna Mohd. Qāsim Nanautvi very well. I have also listened to his speeches and reflected on his ideas and personal merits. His mind was even higher than the mind of those who were the compilers of philosophy. He had such a power to prove every problem of Sharī'ah and to refute every issue of philosophy contradictory to Islām through rational arguments that I have never seen another scholar of this calibre with such a power of reasoning and such a force of expression."[1]

The same author says further :

"Maulāna Mohammad Qāsim had turned all injunctions of Sharī'ah into issues of reason and rationalism. He used to say that all divine injunctions and Prophetic provisions are purely rational, but that every reason does not have access there. In this regard when he proved some problems through his rational arguments, even the most learned listened in dazed amazement. If a question seemed, apparently against reason, it seemed after his lecture absolutely in agreement with reason. When he started to refute by rational arguments those principles of philosophy which go against Islāmic faith or Sharī'ah, it seemed at that time as if Aristotle and Plato were but only kids before him."[2]

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1. Hakīm Mansoor Ali Khan, Madhhab-e-Mansūr, Vol.2, pp.176-78.
2. Ibid.

Reason and rationalism in the Western World has been the inner spirit of all progressive thought termed as 'Modernism' which is often confused with westernism. Briefly it refers to scientific outlook and rational approach. This approach is mainly based on rational perception and critical analysis of an issue. This helps ultimately to conclude and reach certain inferences giving to know the synthetic value of that issue or the total frame-work of many issues in a particular field. In this process personal and local views or partial feelings are continuously set aside or eliminated. Obviously this kind of treatment of an issue on grounds of reason and rationalism imparts it a universal value which can be appreciated not by a community or a section of people alone but by all human beings at large. In so defining modernism, westernism which has come to be a part and parcel of it, must also be eliminated as a local value. What remains then is nothing but a process of universal reasoning and judgement.

If seen in sociological perspective, this scientific outlook and rational approach characterised by modernims, which was due to dominate all academic developments throughout the world, needed a re-assessment of religious view also. In the case of Christianity it was the same old dilemma experienced by it earlier in medieval times also, which had produced but

a dogmatic rationalization known as scholasticism, which had hardly anything to do with universal reason.

In the case of Islāmic faith however, it presented no paradox or self-contradiction. For reason and religion in Islām are no two different things. This is even true in respect of Islāmic faith and its corollaries. However it needed a genius capable of differentiating the real from the falacious, the right from the wrong and the good from the bad.

It was destined for Maulāna Mohd. Qāsim Nānautvi to come up with this need of reassessing and re-interpreting the concepts of Islāmic faith in a rational frame-work capable of being appreciated even by the un-believers.

2. RELEVENCE AND MAIN FEATURES OF HIS AL-KALĀM:

His rational expositions can be divided mainly into three categories :

(1) Questions of Sharī'ah. Many hundred of pages written by him are related to questions of Sharī'ah involving an explanation of their rational bases such as the question of Riba (usuary) in India, the issue of Fidak, the commentary on last sections of Bukhāri, the exegesis (Tafsīr) of certain sūrahs of the Holy Qur'ān etc.

(2) Kalāmi discussions or rational statement of the issues of Islāmic faith. It may be sub-divided further into two kinds :

a) Single issues of faith, where the rational bases of a particular question or objection is brought out and explained.

b) Theorization of Islāmic faith as a whole. This is where the ultimate genius of Maulāna Mohd Qāsim comes into full light and Islām as a'reasoned faith' is profoundly explained.

Most of these discussions which come under the last mentioned two categories are generally scattered in various books and Rasāil. It is, however, painstakingly difficult to find out the discussion of a particular problem or question in these otherwise logically arranged writings. Still more difficult perhaps is the effort to get a broad spectrum or complete frame-work of his rational thought. This is because of the fact that most of his writings are without chapterization and sub-titles and other well-defined indications.

Maulāna Qārī Tayyab says in this respect :

"Maulāna Mohd Qāsim's philosophy is a land full of treasures of learning, cognition and knowledge. But it

is a land which has almost no signs or symbols indicating the path or making it accessable. His books due to the absence of chapters, titles, sub-titles, paragraphs, necessary explanations, annotations, list of contents, translations etc. are mostly inaccessable even to the average scholars, much less a common literate Muslim."[1]

A unique characteristic of his rational style in which he is unmatched in the whole Islāmic history is his exemplification of a subtle rational theory through perceptible illustration. It would have been perhaps most difficult to fully understand his rational thought without these vivid examples and strikingly imaginative illustrations. What is rational and subtle turns through his unique and continuous illustrations perceptible for the senses and simple to understand.[2] The following illustration will give an idea of this unique feature of his writings :

"Having accepted that the existence of God is His own and not borrowed from some other source, then doubtless His Existence must be inseparably so attached to His

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1. Maṣābīḥ al-Tarāvīh, ed. by Maulāna Ishtiyāq Ahmad, Deoband, 1976, see preface, p.16.
2. Ibid., p.15.

Essence as the light with the sun and the heat with fire. Just as it is not possible that the sun is there and the light is not or the fire is there and heat is not, in the same way it will also not be possible that His Essence is there and His existence is not. Rather the very concept of there being the essence of God without His existence - must be wrong and unthinkable, for God is none other than this very existence and beingness."

"Thus, the relation between God's essence and His existence is like the relation between numeral two and its duality. Just as duality can never separate from numeral two in any condition or at any time - neither in mind nor in outside, similarly the existence of God can never separate from His essence. This is so because just as the duality of numeral two is not the same as that of its numerable - i.e. things countable as two - , likewise the existence of God is not the same as that of the creation's existence. It follows then that the duality of the numerable and the existence of the created both are perishable, but the duality of numeral two and the existence of God are ever-lasting imperishable and inseparable."[1]

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1. Maulāna Mohd Qāsim : Hujjat al-Islām, pp.12-13.

The last category of Maulāna Qāsim's writings, as cited above — theorization of Islāmic faith on rational grounds as a whole — forms our subject matter. This we have selected because it has the greatest relevance to this era of hours which seeks to know and understand every thing through a rational plan, be it the physical facts of life, moral conflicts of human nature or the rational basis of a religious faith, if at all a faith has to offer one, as does Islām. Islāmic faith has no doubt become more understandable rationally through his writings than ever before.

We have confined our study mainly to the sphere of his Kalāmi ideas as it fulfils a geniun need of this day. A number of his biographies have been written.[1] In spite of the wide range of treating his works none of these biographers or other commentators[2] on him, gives the true scope of his contribution in the sphere of al-Kalām - except to the extent of giving expression to this relization and desire.

In this sphere we have tried further to concentrate our attention to the rational whole of his interpretation rather

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1. The oldest and the briefest is Sawāneh Qāsmi by Maulāna Mohd. Yaqūb Nanautvi, a friend of Maulāna Qāsim and a learned scholar. The second is Sawāneh Qāsmi in 3 Vols. by Maulāna Munāzir A. Gilani. A third is Anwār-e-Qasmi by Prof. Anwār al-Hasan Shairkoti, in 2 Vols, Published in Pakistan. The second volume could not be made available to us so far. if at all it has been published.

2. Intisar al-Islam, ed. by Maulāna Mohd. Miyan, Qasim al-Uloom ed. by. Shairkoti, Qibla Numa, Masabih al-Taravih, etc. ed. by Maulna Ishtiyaq Ahmad.

than to the single issues picked up from here and there as has been the case so far.

This random treatment of his Kalāmi ideas and books has done unwillingly more damage than any homage to his real contribution. Being the easier and more wel-known side of his Kalāmi ideas, his speeches delivered at polemical gatherings, reproduced in the form of reprtages by others, have come to be highlighted as his main contribution. In reality it represents a small section of his al-Kalām. This is why through such books as were not even written by him, he came to be recognized as a religious debatist and his contribution as polemical. These speeches are no doubt representative of his style, but do not give the true scope of his al-Kalām.

His al-Kalām on the other hand if seen and studied in his own books, emerges as a complete and positive rational philosophy of Islāmic Faith. His postulates of reason and characteristic treatment together, provide a universal accessability to the inner rational view of Islāmic conception of faith.

Another unique feature of his Kalāmi system of philosophy is that it does not seek to outstretch the beliefs to fit to

a particular rational mould, nor it attempts to twist the rational principles to suit to the Faith and Sharī'ah of Islām. In his system, both — Sharī'ah and Reason — remain where they are. Yet their mutual correspondence and complementary relation has been brought into focus.

Still remarkable is the fact that this apparently difficult task has been achieved on almost a visible level. What is rational is perceptible too in his philosophical system. This perceptibility has been brought to bear by the means of exemplifying the theoretical through the physical phenomena. The process of this visualization is so continuous in his ideas that his rational theories and statements may well be defined as a 'Picture-panorama'. The most difficult on theoretical level consequently turns far easier to grasp on perceptible level. This can be most vividly seen in his such books as Taqrīr Dilpazīr (Urdu), Hadīth al 'Ima (Persian), Qibla Numā, Hujjat al-Islām (Urdu), al-Hazz al-Maqsoom (Arabic) etc.

Notwithstanding this 'picturesque- theorization,' the shere subtleness of his ideas in certain books and <u>risālahs</u> or sections of them, seems to make it difficult sometimes for even persons with more than average of scholarship or under-

standing to fully comprehend. Professor Anwar al-Hasan of Shairkot, in his brief introduction to Hadīth al-'Ima, sums up by saying :

> "Whatever we could comprehend, we have written down a summary of it. Now whatever you can grasp, try it for yourself through."[1]

This difficult comprehension in his books, apart from the subtleties of his ideas, is nevertheless related to the mysterious nature of the subject also, as is the case in the above cited books. The subject of identity and relativity of things, nature and purpose of creation, essence and attributes of God in itself involves mysteries of the highest level. Any conception, discussion or comprehension of them on rational plane is bound to have its own obscurities. In the words of Maulāna Qāsim himself, "all divine and prophetic injunctions (involving all this) are rationally comprehensible, but not every individual's reason has access there."[2] In this work we have rather confined ourselves to the basic faith of Islām as interpreted in his <u>Kalāmi</u> writings. Thus, the

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1. Anwar al-Nujūm, p.434.
2. Madhhab-e-Mansūr, Op.cit., Vol.2, p.178.

discussions of divine essence and attributes involving issues of pure philosophy have not been touched upon here. Moreover this subject has been treated at length by the Maulāna and as such requires separate treatment, which our limited scope here does not allow us.

The writings of Maulāna Qāsim are usually based on rational arguments rather than Riwāyat (traditions). He had realised that Muslim trend of Islāmic thought ought to change as the people would not confine themselves to traditions only in the wake of rationlist revolution already knocking at the door. They would seek to know the inner wisdom and the rational basis of everything. Hujjatullāh al-Baligāh of Shāh Waliullāh anticipated this changing trend, while Maulāna Qāsim a century later stood at the threshold of Western revolution of ideas. His response forms precious additions to the understanding of Islāmic Faith and Sharī'ah on rational plane.[1]

Maulāna Qāsim's contribution to Islāmic thought is different from that of Shāh Waliullāh mainly from three angles.

1) Shāh Waliullah did not make al-Kalām a subject of his independent contribution. Maulāna Qasim however,

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1. S.A. Palanpuri, pp.18-19.

contributed profusely in this field of Islāmic learning.[1] This he did not only in keeping with the basic rules of al-Kalām but he raised the status of this discipline to a height where it became a positive philosophy of Islām. For he did not speak merely on single issues of Islāmic faith or on particular questions of it as hithertofore had generally been the case. Rather he has brought out the inner rationalism of the Faith in its totality. Islām in his writings is not a traditional faith inherited through generations but a rational science where every aspect - even its faith system - is perfectly in agreement with human reason. This is in fact his main contribution, more important still than his other contributions to the propagation and preservations of Islāmic learning in the form of Deoband Institution.

2) Shāh Waliullah has explained the underlying wisdom of the main principles of Islām as well as the inner meaning of certain sections of the Prophetic traditions. But Maulāna Qāsim did not ignore even the most ordinary of these sections. Even those small things of Islāmic jurisprudence (Fiqhī Furū'āt) as have been generally considered against all analogy, have found strong arguments in his system of rationalism. However, in this particular sphere not much work could be done as the

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1. Ibid.

Maulāna did not live long. But whatever was made possible it may serve as a guide to the direction.[1]

3) The rational basis in the writings of Shāh Waliullah is mostly theoretical. But in the case of Maulāna Qāsim, even the most theoretical issues have been turned into perceptible facts i.e., they are made observale facts through his unique and perfect exemplification which is seen nowhere else.[2]

We bring to an end our discussion of the main characteristics of Maulāna Qāsim's rational statement of Islāmic faith, and philosophy of Islām as a religion, by quoting a passage in this regard of Maulāna Qāri Muhammad Tayyab who has beautifully summarised the main features of Maulāna Qāsim's rational approach :

"The order of the preludes to the main discussion being natural, so that even the most important inferences seem to emanate by themselves. The discussion being rationalistic and orderly which appeals the mind and finds access directly to the heart. In addition to this the sectional ramifications of his discussion seem to spread in all directions covering all the sides of a particular problem and unveiling every aspect and

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

angle of the issue in question. This not only solves the problem in question but hundreds of other similar questions which come under that category get solved in principle through this interpretation. It seems to open new avenues of many other subjects of learning and cognitive knowledge which in turn seem to level the ground for still newer issues."

"Faced with this situations one finds himself under compulsion to recognize that even a trifling section of Sharī'ah is being supported by many rational principles or several principles of reason are working in this trifling section of Sharī'ah. Due to all this, an issue of Sharī'ah appears not only a section of reason but a part of nature itself."[1]

3. CLASSIFICATION OF HIS WORKS:

As for the books and other writings left by him, they have been counted variously. Some have counted all of his writings separately as about seventy five in all.[2] This is in case not only his books but also all his Rasāils (letters) - many of them running into fifty or more pages - If counted

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1. Hikmate-Qāsmiyyah, pp.20-22.
2. Masabih al-Taravih, Op.cit, Deoband, 1976, p.15.

subject-wise separately. Maulāna Qarī Tayyab, former Muhtamim of Darul Uloom, Deoband, has put the number of his books at thirty.[1] This is because he has counted many Risālahs bound together in a volume as one book. Sa'īd Ahmad Palanpuri fixes the number of his works at thirty six.[2] We have put the number at thirty seven.

In all these are thirty seven books, counting every Risālah of Qāsim al-'Uloom separately and deleting those mentioned more than once, is scattered the wide range of Maulāna Qāsim's philosophy of Islamic faith as well as his rational and analytical views on many issues of Sharī'ah which ranhe from Tafsīr, critical studies of various Ahadīth to rational discussion of juridical and Sufistic problems.

The writings of Maulana Muhammad Qasim can be divided into three kinds in so far as their comprehensibility is concerned. Clearly some of them are easily understandable by mediocres. In the same respective sequence we list his books in the following pages, giving briefly their subject, importance and other necessary and available details in separate columns. Although in this listing of his books we have mainly relied on Sa'īd

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1. Ibid.
2. Sa'īd Ahmad Palanpuri, p.20.

Ahmad Palanpuri rather good classification[1] of the Maulāna's works, yet we have added some more details wherever necessary and if available, and rectified certain details needing eaactitude.

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1. Urdu Trl. of Maulān Nanautvi's Tauthīq al-Kalām : Kyā Muqtadi par Fatiha Wajib Hai ? Deoband, 1977, See Introduction, pp.20-26.

CLASSIFICATION

OF

HIS WORKS

A - EASILY COMPREHENSIBLE:

S.No.	Name of the Books	Subject	Other details
1.	Qiblah Numā	Ka'bah is not worshipable. It only shows the direction of worship.	Only the first quarter of this book is easy.
2.	Hadiah al-Shī'ah (Urdu)	An equitable discussion on controversial issues with Shi'ahs.	
3.	Tohfa-e-Lahmiyyah (Urdu)	Eating of meat is in agreement with human nature.	Its authorship is common: by him and by one of his colleagues.
4.	Ajwibah-e-Arba'īn 2 Vols.(Urdu)	Answers to the forty questions put by certain Shi'ahs.	The first part of this contains two answers to each question, one written by him and the other by Maulana Abdullah of Ambehta. The second volume was written by Maulāna Qāsim alone. The discussion of Jum'ah in the villages has been taken out from it and published separately as Ahkām al-Jum'ah .

5.	Fuyuḍ-e-Qāsmiyyah (Urdu & Persian)	Fifteen letters on different subjects, some of them in Urdu others in Persian.	
6.	Wāqi'ah-Mela-e-Khuda Shanāsi or Guftugū-e-Madhhabi (Urdu)	Kalami discussion of the truth of Islāmic Faith.	It contains the minutes and the speeches delivered during the first round of polemical discussion at Shahjahanpur in 1293 AH. The compilers were Munshi Mohd. Hāshim, proprieter of Matba' Hāshmi and Maulavi Mohd. Hayāt, Prop. Matba' ḍiai.
7.	Mubahithah-e-Shāhjahānpūr (Urdu)	Kalāmi discussions and refutation of Christian Faith.	In 1295 AH, the second round of polemical discussion was arranged again at Chāndāpūr in district Shāhjahānpūr. The minutes including the speeches of Maulāna Qāsim were compiled by his disciples Maulāna Fakhr al-Hasan of Gangoh and Shaikh al-Hind Maulāna Mahmūd al-Hasan.
8.	Latāif Qāsmiyyah (Persian)	A collection of nine letters on different topics.	The last letter of it is also found in Fuyuḍ-e-Qāsmiyyah. The two letters of al-Haqq al-Sarīh are also included in it, therefore, it has not been mentioned separately.

9.	Tasfiyah al-'Aqā'id (Urdu)	Kalāmi discussions of Islamic principles in reply to Sir Sayyid's query.	It contains the letter of Sir Sayyid who put his fifteen principles governing his approach and writings on which he wanted to know if at all there was any fault of approach. Each of these principles has critically been elaborated upon by Maulana Qasim.
10.	Intisār al-Islām (Urdu)	Answers to ten different objections to Islāmic teachings by Pandit Dayānand Saraswati, the founder of Āryā Samāj, a Hindu revivalist cult.	The best of the editions is that published by Majlis Ma'arif al-Qur'an, Deoband.
11.	Hujjah al-Islām (Urdu)	Kalāmi discussion of principles of faith.	It is almost a summary of Maulāna Qāsim's Kalāmi thought and approach and as such a very important treatise published from different places, the best being the edition of Majlis Ma'arif al-Qur'ān.
12.	Qasā'id Qāsmi (Urdu, Persian, Arabic)	Poetic compositions.	
13.	Makātīb Qāsmi (Persian)	Some letters on questions of Sufiism.	
14.	Al-Ajwibah al-Kāmilah (Urdu)	Answers to five questions of a Shī'ah.	

15. Commentary on Sahih al-Bukhari (Arabic)	The last five or six sections of Sahih al-Bukhari have the Hashiya (Commentary) of Maulana Qasim entrusted to him by Maulana Ahmad Ali Saharanpuri, who had completed the major part of this commentary himself.	

All these works are easily understandable. The discussions are sublime. The language and the style is simple. People with little understanding can very well follow them.

B - RELATIVELY DIFFICULT WORKS:

16. Masabih al-Taravih (Persian)	The topic is evident from the title itself i.e. Taravih (prayer of Ramadan). In fact it is the philosophy of Salat (prayer). It contains surprisingly curious discussions.	It has been translated into Urdu under the title Anwar al-Masabih by Maulana Ishtiyaq Ahmad. But the book still needs further clarification and annotations.
17. Taqrir Dilpazir (Urdu)	The framework of Kalami discussions is the widest and as such it is a masterpiece. It is the most representative of his Kalami thought and and hence the basis of our present study also.	The writer wanted to add some more discussions but he did not live long to do that. Still it stands as the last word till now on the subject.

18. Brāhīn-e-Qāsmiyyah (Jawāb-e-Turki-bi-Turki) (Urdu)	Kalāmi discussions.	The author of the book is Maulāna Abd al-'Ali, a desciple of the Maulāna, but the ideas are those of Maulāna Mohd. Qāsim himself. This fact is evident from the style of the language also which does not have the level of culturedness characteristic of Maulāna Qāsim's writings.
19. Taḥdhīr al-Nās (Urdu)	It is a discussion of a Hadith narrated by Ibn 'Abbas. It is a wonderful discussion of the belief of 'discontinuation of prophecy,' The subtle discussions, however, could not be fully grasped by many and unfounded objections were raised which he answered.Even certain lines, originally different and separate, were conjoined out of their context and sent to get a Fatwā from al-Hijāz of his having turned a Kāfir.	In his own time this book became controversial. A number of objections were replied by the author. Some of his un-published answers are preserved at Phalāwda (dist. Meerut). in the personal library of Maulana Abd al-Mughni
20. Munāzira-e-'Ajībah (Urdu)	It contains the answers to the 10 academic objections raised on Taḥdhīr al-Nās.	These academic objections were raised by an eminent Muslim scholar, Maulāna 'Abd al-'Azīz. It is evident from these ten objections that they were not directed for conflict, but to know the truth. He was finally convinced. The book contains the exchange of letters between him and Maulāna Qāsim. There are other objections, and their answers by Maulāna Qāsim whose manuscripts

		are preserved by different people especially in the personal library of Maulāna 'Abd al-Mughni at Phalāwda, Distt. Meerut.
21. Asrār-e-Qur'āni (Persian)	Research based answers to questions on Qur'ān. This also includes commentary of the last two sūrahs of Qur'ān.	
22. Intibāh al-Mu'minīn (Persian)	It is a collection of two letters concerning a Hadīth of Mishkāt al-Masābīh narrated by 'Ali in connection of the Caliphs.	
23. Jamāl-e-Qāsmi (Urdu)	A collection of two letters, one dealing with Wahdat al-Wujud and the nature of "life after death" of the Prophets, and the other dealing with the capability of the dead to listen.	
24. Tauthīq al-Kalām (or Al-Dalīl al Muḥkam) (urdu)	A discussion of recitation of Qur'ān not being obligatory on *Muqtadi* (*the one* offering his prayer behind an Imam).	Both names denote the same book but the former has some additional lines.

25. Qāsim al-'Uloom 4 volumes (Persian)	These four volumes are comprised of eleven articles on such variegated topics as the discussion of (1) "Fidak" (2)Hadith of Imam Mahdi;(3)That which is not Lawful for other Than God; (4)Nature of Matter & Its Forms; (5)Correction between two Hadiths about Maktaba;(6) The meaning of miracles;(7) Usuary in India; (8) Martyrdom of Hussain; (9) Meaning of Imamat; (10)Hadith Concerning "Imam of the period"; (11)The letters of Maulana Muhammad Husain Batalvi concerning questions and doubts about miracles. In 1977 Prof.Anwar al-Hasan Shairkoti has translated all the letters contained in Qasim's al-'Uloom into Urdu with necessary annotations and a valuable introduction, from Lahore.	It contains ten letters of Maulan Mohd.Qasim (and one letter of Maulana Mohd.Husain of Batala seeking clarification on miracles.Batalvi was an eminent scholar of Ahl-Hadith circle).
26. Al Hazz al-Maqsūm (Arabic)	A highly philosophical discussion of the indivisible particle. It also includes a discussion of Sim'a (Sufistic devotion to music).	A Collection of two letters addressed to Maulana Mohd.Rahimullah of Bijnaur, a disciple of Maulana Qasim.These letters are in fluent Arabic language.

C - STILL MORE DIFFICULT BOOKS:

27. Qiblah Numā (Urdu)	The first fourth part of it is very easy to comprehend. But the last three fourths are very difficult to follow. It requires a good level of scholarship and concentration to understand its subtle discussions concerning Ka'bah not being worshipable but that it shows only the direction of worship.	The edition with Maulāna Ishtiyāq Ahmad's annotations, published by Dārul 'Uloom,Deoband, is good enough but does not solve the difficulty fully. Maulāna Qāri Tayyab had also written a commentary on this book but unfortunately it was lost. Its discussions of the abstract like that of Hadīth al-'Ima are highly philosophical.
28. Hadīth al-'Ima (Persian)	This is one of the Risālahs contained in Qāsim al-'Uloom and deals with the meaning of a hadīth narrated by Abu Razīn. Its discussions are very difficult and mainly are related with such questions as existence,divine attributes and essence etc.	One of the most representative of Maulana Qasim philosophical al-Kalam.
29. Āb-e-Hayāt (Urdu)	The subject of this book is affirmation of life of Prophets after death. This is considered the most difficult among the books of Maulāna Qasim.	Shaikh al-Hind used to say about it that whoever comprehended this book, he discovered Maulāna Nānautvi.

PART TWO : CONTRIBUTION TO AL-KALĀM

ISLĀM —— THE RATIONAL FAITH

CHAPTER - IV

REASON AND TRUTH

1) Phenomena of Change
2) The Creator
3) Tacit Tawhid in all Polytheism

CHAPTER - IV

REASON AND TRUTH

1. Phenomenon of Change:

All the human beings belong to the same stock or species. Yet they have not only vast differences and conflicts amongst themselves but even seem often after one another's blood. This observation gives rise often to the perplexion as to who is guilty and who is innocent, who is right and who is wrong or who is good and who is bad —— pointing to various possibilities. Maybe all of them are right or all of them wrong; maybe neither all are right nor all are wrong. The ultimate truth always appears concealed under a heap of numerous probabilities and doubts. Thus the final cognizance of truth is a mind-baggling task, even in the material facts of day to day life, much less the cognition of truth in the meta-physical realm.[1]

But in this world of pain and struggle, there is always a solution and relief to be found for all kinds of questions and problems. This is because the capacity to

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1. Taqrīr Dilpazīr(T.D.): Maulāna Qāsim Nānautvi, Matba Ahmadi, Delhi (Published before 1884), p.4

intelligent thinking has been gifted to every individual. If it can be put to use in differentiating and knowing the worldly merits from demerits or benefit from harm, why can't it be applied to be utilized in the search of the ultimate truth concerning human purpose in this intricately woven universal system and the world of natural laws. This is in order to see if at all there is a maker and sustainer of this world or as the atheists say, it is a self-evolving workshop of life.[1]

"To begin with, when we look at some house, we comprehend without exerting our mind that there must have been a maker of this house. From the smallest to the largest, there is no house on this Earth, which may not have been built by someone. Then how comes that a house of such dimensions as this vast universe, should have come into existence without a maker. This is simply incomprehensible. Well, if the signs of utter neediness in the world and the symbols of drastic variations should not have been obvious, it might have been possible for us to say that just in the manner there is no maker of God, there is in the same way

1. T.D., p.5; Mubāhitha, pp.77-83.

no maker of this world too, and that it exists by itself."[1]

But look up anywhere and you will witness the effects of lowliness and baseness. The sky, the sun and the moon are always on the move, never settled; rising or setting, shining brightly or being eclipsed. Likewise observe the fire which is so restless that it cannot be held together, the wind flowing or racing sometimes, or still and motionless at other times. While in motion, it flows sometimes to north and, sometimes to south or the east or west. Similarly the water is pushed away by the wind to distant places, nor to speak of the land which is trampled or dug up or filled up or made untidy; similar is the case of vegetation which grows small and larger too as it turns lush green or dries up. Then the water and earth together produce innumerable varieties of vegetation, flowers and fruits which are all different from one another.[2]

Likewise the living creatures, particularly the human beings who are though made of the same four elements, they cognisably differ from one another in their disposition,

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

features, habits and temperament.[1] Apart from that there are a number of agents of physical neediness such as hunger, thirst, health, sickness, cold and heat in addition to the forces, of greed, passion etc. which taken together seem to ruin the whole honour of life and corner down all human wisdom and reason. Whereas other creatures mainly need eating and drinking and do not care for cloth, house, vehicle, respectability, rank or estate, sweet or sour, the human beings cannot live without them.[2]

"If mankind who is unanimously the most elated of all creatures is as earthly and humble as is evident from the fact that he is held by neck from all directions by the forces of nature, not to speak of the changing phenomena permeating the whole world, then human reason can hardly be inclined to accept that this work-house of Nature is a purposeless and blind evolution." [3]

If we look deeper down it becomes all the more evident that whoever in this world of sorts seems to merit better qualities or higher position, he is held a greater prisoner,

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1. Ibid.
2. T.D., p.6, Hujjat al-Islām, pp.1-3.
3. Ibid, Hujjat al-Islām, pp.2-3; Mubāhitha, p.73.

like a king in prison who is watched more closely and strictly than an ordinary sepoy. Thus in the heavens, none appears greater than the sun and moon, whereas on this Earth man is supreme. In reality however, man is superior to all in this world.

If the sun and the moon have the light of rays which illuminates the earth and the heavens, man has the light of reason which enlightens the time and space and the whole of the universe. If this light can show the faces, that light unveils the truth. If for that light the heavenly bodies could be worshipped, for this light man deserved it still more.[1]

2. THE CREATOR:

In any case, when the constituents of this world including man with all superiority are helplessly arrested by all kinds of baser pressures and enchained in physical and other compulsions, it points to the existence of some ruler on their heads who keeps them on their toes, never

1. Ibid.

allowing them complascency lest they become haughty and appear indifferent and independent. Their utter needfulness therefore should be for them a source of cognition of God and they might know that it is the character of His creation through which He compels them to perform all sorts of work and keeps up the phenomena of change sweeping their existence.[1] This is exactly the same story as wee see in the case of a good administrator who keeps his subordinates always on their toes and yet transfers them also time and again to various places.[2]

Those gifted with understanding learnt from this the administration of states but hardly heeded as to who is the Ultimate Administrator and why He does so.

Thus this phenomenon of continuous change [3] compels us into feeling that the final arbiter must be someone other than us who is all powerful to do things at will. This conclusion seems to be reinforced as we look to the vast majority of believers Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus etc.

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1. T.D., pp.6-7; Hujjah al-Islām, pp.2-3.
2. T.D., p.7.
3. Mubāhitha, pp.81-82.

The observation in question leads us to infer, as we did, not only of the existence of some creator but it also brings to the fore the truth of His being One and Alone. This appears however to run contrary to the Christian idea of Trinity[1] of God or the Zoroastrian Dualism - God of good and God of evil - or those who believe in still more numerous gods.[2]

3. TACIT TAWHĪD IN ALL POLYTHEISM:

It is various however to notice that at the core their theistic ideology, all the polytheists Christains, Zoroastrians, Hindus etc. have essentially recognised monotheism, but for their fallacious reasoning, were led astray into polytheistic ideas which were reinforced and built upon by later dogmatists to become finally a facade of conviction for believers.[3]

But the fact remains that the argument against observation is not trustworthy and acceptable. Normally, anything contrary to reason is unacceptable without strong

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1. Ibid, p.23; T.D., pp. 114-17.
2. T.D., p.8.
3. T.D., p.8; Guftugū, p.11.

argument. But that which is proved to reason without argument such as 2 x 2 = 4 cannot be disproved by a hundred arguments even. The arguments must be fallacious if they seek to establish which is paradoxical to observation or plain fact. Human reason will set aside all arguments which go against observed facts such as the rising sun cannot be disputed on the strength of a clock telling otherwise, which must be indisputably itself slow and wrong.[1]

Unity and Trinity:

The Christians believe in three Gods just as they believe that the three together are ONE, hence their paradoxical position of Unity in Trinity. The invalidity of this self-contradictory position is as evident as day from night, even more perhaps since the impossibility of two being one or the futility of four five six being one, is equally shared by Christians themselves with the rest of the world. Now if Trinity of God is as invalid a concept as obviously it is to all reason, and the paradox of Unity in Trinity is as futile as evidently it is, then

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1. T.D., pp.8-9; Hujjāh al-Islām, p.24.

what remains of the Christian Faith is nothing but unity of God — a faith human reason finds itself at peace with.[1]

Futility of God-head in man:

The trustworthiness of something which is accepatable directly is always far greater than something acceptable only indirectly. We infer of the existence of fire behind the wall no sooner than we see smoke but we need no inference for the rise of the sun when we are face with the phenomenon. Human reason rejects outright God being one of mankind or man being God. For, it goes without saying that the creator must be free from all want and that mankind is totally wanting with innumerable physical constraints and compulsions such as hunger thirst health etc. It is then only bewildering to learn that Shree Ram and Shree Krishna, Jesus Christ or Uzair are incarnation of God or the son of God. In this case, even if the existence of more than One God could be proved by some logic, these humans at least cannot be God.[2] The idea of man being God or otherwise is directly rejectable by reason.

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1. T.D., pp.9-12.
2. T.D., p.12; Infra, pp.105-6; Qiblā Numā, p.29; Mubāhithā, p.98.

Free Will : Creatorship of the Created:

As for those who perceive themselves as the Creator of voluntary acts and God as the creator of involuntary ones, their position too is no better than others due to the inherent self-contradiction in their stand.

In the first place, such people (rotaries of free-will) count themselves among Muwahhids of great merit which means they conceive Tawhīd as the basic faith. Secondly they are outwitted in favour of Tawhīd by their very idea that God and His servant - man - have separate powers of creation.

All human beings then as the creatures of God and being countless in number, with innumerable Jinns and Angels which form part of their belief - must all be the creators. Consequently man as a creator according to this notion must surpass the creative power of God - both in number and variety. How can this conviction be reconciled with a rational view of faith of which they speak, in the wake of the absolute powers and greatness of the creator and the humility and powerlessness of man, the created being.[1] If

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1. T.D., pp. 12-13; Intisār, p.71.

$2 \times 2 = 4$ is invariably definite, the definitiveness of calculation lies in the intelligent minds' comprehension of the meaning of two and four and of the principle of multiplication. Once having learnt it to be so, one will never take 2 to mean 3, or 4 to mean 5. Having comprehended the meaning of the absolute power and grace of the creator and the meaning of human powerlessness and humility, it is not possible then that one should not conceive God as Great and Almighty in absolute terms.[1] Without this the concept of Tawhīd or the absolute unity of God cannot find validity which variously they seek to establish.

Thirdly, every one knows that if voluntary acts emanate from mankind's free will, that Free will after all is not his own - for it is no act in itself for which it may be termed voluntary or otherwise. To be born human or to be sighted or blind, tall or short deaf or listening is of no man's own accord. Thus be it human will, capacity or life or limbs all have been created and granted by God. That is why if one or all of them are lost, none of them can be recreated.[2] How can a man then think of his being the creator of his acts which will be tantamount to saying that the field and

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1. T.D., p.13; Hujjāh al-Islām, p.7
2. T.D., pp.13-14.

all its farming, tilling, sowing, watering with all labour and care belongs to Mr. X, but the crop, in any case, is mine. Thus after having professed of Tawhīd and Creatorship of God, the argument of human creatorship is a claim which is falsified by its own contradiction. It is as self contradictory as saying my "wife is a widow" or "my son is an orphan" - which comes practically to mean that my wife is not a widow and my son is not an orphan.[1] It is therefore evident that such people too, barring their superficial claim to creatorship, believe ultimately in God as the Only Creator.

Belief in Dualism:

Then there are those who believe in separate Creators of absolute good and absolute evil, mixed up in this world and hence the eternal conflict. They also represent a similar paradox of faith which is based indeed on a basic misconception of Tawhīd.[2]

The fallacy of Dualism is that if good and evil both are taken to have been created by one and the same God, then

1. Ibid.
2. T.D., pp.14-15.

this evil will be attributable to God in the same way as good - whereas He is far above from all evil and must be the Creator of good only.[1] In order to safeguard against attribution of evil to God, they divided the God-head into two : a God of all evil and and a God of all good; Ahraman and Yazdan or Ahura-Muzda.

Creation, however, has nothing to do with doing good or committing evil. Both are drastically different from each other, whereas for analogy there must be two things of similar nature. Some examples will clarify the confusion:

If a potter knowingly makes a vessel of ugly shape or a deft calligrapher deliberately writes with distorted proportions, in such a case only that pot and only that script will be regarded as ugly or distorted and not the potter and the calligrapher. Similarly in a puppet show, some of the puppets are controlled dexterously while others are moved clumsily.. But even that clumsilness is considered part of the expertise of the controllers. Finally, we experience that a pure thing if touched by refuse or rubbish is turned impure. But if this is the analogy why then is it

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1. T.D., pp.14-15; Mubahithah, p.85; For a very subtle discussion of it see T.D., pp.169-74, 145-46.

that the sun-light touches ev
and yet does not get impure
lights up the impurity of [illegible]
ly is that the two are not of the same nature; one being energy the other a weighty material.

In the same way, the divine light also encompasses the existence of every thing but the evil of these things does not and cannot reach God. In other words, creation is an attribute of God and not evil. Evil remains where it is created.

On the other hand, the creation of evil too is part of the grand show that this world is - indicating the perfection of the Great Controller, the Creator of good and evil both. Thus the two creators as conceived fallaciously by them (Zoroastrians) turned out to be One and the Same. This is no impossibility that one thing at the same time may be good for one and bad for another. The act of punishing a thief or dacoit is bad for him but good for the public. Therefore this group (Zoroastrians), minus their 'misconception of good and the evil' also professes of <u>Tawhīd</u> and becomes one with <u>Muwahhids</u>.[2]

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1. T.D. p.15; Infra, pp.131-34.

2. T.D., p.16.

Hinduism:

As far as the Hindūs are concerned, though they worship numerous deities, the Creator to them is One and single only. Mistakenly, however, they believe in incarnation of the Supreme Being that He appeared in different human forms in this world at various intervals. Inasmuch as the idols or stone-worship is concerned, in spite of all worship and glorification, the Hindus do not believe in their being the Creator or Supreme Being.[1]

It is therefore clear that almost all major religious communities, barring their mid-way fallacies or misunderstanding are believers in Tawhīd — the oneness of God. It appears that these fallacies or miscomprehensions in conceiving of Tawhid, arose mainly from a lack of proper perspective of faith which speaks loudly of the inattention of the believers towards their faith.[2] It was contaminated where it was pure, and misconceived where it could be genuinly comprehended. Still, the number of those who believe in one God far exceeds that of the believers in plurality of God.

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1. T.D., p.16.
2. Ibid, p.17.

CHAPTER - V

UNITY AND EXISTENCE

1) Unity and Plurality
2) Existence : Real and Reflected
3) Essence and Existence

C H A P T E R - V

UNITY AND EXISTENCE

1. UNITY AND PLURALITY:

We have seen so far that most of the people in the world profess of *Tawhīd* as also we have surveyed the flimsy arguments of those who are at rest in their anti-Unitarian stance. But the demolition of the other's house does not ensure the construction of one's own - which is built up only when it is built.[1]

In case of more than one God, the world can not remain in tact. It goes without saying that God is He Who is flowless - otherwise we the created beings too will become His match : If God too should be a deficient being, He would be no different from our deficient being and therefore no God. We would spare no merit or good for us in order to exist if only our existence would have been within our reach. If this is understandable, it is then also not possible that the Creation be divisible between two or more Gods. If God is perfect, as it is, the existence emanating from Him, must also be as perfect. How this creation can remain in tact in case more than one

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1. Taqrīr Dilpazīr (= T.D.), p. 17.

Creator try to create the same world, where every thing within its own single existence is independent and as such does not allow within its limits the other to exist.[1]

We conceive God as single and alone, perfect and flawless, with all the Creation having been created by Him and existing at His will; He is beyond and above all need; the origin and the root cause of everything, all else is His offshoot.

This must be so when all observation clearly points towards a final unity or original root of every organism or phenomenon:[2] Look up to the light of the sun which manifests itself through innumerable courtyards and ventilators that are separated from one another but all of these manifestations are directly related to the sun - the moment this relation is broken, the manifestation disappears. Turn to the sequence of numbers which is infinite - ones, tens, hundreds, thousands etc. not to mention the numerous mathematical principle and methods governing them - but the origin of all numerals is the numerical one. Had there not been the

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1. T.D., pp.17-18; Hadīth al-'Imā in Anwar al-Nujūm, pp.497. Mubahitha, pp. 70, 22.
2. Ibid, p.18.

numeral one, the whole sequence would have been unimaginable. The waves and bubbles - whatever their number - all belong to water. The branches and their foliage all start from one seed.[1]

In the sameway wherever we look, there appears no plurality which does not have its origin in some kind of unity. These various origins in turn have their common origin and so on.

For instance, humanity as a common factor rules supreme over all human beings who comply to the dictates of this origin - be it physical appearance, speech or reason, nothing can be changed or substituted. Similarly other species like donkeys or horses have their separate origins. There is however a common origin again for all these various origins where they become one i.e., being animate. Then together with various forms of vegetation, the common origin is organic body, which if taken together with all other forms of matter comes under the common origin, substance, and so on till we
reach the common fact of everything - i.e. the existence.[2]

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1. T.D., p.19; 'Ima (in Anwār al-Nujum), pp.471-72
2. Ibid.

But since the common factor is not the essence or identity of the varigated things, there is bound to be diversity. Therefore as the existence is not the identity of the creation, it seems that the existence of the world is something separate from its essence. Otherwise it would not have been possible that a thing should exist at one time and be non-existent at other. Had the existence and the essence of things would have been one and the same, they would have existed for ever.[1]

As for existence, it is throughout the same. The heavens or the earth are called existent just the same way as we call ourselves existent - just like sun-light is recognised wherever it is, as the sun-light, similarly the existence wherever it is to be seen or felt is called existence. However, like the sun-light in a large courtyard compared to a small one covers a larger area and therefore remains for longer time, the existence of the sky or of the heavenly bodies is far bigger than ours, and therefore must remain in fact for much longer time than our existence.[2]

Anyway the common fact of existence throughout the world gives us to know that the world and its existence are

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1. Ibid; Qibla Numa (Majlis ed. Deoband), p.222; Guftugu, p.12
2. Ibid.

two different things and not one and the same thing. It follows then only logically that the existence of the world is not original and of its own belonging. It must be temporary and transitory and as such must have been endowed from some external source, where it must be original and of personal belonging. Who else that source can be except the Creator ?[1]

We stand therefore satisfied that this world is not existent of its own accord; its existence is as transitory as the heat of hot water granted by fire whose heat is original and inherent. As the sun-light spread at thousands of places in various outlines and forms, still all of this issues forth from one and the same sun. In the same way, the existence of the world too is a refelection of one and the same source - the ultimate Being whom we call God.[2]

One may entertain a doubt here that in case there are more than one creator, their reflections would merge together to appear as one, just as in case of two suns, their light would not be differentiable. But the doubt is untenable on

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1. Ibid, infra, pp.147-48.
2. T.D., p.20.

various grounds. We have already known that every phenomenon here ends up in some unity of origin,[1] and that all the expanded forms in this world taper down to be recognised finally as a single fact. Moreover the existence of this world being a reflection of the Ultimate Being, the unity of all roots here must also have its ultimate origin in the creator - who must be the Final Root.

Non-Existence : The Cause of all Plurality:

Plurality in fact is related to the kinds of existence, not to the things existent, as often mistakenly perceived. The basis of unity is existence whereas the basis of all plurality is non-existence, For we see that the sun-light is a sole and single thing, but where two ventilators in a wall are side by side, the sun-light through them appears separated. This is because of the darkness in between has obstructed the passage of light. If the wall, so to say, is lifted off altogether, there will be light everywhere and this difference and distinction of things known as plurality and numerousness will disappear. Since the darkness is nothing but the absence of light and the same is called non-existence, therefore it is

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1. Ibid.

clear that all plurality makes appearance due to non-existence.[1]

In the light of the above discussion, some important inferences are drawn :

That all the attributes and qualities which are various kinds of existence and found in the world such as being sighted must be found in God also. In the same way, all those attributes which are non-existential such as being without sight, must not be found in God.

That whoever is the Ultimate Being cannot have room for any division. Or else as an attribute of existence,His oneness cannot be original and of his own belonging. This is obviously impossible that being the final source of existence and all existential attributes, He should not have a certain attribute.[2]

That His existence, His essence and His attributes are all identical with one another. In other words He must be simple and plain, having not even an iota of composition

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1. T.D., p.21; infra, p.147.
2. T.D., p.22.

in His Being. Reason in no way concedes to conceive Him as a composite being.[1] If He is the original or Ultimate Being - as most certainly He is - He must be of necessity both simple as well as indivisible.

All creatures share certain typical characteristics while they have certain other properties and features which are individual to them only. For instance Mr Y and Mr X share in existence, humanity, religion and region. But both differ in face, disposition, height, complexion, age manners temperament etc. Had there not been this difference which accounts for individual features, there would have been no distinction between man and man and as such no variety and plurality would have been possible. The same applies to everything in this Creation.[2]

The names are meant to denote distinction and make discrimination among things. This discrimination refers to the characteristics features or special attributes which taken together in a thing apart from its existence are known as the self of that thing.

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1. For fuller discussion, see Qibla Numa (Majlis ed.) pp.141-51.
2. T.D., p.22; 'Imā (in Anwār al-Nujum), pp.471-72.

2. EXISTENCE:REAL AND REFLECTED:

The self, however, is a nonentity so long existence does not attach with it. By this we mean the same phenomenon as witnessed when the light reaches the houses, fields, mountains etc, and enlightens them. Here, obviously, the sun's brightness is as original as the darkness of these objects[1] is inherent. In the same way God has by reflection endowed a sort of existence to these identities of things whose non-existence is an original as the existence of the Real Being. Everything on this earth is originally dark and only the sun is bright - this is why even at mid-day in places like underground cells where the sun does not reach, all distinction between black and white is eliminated. Similarly everything - except the Real Being - is originally non-existent. Whatever of existence then it receives is not real but only a reflection of the Real Being[2] just as the sun-light on the ground is a mere reflection of the brilliantly shining sun.

In this sense every enlightened thing can be said as sharing the sun in its light. Similarly every existent thing

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1. T.D., pp.22-23.
2. T.D., p.23; Guftugu, pp.11-12.

can be said as sharing the Real Being in His existence which in reality means sharing the existence of the Real Being in its reflected form only.[1]

It is therefore inevitable that the Real Being must be One, dualism or pluralism of Godhead being absolutely illogical. In the same way conceiving of any division or composition in Him, shows, to say the least, a deficient reasoning. It is just like conceiving of numerousness in Mr. X, Y or Z. Thus if at all there may be many Gods, the unity of the Real Being remains unaffected, for they can not exist but as a reflection of the Real Being - just as we do. How is it then to call them God and not to call us so who too exist the same way ?[2]

Chain of Cause and Effect:

But once we have understood the meaning of the original and reflected existence, it implies that all existential attributes as contrasted with non-existential attributes, must also come as indivisible part of our existence from

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1. T.D., pp.23-24.
2. T.D., pp. 24-25; Mubāhitha, p.80.

the Real Being.[1] Human fantasy however has presumptively seen divine powers or creatorship in whatever appeared as a source of action or efficacy.[2] The time, the heavens, the human individuals, the herbs , etc. due to their supposed or apparent efficacy creatorship of actions and events, have the semblance of being creator or efficacious.[3] As such these are often regarded as responsible for directly affecting events or producing actions and efficacies.

In the true sense, however, all such things should be seen only as a medium and a means for giving expression to the will of the Real Being, like the tools of a carpenter which cannot work without him. The beneficence of the Real Being reaches through them to others, like the heat of the sun through a curved lense, or the roof-water flowing down from a drain pipe. No one needs be told that the heat belongs to the sun and the lense has no heat, or that the water only flows down the drain pipe and not produced by it.[4]

The unity seems to be confirmed still more indeed, as we look through uncontaminated reason to the phenomena of

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1. T.D., pp.19-20, 24-28, 167-169; Cf. Qibla Numa, pp.191, 224-26; Hadith al-Ima.
2.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

this creation and the chain of cause and effect that invisibly links all things to produce a systematic whole, pointing clearly to the unity of creation and hence to the unity of Creator.[1]

For instance look to the intricately woven chain of this inhuman actions which are performed with the help of limbs. The limbs cannot move without capability and power.[2] This power is subject to the will to do which in turn is motivated by desire. The desire too then is governed by cognizance and knowledge of accruing benefit or harm.[3]

This chain of cause and effect leading to human actions is subject in the process to a variety of inner and outer forces. These intervening forces apart, the cognizance or knowledge is then linked in this chain with reason. It goes without saying then, that this reason happens between knowledge and God[4] — in such a manner as a spade between the work and the worker.[5] This gives us to think of a factory mechanism having several parts fitted

1. T.D., ; Hujjah, pp.14-17
2. T.D., p.25.
3. T.D., p.26.
4. Ibid, . .
5. Ibid.

one after the other, each with a definite function. As the operator moves the first part of the mechanism, all other parts are set respectively in motion. The required function, however is performed by the last part.[1]

Obviously the mechanism is motionless and senseless in itself and cannot work without an intelligent operator who must have will and power both. That is why, the running of trains is attributed to the railway staff and not to the machines.

Thus God is to be acknowledged in this Creation as the Efficacious Real and mankind like the last part of the mechanism as the efficacious metaphoric.

The parts in the process are to be regarded, on the other hand, only as the means of invention. These intermediaries are otherwise essentially non-existent as discussed above.[2] They are no more than the drain-pipe of the roof through which water comes down and wets the ground. The efficacy of the Real Being reaches through them to the human actions and imparts existence to them too.

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

3. ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE:

In other words, whatever peculiarities other than existence they have, for which they are differently named, are originally non-existent just like the peculiarities of actions are originally non-being the only difference being that existence is imparted to these intermediaries first and only later to the actions. Had this existence been their own and not given from some external source, there might have been room enough to think of Creatorship in them.[1]

This is something to be found only in God whose existence is His own, not borrowed or best-owned upon from some external source. But this is not possible unless and until His essence (ie.the special distinctive features) is existence itself which imparts the same to non-beings in a manner the sun-light reaches and illuminates the houses and other objects on Earth.[2]

We are therefore convinced that neither He was ever non-existent nor He will ever be. As the sun is the perfect

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1. Ibid; Hujjah, pp.6-7; Guftugu, p.12.
2. T.D., p.27.

light and dispels all darkness, in the same way by His existence, all non-existence is removed. Further, just as the darkness cannot touch upon the vicinity of the sun, non-existence cannot touch upon the vicinity of God.[1] This might have been possible only when His essence would have been different from His existence. For if they are two different things, their parting is no impossibility as is commonly observable.

One thing which did not exist earlier does exist for some time and then again becomes non-existent i.e. existence parts from it.[2]

The following example will clarify it further that how the essence and the existence of things are different. Then a builder intends to construct a house, he thinks out a plan for it first of all. If the house after having been built up is demolished or falls down, its plan or map lingers on in minds. Due only to this plan, that house is distinguishable from other houses. Thus this plan of the house is the essence of that house, for as we have seen that the essence of something is nothing else but the

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1. Ibid.; Guftugu, p.12.
2. Ibid.

the features which distinguish it from others.[1] But the state that on a piece of land it became visible as built up to those who can see and became touchable to those who are blind, and that the people started using and visiting it — is the existence of that house.[2]

Thus it is obvious that the essence of that house, i.e., the plan, is something different and its existence is something else. This is the reason these join together sometimes and part company at other times. Had the two been one and the same thing there would have been no question or possibility of any separation.

In this respect however, the earth, the heavens and other creatures are no different from a house. Their plan too is conceivable separately from their existence, the only difference being that some structures are durable and sturdy, others are not.[3]

But if the plan of God - i.e. His essence is made known to someone, he would certainly call out that there is no plurality. For His essence and existence are identical

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1. T.D., pp.27-28; Hujjah, p.27.
2. Ibid, p. 28.
3. Ibid.

and one and the same, there being no possibility of any distinction before realizing the truth, it is no more than a blind man's fantasies about things. This distinction, however, is uncontestable inasmcuh as the creation is concerned,as discussed at length above.[1]

There creeps in at this stage a curious doubt that if for everything there is a plan in addition to its existence as is apparent, then these plans too are after all a "thing" and as such must have their "existence" too which is also indicated by their being called good or bad.[2] Thus if there are plans for these plans also, it will become an endless story and therefore unacceptable. Moreover, in case their existence and essence is identical, they will become the real being like God, which is all the more unpalatable.[3] Verbally it seems knotty question.

It is however not so knotty and is quite understandable if we look to it realistically. The following illustration will help clear the doubt.

The bright rays of the sun, issuing forth from it and as such bound to it, are not as transitory as the sun-light

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1. Ibid.; 'Imā, p.557; Qibla Numa, pp.32-35.
2, T.D., pp.28-29.
3. Ibid.

that enlightens the earth and the heavens, which are originally lightless and dark, and, light up only temporarily. These rays are luminous and bright in themselves like the sun, the only difference being they are not as bright as the sun : For, initially, they are born of the sun and, further, they stand no match to the sun itself.[1]

In the same way, it appears that the plan of the whole creation must have since eternity a hidden existence which is original too - though not as original as that of God, yet quite unlike this perceptible existence which is only transitory. Thus this work-house of Creation is only functioning in confirmity with that plan whose hidden existence may be called as pre-determination.[2]

This manifest existence is related to that hidden existence antithetically. It is like the relation with us of our reflection in a well or the relation of a stamp-impression with the characters of its stamp. Obviously the reality that the stamp's characters or say, we have, the stamp's impression or our reflection do not, because both are mere

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.; Hujjah, p.27.

images. Yet both are identical images of their originals, save that the positions of the impression and reflection have been reversed,[1]

In the same way, this perceptible existence is identical with that hidden existence but only the position is in the reverse. This is why perhaps that meekness and humility of this world is considered respect and pride amidst all understanding people, while the haughty are regarded as base and low. Similarly the generous who turn penniless by their generous spendings are thought to be rich and held in great esteem, whereas the miser with all his hoarded riches is considered poor and ridiculed.[2]

That hidden existence and its counterpart here further implies that the former cannot be discovered by the senses, though it should be discoverable in the same manner through reason.[3] Just as the appearance of things differs due to their remoteness and vicinity or clarity and dimness of sight here, similarly discovering the hidden things of that existence depends on the soundness or dullness of reason and its distance from those things.[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. T.D., p.29.
3. Ibid, pp.29-30.
4. Ibid, pp.29-30.

An important insinuation of belief in this hidden existence is that it proves the knowledgeability of God about this manifest Creation in detail since eternity, though His knowledgeability in general too is not dependent on this hidden existence. He knows everything in general without it too. Likewise His knowing this world in general does not mean that He knows something and does not know the other. This is ignorance and defect which can have simply no trace in Him.[1] Little wonder then if His knowing in general is even greater than knowing in detail. This is just like the outspreading rays and the sun lights which are but the details of the sun. Nonetheless, the radiant light filled in the body of the sun itself appears to be hundreds of thousands of times brighter than the outspreading lights which are born of it and intrinsic to it. Similarly from His knowledge in general is born the knowledge in detail.[2]

Thus accepting the detailed divine plan of this manifest existence as the hidden existence, discoverable not through senses but reason, is as reasonable as the pre-determined plan or estimate of a material construction.

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1. T.D., p.30.
2. Ibid.

CHAPTER - VI

THE ULTIMATE BEING : MATTER OR GOD

1) Possible and Impossible
2) Things and their Properties
3) Pre-cariously Balanced Creation

CHAPTER - VI

THE ULTIMATE BEING : MATTER OF GOD

1. THE POSSIBLE AND IMPOSSIBLE:

Our main point in discussion is that this manifest and perceptible existence of any thing is not eternal. The eternal existence is that of God alone, Who is the Real Being.

If so, then those who eternalized matter and spoke of its imperishability committed a blunder, indeed. Their contention of the impossibility of nihility of matter is nothing but advancing an impossibility itself. This would have been possible only when the essence - i.e., identity of matter - and its existence would have been one and the same, not separate as they are.[1]

For there are only two ways in which the impossibility of something is indisputable : getting together of two contrasts or total absence of both of them, such as to be or not to be. The two can not get together simultaneously nor anything can be empty of both at the same time.[2]

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1. Taqrir-e-Dilpazir (= T.D.), p.30; Hujjah, p.7; Guftugu, pp. 12, 32.
2. T.D., p.31.

On the other hand, getting together of two unrelated things in "Being" means that the existence of the two is one - for instance colour and quantity, which are to be found in one body, implying that the existence of the two is not different but one and the same. Thus if these two may exist together, they may equally be absent also together such as in grief and comfort where colour and quantity are absent. Likewise heat and light are not found originally in water but both are to be found in the sun. In cases against this, where two things may be together in non-existence e.g. tree and stone both non-exist in man - but the two cannot get together in existence i.e., one thing can not be stone and tree both at the same time, the reason being that one of the two modes of impossibility is found here.[1]

It is easier now to understand just as non-existence of the two things which are together in existence or vice-versa is no impossibility, similarly their parting from each other also does not involve any impossibility. For calling them as two things means that their identities are different and if still they are together, it implies that

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1. T.D., p.31.

one and single existence is surrounding them, otherwise they are different things.[1]

Obviously separating one thing from the other is no impossibility and as such not the least opposed to reason.[2] For instance, fragrance and redness are together in rose but both are absent elsewhere : the rose extract has the fragrance but no red of the rose; heat and light are found together in one thing and separately too.[3]

Thus for an impossibility to emerge there are no more than the two ways or modes cited in the beginning. All other modes as discussed above do not present an impossibility which requires two contrasts either to conjoin together or to be absent simultaneously.

This being so, the contention that matter is imperishable and eternal is left without argument.

But to conceive God as eternal remains as it is - a well substantiatated.proposition. For the essence and existence of God are not different things but identical and one and the same. On the other hand, the essence (identity) of

1. T.D., p.32.
2. Ibid.
3. T.D., p.33.

matter and its existence are not one but separate and different things. Its nihility implies that the two things in it — i.e. its existence and essence — get separated. Obviously in this there is to be found none of the two modes of impossibility as there are involved no contrasts. To sum up, impossibility of something is that which is not acceptable to reason. Therefore to say that nihility of matter is impossible is wholly unfounded and an idea without substance.[1]

But to say that though nihility of matter is possible yet it will not perish — is a contention that merits some consideration. This contention for being accepatable, demands however an indisputable argument. But the arguments in favour of it are vulnerable even to Hukama[2] themselves. For, the senses are confined to the present without any idea of what the next moment has to unfold within us, much less to know of the whole material world without us.[3]

There may be only three modes of knowing about future: (1) to come to know about divine intentions, (2) to learn through senses, (3) to know by reasoning process.[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.; The 'Hukama' refers to Greek philosophers.
3. T.D., pp.34-36.
4. T.D., p.37.

The first two modes of the three obviously are not of much utility. The third, i.e. the reasoning process is however, useful enough in this effort, and the only one mode too which may have universal acceptance. But the basis of all reasoning process lies in the inseparability of inherent properties as found in things. That is to say, the argument in this process is attached to the claim so intrinsically as the day-light with the sun or the sun with daylight. Thus if this attachement of a claim with its argument is removed the reasoning also turns wrong.[1]

2. THINGS AND THEIR PROPERTIES:

But a deeper contemplation regarding the inseparability of the sun and its light or the inseparability of fire and heat reveals that in reality their relation is merely accidental. This relation virtually is no better than the relation of a dog sitting under a cart: as the dog moved the cart too accidentally moved ahead and then as the dog stopped the cart also stopped. Now if someone thinks that the movement of the cart is tuned to the movement of dog, he will be hardly better than a fool.[2]

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

In the same way fire and heat, the sun and its glare are separate things, as they are perceptible separately in their meaning i.e., their inner existence. Little wonder therefore if they get separated in their external existence also, just like saltish or sweetened water which looks a single thing but its salt or sugar can be separated through certain devices.[1]

Had these methods not been known, the separability of water from those constituents would not have been believable or a plain fact to many. Similarly the heat of water which we know as temporary, might have appeared as its intrinsic characteristic to someone who did not see water.[2] If in the same way, the heat and glare are separated from fire and the sun, or for that matter the existence of matter from its essence, it only shows the possible and not the impossible.[3]

These observations stand clear witness to the fact that heat, coldness, dryness, moisture, light, darkness, existence, nihility and such other intrinsic characteristics in things are all essentially separable.[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. T.D., p.38.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

It may be pointed out here that in view of this separability no wonder if such stories as are common among the Jews, Christians and others, about some of their spiritual leaders that the fire turned cool for them etc. might have been correct. In case such events may be established by some authentic books, we shall doubtless accept them and will never turn to see that our elders or the community also accept them or not.

Anyway this so-called intrinsic attachement observable in things with their characteristics, means only that the two live together and do not separate. It does not mean however, that they cannot separate. To us therefore all miracles and supernatural acts belong to this class.[1]

Many original characteristics are removed due to some external force. Had this external force not been found in the world, one could not imagine the separation between things and their original characteristics : were it not for the interference heat of the sun or the fire, the removal of coldness from water would have been un-imaginable. Likewise without the power of limbs or the force of wind, there would have been no way for things like dust, stones etc. to go up in the air.[2]

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1. T.D., p.39.
2. Ibid.

If something then is regarded as intrinsic to another, it will be at the most an inherent attribute of the other. So if the characteristics just cited can be detached or removed by some external force, who can deny the possibility of removal of all other inherent characteristics too.[1]

Thus if someone tries to establish the eternity of matter- it will be at the maximum due to the fact that between these arguments and this subject, there is an inherent and intrinsic relation. However, in the first place, these intrinsic relations between things are no more than accidental. The fire burns —— the cause being that the fire is extremely hot. But one would feel only non-plussed if asked why the fire is hot. He can say no more than that God the Merciful has brought the two things —— the fire and heat - to live together without any cause. Obviously the same thing is called accident or co-incidence as we have seen in the example of dog and cart.[2] Or for instance a man is tall and black. Here, the tallness and blackness have originally no relation. Both have essembled for no reason or relation. Had there been some original relation between them, both would remain together always. The same applies

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

to water and its coldness or fire and its heat which are wedded together for no cause, pointing only to an accidental relation. Clearly, then, accident does not necessitate perpetuation.[1]

To sum up, where two things are intrinsically related with each other, the utmost of this relation is that they are inherent features for each other. It is however made amply clear that though the intrinsic features may not separate by themselves, they may still be separated by some external force. Thus the eternity of matter may be at the maximum one of its inherent features. These inherent features, if not separable by themselves may be removed by some external force.[2]

It is only equitable then, to accept that eternity of matter can not be established or proved either through senses or through the intrinsicality of its features.[3]

3. A PRECARIOUSLY BALANCED CREATION:

On the other hand, ever-changing material conditions of the world only seem to reinforce the idea that this

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1. Ibid.
2. T.D., p.40.

work-shop is going some day to be broken to pieces. Like the human beings, this world too is composed of many constituents of conflicting efficacies. The conflicting of water and fire, the dry land and rivers are only too obvious. In the same way, the heat of the sun, the cool of moon-light, the tides and the stars too must be having different efficacies (apart from the effects of stars which are narrated by many astrologers and are not the least trust-worthy). Obviously then these efficacies are as numerous as the constituents of this world.[1]

It appears therefore that these variously efficacious things taken together must be precariously balanced. As such when one or more of the constituents get an edge over the delicate balance, the equilibrium will be disturbed. In other words, the disequated constituent will have to be regarded as a deseased part in the body-constitution of this world.[2] While human beings are composed of merely four constituents and an imbalance among them produces thousands of deseases, the world as a whole is made up of innumerable things, whose imbalance is bound to lead to hundreds of thousands of deseases.

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1. T.D., pp.40-41.
2. Ibid.

Thus the effects of the changes in winds, storms and tides are only too obvious to explain. Similarly the fact of disequated changes of climates, the appearance of deseases and epidemics etc. is known to every one.[1]

As for productive conditions prevailing on land, the common observation is that certain regions excell in agricultural production while others can produce very little. A land produces abundantly for a few years and then does not so abundantly. Sometimes production goes contrary to the applied labour and resources. Those who disbelieve can ask the farmers. Likewise annual yield of fruit - crops is not the same always. Similarly the annual rain-fall varies quite often, not to speak of the storms, tornadoes, cyclones, gales etc. with the destructive forces they bring in their folds.

All these things according to reason denote changes in the "Optimum Temperament" of the world. What-ever in these changes agrees then with this optimum temperament is to be regarded as "health" whereas all else will have to be counted as desease and sickness.[2]

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1. T.D., pp.42-43.
2. T.D., p.44.

These are the world's external desease like the moles and absesses which appear only to spoil the outer looks or inflict partial damage to total health. However, just as in human system there are inner deseases like pain and pulpitation in addition to the external ones, in the same way, this humble writer sees through this world many inner deseases also, in addition to its external ones.[1] But we do not know their details and how at all can we know ? The patient only knows the real state of the sickness, particularly if it is an inner desease or pain which can be felt only by the soul - in this case the grand soul of this world.[2]

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1. T.D., p.45.
2. Ibid.

CHAPTER - VII

REAL MEANING OF LIFE

1) Manifestation of Life
2) Relation of Body and Soul
3) Synthesis and Analysis

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CHAPTER - VII

THE REAL MEANING OF LIFE

1. MANIFESTATIONS OF LIFE:

In so far as the existence of a soul of the world is concerned, it looks on the face of it an irrational proposition. But the reason behind a superficial view of life is that breathing and voluntary motions have been named as life. This is however not the reality of life. Life is the name of what is related with knowing, recognising, thinking and comprehending. Even if you did not affirm excepting man and animals, a soul for everything in this world like trees, mountains etc. including the Creation as a whole, you would not deny the possibility of these souls, had you only known the real meaning of life.[1]

As for breathing, the one who has held back his breath, will not be called dead even by a mad man. Although breathing in man and animal is a natural phenomenon, yet it can be withheld for a while and as such it can not be the criterion of life.

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1. Taqrir-e-Dilpazir (= T.D.), p.45.

In so far as vluntary movement is concerned, we do not see anyone who could establish by any argument that trees and mountains cannot move out of their own accord. The maximum that some one can say in this regard is that no one has ever seen a mountain or tree moving from its place. If this is the argument, then we have not seen many things ! Does it prove that they do not exist ?[1] If the historical authenticity of a report narrating that certain trees and stones talked or moved, can be established beyond doubt, we will not refuse accepting that report merely on the ground that the common observation does not verify it, especially when a strong argument seems only to strengthen phenomenon, however rare the observation of it may be.[2]

The question needs a little elaboration. It has been established in preceeding pages that in this creation, the existence of everything big or small - is different from its identity. In other words, there are as if two existences of everything : other existence which is manifest and inner one which is the totality of distinctive characteristics.[3] The inner existence is related to the

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. T.D., p.46.

person of God in a way as the rays of the sun are related to the sun whereas the out existence should be considered as equivalent to the sunlight which makes appearance differently and separately in every courtyard, window and ventilator. Like the sunlight which comes at one time and goes away at another, the outer existence manifests itself at one time and disappears at another. Similarly as the sun-rays are always existent because of the sun, like-wise this inner existence is perpetually abiding because of God.[1]

It is then obvious that the light of the sun must have given birth first to the invisible rays and afterwards to the sunlight which encompasses exposed surfaces. Now, it is due to this order only that all kinds of qualities of the sun must be found in the invisible rays of the sun in much greater degree than the same can be found in the sunlights spread over exposed surfaces —— however shapely or large these sunlights may appear in the fields and courtyards.[2]

In the same way, the inner existence is first in the order, while the outer one comes afterwards. In deed,

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

the outer existence should be considered as the reflection of the inner one. Thus the benevolence of God must reach first to the inner existence and only later to the outer one - just as in the first place the rays of the sun are benefitted with solar qualities and then in the second only the reflected sunlight.[1] Therefore, it is impossible that the divine benevolance of life should reach our outer existence and yet the inner existence of others should receive no share of that. For, the inner existence whoseever it may belong to, must precede the outer existence of all just as the solar rays of any direction must have precedence over the sunlight of all places.[2]

This also helps understand that inspite of the divine unity and oneness, all attributes in their perfect form must be found in the Essence of God. It is because of different functions that He is called the Sustainer, All-hearing, All-seeing etc. If so, then His benevolence must also be a totality of all His attributes, and all creatures must receive more or less all the attributes in accordance with their capability. This capability can be seen from the difference of sunlight absorbed and reflected by a stone and a mirror.[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Thus we do not say that the life of a stone and a human being should be identical. On the other hand, it is obvious that the kind of manifestation of life in human beings is absent in animals whereas that is found in animals is absent in vegetation and the kind of life in plants is not to be found in inorganic bodies.[1]

The plants and trees however with their capacity to grow are not wholly devoid of consciousness - as can be seen from the fact that a tree sown in open field spreads in all directions but does not go higher up as against the trees sown close to one another grow vertically more than horizontally because of the mutual obstruction.[2]

Similarly, deeper observation reveals that the signs of life - however feeble they might seem - are nevertheless witnessable even in stones. Whenever a stone is let go in in the air, it rushes downward and never goes up. Likewise is the rushing of iron towards a magnet. To say conversely that the earth pulls down the stone and the magnet attracts the iron, comes still to the same thing. Why the earth pulls down a stone and not the fire, and why the magnets attract

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1. T.D., pp.46-47.
2. T.D., p.47.

iron alone. What else is it then if it is not life. Thus the manifestation of life is pronounced and explicit in one form while vague and supressed in another, but none is totally deprived.[1]

If, one the other hand, it is proposed that these motions and attractions in things are only natural and they have no consciousness of their own at all, then it will amount to no more than a thoughtless proposition itself. Far better than this will be to say that these things have life and consciously these acts.[2]

Howver, one can say that had in things these attractions been related to their own will, this might happen sometimes and might not at other time. However the answer is that practically there is no difference between the fact that whenever a stone is set at liberty from above , it comes straight away downward, and the fact that whenver a sword is brandished over a man, un-hesitatingly his hand rises to defend. Still this defensive gesture is not considered wholly devoid of will power like shivering.[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. T.D., pp.47-48.

2. RELATION OF BODY AND SOUL:

It appears then, through all arguments and estimates that there exists a soul in everything and the characteristic motion observed in things result from their will - However, feeble and limited that will power may be. Thus stories stating of speech or motion in stones etc. can not be rejected as being impossible - specially when speech ultimately refers to the expression of what is in mind - which is also possible through other forms like writing or gestures. For instance, an observation of ants and their activities clearly indicates that they must be having some kind of mode for expressing their heart, as one of them picks up some food and shortly afterwards the whole tribe is seen following. Thus the fact of there being a soul for everything seems to be augmented and reinforced by all observation and argument.[1]

Since the world also as a whole is a thing, therefore it also must have a soul. Moreover human beings, animals, etc. to the world in its totality are like the limbs and parts. If these limbs and organs have a soul , then there must also be a soul for the world as a whole. (Likewise no wonder if there are separate souls for each of the human limbs also). But neither we know of the souls of these

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1. T.D., p.48.

limbs separately nor the grand soul of the world.[1]

Thus only the soul of the world itself must be knowing fully of its physical conditions - the sickness or health. But the world's deseases about which we know, seem to occur continually and if the stories of the past stand any witness, such inner deseases appear to have become more numerous. In spite of this no one seems to take care of curing himself, not any of these limbs with their morbid conditions can be amputated. There remains then no way to attain to health.[2]

It will be then in the nature of things to presume that the present time for the world is much similar to the old age of human beings, when all human powers are weakened and various deseases begin to lay siege. It will be therefore only natural that these increasing deseases ultimately bring an end to the existence and life of the world. The way human bodies after death swell and rot and are then torn to pieces, in the same way after their death the earth and the heavens also will swell, rot and will be torn to pieces. The maximum will be that certain parts of this world may last longer than others like bones in human body.[3]

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1. T.D., p.49.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

3. SYNTHESIS AND ANALYSIS

It is common observation that when a thing is a mixture or compound of different constituents and each of these constituents is meant for different functions, that thing is broken down in order to separate its various parts. For example the agricultural produce is made up of two things : the grain and the husk. How laboriously the two are separated. Again the grain is made up of the flour and a husky part. Both are different and are painstakingly separated. Now not a fool even can say that there different things must remain compounded and should not be separated. Rather everyone thinks it only rational and reasonable. Likewise the flour contains many food - constituents - (like proteins, starch, vitamins etc.) - which are separated for different functions in human stomach, intestines and liver. Similarly in every human activity we first proceed to separate things before we use them. All these things and activities are considered as part of human wisdom and experience. Once we have grasped this idea, we can now understand the following.[1]

Being made up of this world of many different elements and parts is only too obvious. The earth, the water, the fire

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1. Ibid.

and the air are all different things. The difference among them needs no explanation. Let us take for instance the earth, not to speek of the other three which we leave to the imagination of the reader.

The earth produces innumerable types of grains, fruits and nuts which grow up combined with grass and hay. These products themselves have various constituents. But their taste is confined to the tongue only. It cannot be relished or felt down the throat where only those parts of food are absorbed which are needed by the human body, the rest being released out by the nature. Even this is not total waste and used as manure and fertilizer. This finer constituents of the food are turned into blood by the liver and sent to the heart which pumps it out to the whole of human body. In this process some kind of vapour is produced in the body. By this time all the unwanted or coarse constituents are finally extruded.[1]

This vapour which spreads throughout the body may be termed as the airy spirit or the second soul (al-Nafs). If this finest substance or vapour called airy spirit (or "spirit" only), some how or the other may be transformed into food, it

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1. T.D., pp.50-51.

appears then that none of the physical compulsions like deseases etc.will confront us, as these are obviously the result of coarser and heavier substances consumed as food. Therefore all such constituents of the body as are offensive in smell are obviously torturous for this spirit. This must be so because of the finer reality of this and the unrefined existence of that. In fact this airy spirit is the gist of this physique. It is this spirit which perceives and feels of physical pain and comforts.[1]

It is therefore only logical to conclude that this spirit (al-Nafs) does not have access beyond physical limits. The sorrow or happiness of moral and spiritual nature does not affect it, so as it may conceive the truth of good or evil. This is because it does not belong to their stock.[2]

The human body needs a different soul in order to dicover the truth of good and evil. This soul must be still finer than the airy spirit, which is after all the gist of this physical existence. If good and evil are both incorporeal and do not have a physical origin, the soul which experiences them must also belong to their origin. However we have no

1. T.D., pp.51-52.
2. T.D., p.52.

knowledge of the reality of this metaphysical soul. Human reason is helpless here. It is quite probable that this soul might be the name of the divine plans as discussed above.[1]

It is however, certain that the airy spirit is also a soul. Since this spirit is the gist of a body - or the gist of food - therefore we know that this spirit must be found in every physical existence - be it a tree, stone or a mountain. This is because of the fact that all physical bodies can be possibly condensed to a gist of the finest degree, whether we know how to do that or not.[2] Had there not been a mechanism in our body, we possibly could not know the final refined elements of the food that are produced by our digestive system.

Nonetheless, it is obvious that the airy spirit in human beings is the gist of very many things, whereas the spirit of a stone etc. is the gist of that solid mass only.

Thus, notwithstanding the common fact of there being an airy spirit in all bodies, the qualities ingrained in human

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1. Ibid.
2. T.D., pp.52-53.

spirit and representing the highest level, are not to be found on other non-human spirits i.e. animals and so on. Similarly the first souls of these things must also be different in levels like the second spirit, particularly if these first souls are but the same plans as mentioned above. In case it is something else, God knows what it may be. It appears this airy spirit should be something fine and good. For it is evident through the wisdom of God that the good things are meant for the good and the bad things are meant for the bad.[1]

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1. Ibid.

CHAPTER - VIII

MEANING OF DIVINE JUSTICE

1) Treating According to Merit
2) Incapacity ; of Reason
3) Constituents and Their Sources

CHAPTER - VIII

MEANING OF DIVINE JUSTICE

1. TREATING ACCORDING TO MERIT:

Something however made up of good and evil both, is liable to be broken up in order to separate the good from evil and keep them where they are best kept. As we have seen that the whole world is a combination of many different elements, therefore it is to be expected from the justice of God that the different constituents are decomposed and separated by Him from one another so as to be sent to places which are suitable for them. Thus the good people should be sent where even the name of pain and discomforts is not to be heard and only the good things are found. The same is called Paradise. Likewise the bad ones should be sent to a place where even the name of any good and comfort is not to be heard. The same is known as the Hell.[1]

Anyway the constituents of this world will be separated as those of a crop, and then sent to the places which are appropriate for them. This is the true meaning of justice of God.[2] Cruelty, which means diversion from the straight

1. Taqrir-e-Dilpazir (= T.D.), pp.53-54.
2. T.D., p.54.

path, may be attributable to God only in case this separation of good from evil is not done. For cruelty in the sense that God should mis-appropriate the belongings of others is not imaginable in respect of God, since ultimately everything belong to Him. As such He has all the power and authority to treat the good people with His wrath and the evil-doers with mercy and yet all this will have to be counted as justice alone.

Nevertheless, it will be conceded that doing that way will be certainly out of place and in-appropriate. Who on earth does not think that treating that way is a defect and perverted action and against all moral sense. We have seen above that of necessity God must have all perfections. Therefore we are convinced, beyond all doubt, that the divine attributes are perfect attributes.[1]

This may be exemplified by the inherent qualities found in man, such as the instinct of perfection and intrinsic moral sense etc. It remains, however to say that our inherent qualities are not fully intrinsic, or ingrained inseparably in our nature. For these qualities are often removed by

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1. T.D., pp.54-55.

some external pressure just like the natural coldness of water is removed for the time-being by the pre-dominance of fire or like the gravity of the earth is dispelled from the stone when it is thrown up in the air. It goes without saying here that God Almighty is subject to no external power.[1]

Here some one may entertain a doubt that as breathing for us is natural but still we can hold back our breath for a few moments, or anger is part of our nature yet we can suppress it also, in the same way, God in His wisdom can also do contrary to His nature.[2]

But this doubt is not feasible because the human beings do things contrary to their nature either in the hope of some ultimate benefit or to get rid of an eventual harm.

But in the essence and attributes of God, there is no room for either any benefit or harm. In the first place harm or defect denotes the absence of some perfect-quality, whereas God must have perfection only. In the second place, harm or damage is inflicted by the pre-dominance or forcefulness of some external source. Obviously, no power or efficacy

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1. T.D., p.55.
2. T.D., pp.55-56.

is effective in respect of God. Thus, if there is no room of any benefit or harm in the essence and attributes of God, then there is also no possibility of His doing contrary to His nature. Therefore we believe that all of His attributes exist since eternity to enternity.[1]

God knows only what and how those people[2] have comprehended who consider equity and justice as the duty of God and incumbent upon Him. This will mean that an all-powerful existence must be accepted also over and above God who can dictate obligations upon Him - just as a ruler can dictate duties like collecting of taxes etc. Moreover, this view necessitates for God doing contrary to His nature also. Anyway making justice incumbent upon God and holding Him responsible for equitable reward is no small impudence. To sum up, justice of God is a truth beyond all doubt, but His justice implies to send and keep a thing where it is befitting for it to be kept and found. The good things are meant for good places and the bad ones for the bad places.[3]

2. INCAPACITY OF REASON:

But how to discover in every thing as to what is good and what is not ? - more so due to the various subtle levels

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1. T.D., p.56.
2. The allusion refers to the Mu'tazilah.
3. T.D. p.57; Cf. Hujjah, p.28.

between good and evil both, which are hard to be identified. There is, however, in this creation a scale for everything in order to discover its value and the variations of that value. For instance, the eyes can differentiate and as such are a scale for distinguishing between the black and white, and the good and bad shape. The good and bad sound is to be judged by the scale of ears. The good or bad smell is evaluated by the nose - the sweet and sour is determined by the tongue, the heat and cold is felt and weighed by the whole body. Likewise there are thousands of other scales. The scales for good and evil is human reason. But all these scales which help us in the cognizance of the differences between values, give us not the accurate value but more or less an estimation. In this respect all these scales are defective, just as a man picks up two stones and after weighing them, in his hands, tells that one of them is heavier than the other. This will give an estimate and not the accurate value.[1]

Therefore our reason can reveal the difference between evil and good only where the difference is quite marked. The minute and subtle differences and their accurate degrees can never be discovered by reason. It is the sphere of the knowledge of God alone. The human reason also receives what - ever it can from the same source.[2]

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1. T.D., pp.57-58.
2. T.D., p.58.

As for the essence of human reason, it appears that it is an eye to look into the book of divine knowledge, and as such it is the records office of that knowledge, as is obvious from the feet that there is nothing in which resort is not had to reason. It is indeed an inner eye to discover the letters and features inscribed in the invisible book of divine knowledge. Human reason does have some information or realisation or awareness of everything. The difference of black and white, or shapeliness and ugliness is discovered by the outer eyes, where as the difference between good and evil can be discovered by this inner eye of reason.[1]

We find, that the eyes of different men also differ in their levels of sight. All the eyes cannot discover the difference equally at the same level. Some eyes see even inversely - the squinted sometimes, sees two in place of one. To person suffering from jondice everything appears as yellow. In the same way not human reason can distinguish accurately between the good and evil. Just as the dim-sighted finds certain resembling colours — like a deep brown and black — as identical, similarly those who do not have the capability of clear reasoning find everything in respect of good and evil as much the same.[2]

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

Even so, if certain eyes can discover the difference and its degrees between resembling colours - there exists no human reason which can discover the degrees of difference between the evil and the good so accurately. This thing is confined to God, the Merciful only.[1]

Thus, in the light of the above, we conclude that God Almighty will break this world to pieces and separate the good from the evil - just as a crop is threshed up for separating the grain from the husk - and send the good to a place which is apt for it, while the evil to a place which is fit for it, Understandably there should be found no synthesis of good and evil at these places, otherwise that would also become liable to a thresh up in the same way.[2]

3. CONSTITUENTS AND THEIR SOURCES

This concept of separation of good from evil seems to be augmented by other reasons also.

"Those things which are synthecised with different constituents, there is no denying of the fact that each of

1. T.D., pp.58-59.
2. T.D., p.59.

such constituents must also have separately a source of its own - from where they have been originally derived. Thus, in case of separation from their synthetic whole, they invariably rush to join their sources or would be liable to be sent to their places of origin."[1]

For instance, human body is synthecised by four constituents. All the four elements - earth, water, air and fire - have their own four separate sources. The experiments and observations testify to the fact that if this synthesis is unfolded, there is no doubt that all the four elements will rush to join their origins or sources.

It can be seen from the experiments that in case a constituent of earthy origin is released from the above it will rush down to join its source, or conversely speaking, the earth itself will pull it down. Similarly, if a constituent of air is somehow taken deep in water, it will, cutting through water, rush up to join its source. Likewise many of us would have seen that in case the lighting under some kind of pressure falls down on the earth, then as soon as that pressure is removed it flys up back to its source.

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1. Ibid.

Or the firy torch, for instance when inclined downward, its flame still points upward - as if in case the flame is let go, it will rush up to join its source.[1]

In the same way, this world is to be taken as a synthetic whole which is so intricately woven by evil and good, and as such these constituents too must have their own spheres of origin, from where these have been initially derived. Thus, in case of their analysis, the two must return to join their separate source.[2]

It is therefore apparent from the above discussion that whenver the stage of perfection of this world is reached, the Ultimate Master of this creation will break-up this workshop and separate the good from evil, so as the two would be sent to their places of origin. Thus, the concept of a place of reward and place of punishment as believed by almost all communities, should not be essentially wrong. If some misconception is involved it must be in the statement of its true state and not in its other-worldly existence.[3]

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1. T.D., pp.59-60.
2. T.D., p.60.
3. Ibid.

CHAPTER - IX

HUMAN NATURE

1) The Inner Conflict and Its Sources
2) Benefit and Harm: Need for Pathy
3) Reason : The Basis for True Faith

CHAPTER - IX

HUMAN NATURE

1. THE INNER CONFLICT AND ITS SOURCES:

As the existence of everything including good and evil necessitates separate origins and sources, where there should be nothing but only good or only evil, we have then reason enough to say that the angels and the satans really exist and their existence is no fiction or myth.[1]

The reason of this is that every human individual is inclined towards a good deed sometimes and towards an evil one at another. A deeper observation reveals that the inclination rather remains towards both at the same time. For precisely at the moment of inclination towards evil, human reason dominates while precisely at the time of inclination towards good the human desire dominates. Thus, just as we come to know of the four elements in human beings on the basis of heat, coldness, dryness and moisture, similarly it appears that in every human being there are two souls. One of them by nature is inclined towards good and other by nature is inclined towards evil.

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1. Taqrir-e-Dilpazir (= T.D.), p.60.

Moreover, just as by the domination of one of the four elements, the temperament of a particular human individual is obtained, similarly the ratio of good and evil determines various levels of good and bad characters, otherwise everyone has in him good and evil both.[1] Anyway there is no doubt that the human nature is made up of two conflicting and contrary tendencies.

Now, the one inclined by nature towards good is known in Islam as rūh (soul), while the other inclined towards evil is called in Islamic terms as Nafs (spirit). Therefore, we say that both of these constituents have their own separate origins and sources : The source of one being the class of angels and the source of the other being the class of satans. The former having nothing to do with evil, and the latter have no concern with good.

Those who do not believe in this, cannot deny the existence in man of the two contradictory inclinations - which must have their separate sources and origins. We propose the names for the same sources as the class of angels and the class of satans.[2]

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1. T.D., p.61.
2. T.D., pp.61-62.

Moreover, in the manner the four elements of the human body get help from their own different sources, for instance, the hot medicines help retain or raise the temperature of the body to its optimum level, similarly, it appears that the human inclinations towards good and evil are aided somehow by the angels and the satans which are in ultimate origins of these tendencies. As for the non-appearance of angels and satans, it is understandable in terms of the air or the soul which affect the human body so profoundly and still cannot be seen.[1]

It is therefore, perceivable that all the pleasant things of this world are not pure but mixed up with unpleasant things and none of the sorrow in this world is totally devoid of happiness. Thus, all the unpleasant things have some sort of satisfaction also just as all benefits have an element of harm as well.[2] Anyway, everything in this world - be it pleasant or unpleasant - is made up of both elements. It necessitates then that this synthesis of sorrow and happiness, pleasant and unpleasant good and evil etc. should also be decomposed and the ingredients be sent separately to their places of origin.

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1. T.D., p.62.
2. Ibid.

These places of origin can be none other than what is called the paradise and the hell. It is therefore only logical that all kinds of delightful and pleasant things should be found of necessity in paradise while all kinds of painful and torturous things should necessarily be found in hell. Moreover, the delights or the tortures of that world should also not have full resemblance with the sorrows or happiness of this world, for no happiness or comfort here is pure whereas all bliss in that world must be in its purest form.[1]

From the above discussion it becomes amply clear that the pains and comforts of that world must be unmixed and the day of judgement must be a truth and the existence of places known as paradise and hell must be true.[2]

Some Doubts and their Answers:

At this stage some half-sighted and dim-reasoned may entertain a doubt that if God - the One - is the Creator of everything including human actions then will it not invalidate

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1. Ibid.
2. T.D., p.71.

the concept of all human liberty ? Moreover, it is difficult in the first place to perceive that human actions must have the distinction of good and evil at all. Secondly, if it is so, why God the Merciful should at all differentiate between things as good or bad. In other words why He did not create everything and everyone as good only ?[1]

There is no doubt that the Creator of human beings is also the Creator of evil and good both. The apparent doers and performers like man, animals, saints, Prophets, angels etc. are before God no better than the puppets in the hands of the puppet-controller. Here apparently the puppets are performing, but everyone knows that the real performer or the controller must be someone else and not the puppets themselves. The real controller motivates the puppets to perform like a king or a vazir etc. Certainaly if the controller wills so, he has all the power and control to reverse the position and performance of the puppets and yet none has the authority or power to raise a finger. Holding one responsible is possible where one owes something to the other. But the Creator owes nothing to the created.[2]

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1. T.D., p.71

2. T.D., pp.71-72.

By now it should be clear to the understanding that just as the governance of a kingdom is not possible without a king and his officials, in the same way, Godhead will be defective and deficient without the creation of the good and the evil. Moreover, this distinction of good and evil is afterall in respect of human beings - whereas for God Almighty, all is equal and the same.[1]

The sun shines everywhere - be it a valley of flowers or an arid desert. Like-wise the bad thing is bad for its own self. Nevertheless in relations to the world as a whole, the evil is like the black locks of hair or a mole on the cheek of a beloved. These things are not quite attractive in themselves but the beauty of the beloved is certainly multiplied by them. Now there is no other way but that we thank God if we could perform a good deed that we have been blessed with the power to do a good thing, while in case we commit an evil-doing we must not raise our head in protest.[2]

Thus, if we have the fear of God, then just as we proceed to produce rose-flowers with the help of dung as manure, may be our evil-doing too should result in producing a good deed. This can be exemplified by the fact that if commitment of theft produces repentence in someone, it

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1. T.D., p.72.
2. Ibid.

leads him to compensate that crime by his good deeds.[1]

Anyway, it is a place of great fear that we are helplessly living under the shadow of an Almighty and Omni-present Master. If we have His fear with this under standing, we shall be willing enough to do the good and avoid the evil. This willingness in turn will produce good motives which will result according to the individual capacities into the performance of good-doings. It will be then much the same thing as the device of a mechanism that moves another devices and that in turn puts into motion still another till the last of the devices performs the designed function. Thus, in accepting God as the Creator or evil and good, only those can entertain doubts who have not fully understood that all fragrance is meant for the good clothes and not otherwise, whereas all that rots and stinks is fit for the fire.[2]

One again may doubt here that the fear of God can be felt only by the one who knows good and evil and accepts them too. Why then the one should have any fear who does not recognise good and evil at all - much less to accept.

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1. T.D., pp.72-73.
2. Ibid.

This can be understood by the fact that the whole world agrees in considering certain deeds as bad and certain others as good. If at all there is any controversy, it is in respect of determination and details.[1]

2. INTELLECT AND POWER OF ACTION:

However, when we look around, we feel that everything contains in itself a whole world of wisdom. But everything here is connected with a specific objective and function. The ultimate perfection or defect of that thing depends on the same objective and function - though it may be of some use for certain other functions too.

For example, the ultimate purpose of a chisel is cutting and peeling off the wood. The perfection or the defect of it is implicit in this objective. In case it is not properly carved or its breadth is not suitable or its blade is not sharp enough, the chisel is certainly defective - though it may be still of some use as a spade or stick. Similarly, a horse can be loaded or can be slain for eating purpose, but its real perfection or defect is to be sought

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1. Ibid
2. T.D., pp.73-75

in its speed and nothing else. If it is upto the mark it is good if not then certainly it cannot be considered a worthy one. Likewise the greatest aim of cows and buffaloes is their milk and not their speed or capacity for being loaded. The rose is wanted for its fragrance and colour, and never for taste. A book can be used as pillow also but it is mainly meant for reading, or a cloth can be used as fuel but the chief purpose is the wearing. Thus, everything is meant for its main purpose which determines whether it is good or bad.[1]

Consider human beings also in the same way. But then what is that on which depends his being good or bad. Man, as a compound is made up of a variety of constituents. For instance, first is the reason which is the main constituent. Second, is longing or fear, third will or discretion, fourth physical power, fifth the physique itself like the hands, feet etc. There is none among human beings who does not have these five things, though there is always the difference of these capabilities being more or less among individuals.[2] The ultimate objectives of the above constituents in human beings are :

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1. T.D., pp.73-75.
2. T.D., p.75.

1) The main aim of human reason is the cognizance of good and evil,

2) The purpose of longing is to provide stimulus for good deeds while that of fear is weaning away from the evil,

3) The main function of human will or discretion is to put to use the physical power,

4) The objective or the physical power is to exert to service the human limbs,

5) The limbs themselves.

All these five human constituents can be summed up in the following two :

(1) Human reason,

(2) Power of action.[1]

Both of these features are related to each other as the ruler and the ruled. Now if this power of action or any part thereof falls short of performing its main function due to

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1. Ibid.

dominance of non-reason, in that case the human reason will be considered as defective and deficient, though its rulership in principle will still remain intact.

Once we have concluded that reason is meant chiefly to distinguish the good from the evil while the power of action is meant for the compliance on physical level - then in effect certain deeds will have to be considered as good while others as bad. Otherwise, what is it that will be distinguished and differentiated by reason ? Equally what is that which will be complied by the power of action ?[1]

It also brings to the fore that the power of action in respect of reason is just. Likw a pen in the hand of a writer or like a chisel in the hand of carpenter. Here the pen or the chisel does not function for its own sake - rather the whole benefit or loss is borne by the writer or the carpenter. Thus, if in performing this function the pen is broken or the chisel. For it needs no deeper understanding to recognise that benefit or loss ultimately, represent happiness or grief of which the pen or chisel are only blank.[2]

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1. T.D., pp.75-76.
2. T.D., p.76.

3. BENEFIT AND HARM : NEED FOR PATHY:

In the same way whatever, the power of action performs it not for its own sake. Thus, the real benefit or loss incurred by the human reason or by the one for whom the human reason works. The human body is affected by the working of reason or soul i.e., the power of action dances to the tune of reason - even more than that, as in times of anger and furry. The face getting reddened in rage or the complexion turning white under fear. All such impacts or expressions indicate not as much the domination of reason and soul as point to the inner relation of body and soul.[1]

Apart from this, the difference in natures of all living beings are so distinctly marked that even differences of faith and religion appear subdued in their wake. Something which is the source of life for one is precisely the means of extinction for the other. Those who breathe in the open air will sink to death within minutes in water. The creatures of water simply cannot live on land. In this way the beneficient and the harmful of everything are different and separate.[2]

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1. T.D., pp.76-77.
2. T.D., p.77.

If so, it will be then only logical to think in respect of reason and soul that they too must have their own principles of what is harmful and what is beneficial with this in mind we see that something which is beneficial in respect of someone from the start is, invariably pleasant also for him - though it may turn repulsive for him due to some external cause which of course is not considerably. Likwwise something from the beginning is also disliked by him though it may not be disliked for the time-being due to some external reason. For instance, the bread or water are beneficial for the human body which depends on them for it is sought and how palatable it is. Likewise the obscess or the skin irritation leads one to develop a liking for scratching but it does not mean that the original dislike has been removed. Rather this unwanted desire to scratch must also be counted as part of the desease itself.[1]

This clearly points to the fact that just as a pathy is required for physical treatment in the same manner, another Pathy is needed for spiritual treatment for inner deseases. With its codified principles and rules, indexed the same is called the True Faith. Thus, the human reason in front of the Absolute Master dares not to raise its head

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1. T.D., pp.77-78.

or any questions - for human reason before God is no more than a local official in respect of an Emperor.[1]

Nevertheless, it is not to be expected from the all-pervading wisdom and sobriety of such an Absolute Master that He should send a conflicting or a different law when the human reason has decided a case in accordance with - if at all - a law already sent by Him. It must be however, related to the "does and don'ts" of the same thing which the human genius or the perfect reasoning decides as beneficial or harmful.

If we look a little more deeply we find that reason indeed is like a telescope and microscope which is meant to reveal the truth of every thing and every action as differentiates between the levels and degrees of their mutual relation. The human reason, therefore, does not take decisions of its own creation - rather it reads through nature of things and informs of the divine propositions of their being beneficial or harmful.[2]

But not every human reason has that capacity and clarity which is required to differentiate the good from the

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1. T.D., p.78.
2. Ibid.

evil, nor every reason has access to cognition of everything far and near. For this a perfect human reason is needed. The rules and principles of physical science too have not been discovered by every layman, whereas in view of the fine origin of the soul, the spiritual prescription must be finer than all physical prescription and as such it cannot be discovered by every common man.[1]

Keeping this in view, if the perfection of someone, in spiritual treatment is proved beyond doubt, any interference in his prescription will be only foolish and uncalled for. Even more than that, as the learning of physiology and medicine is possible through effort, whereas learning of spiritual treatment and its principles is not possible through effort since it is gifted to the selected few. This does not exclude however, the effort made towards preparation of the prescribed things, as it does not amount to interference in the prescription itself.[2]

Thus, if such a spiritual prescription depends in its preparation on the availability of various things then all effort spent in providing these things will be only a perfect

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1. Ibid.

2. T.D., pp.78-79.

compliance of the instructions. Thus, if a section of people belonging to a certain faith conflict among themselves on addition or omission of a certain part of the prescription, then the people who are competent and learned should come forward to decide in accordance with the prescrption. Any amendment in the prescription will have to be regarded as wrong only.[1]

Anyway reason and power of action in man are so related with each other that the former is benefitted as well as harmed by the latter. In other words many actions for the human reason and soul are beneficial while many others are harmful. Thus, the same is known as the good and the evil and the same is the basis of spiritual treatment. Identification of physically harmful and beneficial is the physical pathy while identification of the spiritually harmful and the beneficial is the spiritual pathy.

This also helps us understand that the evil and good of everything is eternal. And in the True Faith the do's and don't's must be related to those things which are liked or disliked by the pure spirit and the sound reason. But this does not relate to persons like us who are easily distracted to the harmful like the sick who, is always after what has been prohibited.[2]

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1. T.D., p.79.
2. Ibid.

4. REASON - THE BASIS OF TRUE FAITH:

It is recognised by one and all that the truth is accepted by the heart in the manner as sweets are accepted by the stomach.

Therefore we feel satisfied in our conviction that if certain persons of perfect reason, identical temperament, belonging to the same period, un-hindered in their reasoning un-encountered by any faith or its believers, will think out their own way in accordance with pure reason, and doubtless fix up ultimately for themselves a faith as their way of life, and will not let them disgress from that path. This faith then can be none other than the True Faith.[1]

The above discussion brings to the fore rational and natural basis of the true faith. Now we turn to the nature of laws needed in order to regulate the life in its various aspects.

In normal human food the bread and the water are the basic requirements and none is devoid of them except under prohibition. All else in the human foods are additional not essential, and are largely different in respect of various

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1. Hayyi bin Yaqazan, Ibn Tufail, Cf., p.80.

lands and people, age and temperament, health and desease etc.[1]

It should not be surprising, in the same way, if there are to be found great differences in spiritual foods and curative measures also - not in principle but in respect of details. This is particularly important when the common observation is that most of the people are physically fit but spiritually are not as healthy and fit. This is apparent from the fact that they tend to practice quite often and deliberate by too what is clearly unreasonable and against all wisdom such as is seen in the observance of many customs and conventions.

This concerns the observable sickness of human reason and soul. As for the hidden deseases of the soul, these are not realized even by the deseased himself.[2] Moreover we are normally inclined even towards the manifest good things only after we have known them or used them. Therefore these good things of which we are not even aware i.e., neither we have tasted nor heard of them, cannot be an object of our inclination. Thus, many of us are not even aware of any facts of the true faith, how can we then feel inclined to the good inherent in this natural religion or true faith.[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. T.D., p.81.
3. T.D., p.82.

This discussion however should not give rise to the doubt that since the true faith consists of only good and the fine things, therefore whatever appears good to us or we are inclined towards should be nothing but the true faith only. This kind of approach is fallacious indeed. Rather it will be spiritually a deseased view itself. Further, just as there are to be found physical deseases in the form of epidemics which kill a large number of people, in the same way spiritual epidemics too, are not lacking rather these exist more often and ruin even larger numbers of people.

Look at any community and you will find that they have imprisoned themselves in such restrictions and chains for all occasions of joyfulness grief that though the harm and the damage of them is fully realised yet they never retrace their wrong steps. The same applies to the religious beliefs and communities. Even if we consider anyone of these communities adhering to the right faith, the majority will be still left adhering to futile beliefs.[1]

In the same wake of all this after a long period, times change in terms of habits, customs and outlooks almost in the same way as the climate of a particular region often changes after a prolonged period.

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1. Ibid.

It is therefore necessary to recognize that just as a physician's prescription is subject to revision with the lapse of time and in view of climatic and health conditions - in the same way, spiritual conditions tend to change in the course of time. Like the many deseases which we experience today were not to be found in earlier centuries. Many spiritual deseases in terms of good and evil did not exist in preceding periods but are commonly observed today.[1]

Little wonder then if for curative purposes spiritual prescriptions need be altered so as to keep pace with the changes in moral standards and other conditions emerging from the advance of time.

Thus the variations and changes in the laws of religion concerning the modes of worship and injunctions regarding mutual relations should not be surprising in the least. As such these changes in the laws of heavenly religious only represent the growth of human society while in the spiritual treatment protrays the periodic changes in spiritual ills prevailing and eatings into the vitals of individual and social good.

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1. T.D., pp.82-83.

CHAPTER - X

MORAL SENSE

1) Basic Morals
2) Moral Growth
3) Reward and Punishment

C H A P T E R - X

MORALE SENSE

1. BASIC MORALS:

To come back to our focal point of discussion - beauty and ugliness (Husn and qubh) - we shall discuss here some more arguments.

In the various aspects of the moral sensibility, the following four aspects are generally agreed upon.

Equity and Justice;
Doing good to others;
Gracefulness;
Cleanliness and purity.

Those who posses these four most basic morals are commendable and they too take pride in them.[1] Conversely speaking, those who do not have the above morals, they become a source of tension and the target of abuse everywhere. In other words they are considered bad people by the whole world and in themselves such people feel always jealous of those

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1. Taqri-e-Dilpazir, p.84.

who are loved for their moral excellence. This is because at the core of tehir heart, the bad characters also acknowledge the beauty of this moral excellence, while their jealousy represents only their sense of privation of this beauty.

It is important to notice that though the above moral characteristics are verbally four only, yet their virtual expansion exceeds all imagination. There are few subjects which might be having such wide-ranging details. We shall however comment first only briefly here and then discuss the conclusions drawn.[1]

(i) Equity and Justice: As for equity and justice, it includes both the duties towards God and the obligations regarding the mutual human relations.

Duties towards God: Concerning this aspect are paying ones religious duties physically and otherwise sincerely and faithfully, believing none as equal to God, remembering Him with love, feeling oneself helpless and humble before Him, to have always His fear and not to feel disappointed of His blessings. Finally worshipping Him with one's all means and resources i.e., giving to the needy out of one's belongings.

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1. Ibid.

All these things are basically related to equity and justice in respect of duties towards God. Since we consider outrageous all such acts as interfere in our belongings against our will, therefore, if our belonging and we too ultimately belong to the Creator and the Master of all Creation, then everything should be spent and utilized according to His will and prescription, or else there would be no equity and justice.[1]

Human Relations: To this second aspect of equity and justice are related such obligations as those concerning the parents and relatives. For, these obligations are in fact the compensation towards the great favours they have done. The same applies to things in terms of their sale and purchase. Because if we look deeper into the reality of sale and purchase we will find that imparting the price of a commodity to the seller is but the compensation for the favour that he has done by giving away something of his belonging to the buyer.[2] It is nevertheless obvious that the financial favour cannot compare with a favour done through sacrificing one's life. Thus a motiveless favour must of necessity be incomparable to all other favours. This is why in every community doing good to the parents is never considered an equal

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1. T.D., pp.84-85.
2. T.D., p. 85.

compensation to this selfness toil and a true motiveless love. Likewise consideration of the relatives is regarded as good doing among all people.[1]

(ii) Doing good to others: In so far as good speech, manual service, verbal recommendations, alms giving charitable deeds etc. are concerned, these belong to the second of the four morals as noted above which is doing good to others. Obviously the substance of a favour is providing comfort to others.[2]

(iii) Gracefulness: In the same way, bashfulness, goodwill tolerence, non-wastage of life, non-complacency, refrainment from futility etc. all these things belong to the third of the four morals which is gracefulness and sobriety.

(iv) Similarly, keeping one's body, costume, living quarters clean and pure as also refrainment from eating impure foods come under the moral category of cleanliness and purity.[3]

Thus the teaching in certain religions concerning the prohibition of meat of certain animals is based on these last two principles - gracefulness and purity. Among the Christians, however, the original prohibition of pork is no

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. T.D., p.86.

more considered practically valid on the one hand those loving cleanliness and purity will never opt to eat the meat of an animal so insensitive to the impurity. Moreover, there is also the possibility in the light of medical and other principles that the efficacy of a food ultimately penetrates deep into those who eat it. For instance the valour and interpidity in respect of those whose main diet consists of meat and those who do not touch it, is only selfevident.[1]

Likewise almost every animal continuously guards against any assault on his female and does not hesitate in fighting back even if it ends up in his extermination. But as far as the pig is concerned, he is affected not in the least if his female is assaulted by his counterpart. It is therefore only in accordance with the principle just mentioned that those who eat pork quite often are apt to be infected with this shameless characteristic of the animal. On practical level this feature is so open a fact as needs no explanation in respect of the communities whose food consists of this impure meat.[2]

From here also we get a very fundamental and good rule that all those animals which have a characteristic in contrast

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

of one of the aforesaid morals, the eating of their meat must not be acceptable. Similarly if an animal lacks in more than one of the four morals, the eating of it will be still more unacceptable and so on. This being so, if an animal has one of the above mentioned moral qualities, eating of its meat must be good enough and in case of two, it will be still more pleasant.[1] Thus, the eating of pork is not only against all sense of cleanliness but against all grace and sobriety also, and as such still more evilsome than eating what is only impure.

An important corollary of this principle is the prohibition of suicide in Islam. The reason of this is that one's life is not one's own property, it belongs instead to the Creator. Just as breaking up by some one of the tools of an artisan is but a cruel act, in the same way committing suicide is an act of plain cruelty as it is tentamout to ruining the belonging of someone else against his will. But in case one lays his life in performing a task assigned to him by the Creator Himself, it will be like giving out our tools to someone else in order to get something done, and in that process, say, the tool gets broken. Certainly it will not be considered a cruel act. According to this rule if the divine permission

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1. T.D., p.87.

for eating the meat of a particular animal of good characteristics is proved by a perfect argument, the eating of its meat will also not be a cruel act in the least.[1]

Once it is established that almost all the things of moral excellence are covered by these four morals it will be then only logical to realise that immorals ie. the antithesis to the above cited four morals must also be equally wide ranging. Thus there exist cruelty, impurity, impudence and evil-doing with their innumerable degrees and levels, contrasted to justice, purity, gracefulness and good-doing. In any case, any thing concerning good and evil does not go beyond these eight aspects of moral existence.[2]

2. MORAL GROWTH

Now on the basis of our discussion so far we can vividly understand that the voluntary actions, compared to the inner morals are just like the branches, twigs and leaves in comparison to the seed. Just as no fruit can appear without there being stems and branches, similarly there cannot appear any results whatsoever of these eight morals as mentioned above without there being human actions.[3] Thus these morals in

1. T.D., pp.87-88; See also on this subject Maulana Qasim's separate Risalah entitled Tuhfa-e-Lahmiyyah; Also see Hujjah, pp.72-74.
2. T.D., p.88.
3. Ibid.

their appearance depend on actions in the same way as the seeds depend for their fruition on the branches, twogs and leaves. Generosity without award and valour without conflict cannot be manifested. In the same way, human actions cannot appear without these morals, just as the branches and leaves cannot make appearance without there being a seed. Therefore there can be none in humanity whose action's origin is not related to these eight morals.[1]

Having realised that human actions are not imaginable without these morals, it will have to be accepted that if the morals are good, the actions will also be good, whereas if the morals are bad, then the human actions will also be equally bad. Thus there can exist no human action which cannot be called either good or bad.

From the above discussion certain logical conclusions may be drawn.

(i) The plant and its fruits must correspond to the seed sown for it. Likewise the seed of the spiritual qualities (i.e. the morals) will produce fruits and results corresponding to its nature. The qualities of good morals will produce good actions, which in turn will produce good results,

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1. Ibid.

while the qualities of bad morals will produce bad actions which in turn will produce bad results. The same thing in our terminology is known as the punishment and reward.[1]

(ii) When a seed is sown into a good place of land and it is cared also through watering and other things for its growth, barring all heavenly calamities, the seed sprouts and grows rapidly with many branches. It also produce then its fruits abundantly. But the same seed if sown into a saltish or barren land or proper watering is not done or some calamity befalls it, in all these cases the seed either does not fully grow or its fruits tend to remain deficient it is destroyed even. Precisely the same applies to human morals or inner qualities. Thus we see in human beings someone as intelligent, the other as retarted, one being miserly, another being generous, some one with satanic qualities, another angelic in character, one heeds to everything which is wise from the another simply does not heed to the last.[2]

Having this been understood, now we say that the incidents of life like the good or bad company, riots and conflicts, stories with a lesson, books of truth and such other events -

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1. T.D., p.89.
2. T.D., p.90.

should all be considered like the watering of a plantation and the means of its growth. In the same way the crowding of unhealthy ideas or stunning shocks of life should be considered like the heavenly calamities. Likewise bad company and responding to persuasions of the distracted should amount to catching fire or sun stroke. All this being so, it becomes now comprehensible that just as the condition of a plant due to these variations never remains the same, similarly the actions of a man are also subject to change. Neither the actions of human beings remain always the same, nor the results or rewards of such actions are always equal.[1]

(iii) The third observation is that the more the branches sprout the more the roots expand and become thicker. Rather we should better say that first the roots expand and get thicker, only then the new branches sprout[2] and grow.

In the same manner, as the growth of morals and inner qualities progress, more and more actions are stimulated. From this we gather that it is the growth of morals which causes the growth of human actions, not vice-versa.[3]

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1. T.D., p.91.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

An important inference drawn from this observation is that the seed's being good or bad is not the discretion of land. In the same way, being good or bad of the seed of these morals is not in the hands of man. This is clear from the fact that without any education individuals from their early years happen to be generous or miserly, brave or coward, intelligent or retarted.[1]

Thus whatever seed — good or bad — is sown by God, the land of heart will nurture and nourish only that. All surmoning and good advice will help rear up but the same seed. We see that some people only double up there evil-doing as a result of good advice, the reason being that they have a bad seed in their heart — and so the watering of it with advice or surmons only helps develop the same bad seed.[2]

Since being good or bad of the seed of human morals is not a human choice and reward or punishment as fruits depend on the seed, the contention of free will and human choice remains no more valid. In fact those who speak so have the fear that if God is the creator of human actions, the bad deeds of a man will also have to be accepted as the creation of God.

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1. Ibid.
2. T.D., pp.91-92.

At the same time man cannot be held responsible for the sins that he committed. Therefore these people [1] held that man himself is the creator of his actions.

But by saying so the fear is not eliminated. For if the human actions are of human creation at all, the human morals cannot be of his own creation. The morals are as innate and beyond all choice as the physical features like eyes, nose and the whole human figure, i.e. these features exist just as God has made them. Thus this idea is only unfounded and it proves nothing except that the propounders of this view lack in understanding as also in descency, for they are trying to equate themselves with God in creation.[2]

3. <u>REWARD AND PUNISHMENT</u>:

One more drawback of this outlook is that the reward and punishment will come to mean compensation and wages. For it will amount to punishment and reward being obligatory on God in the same manner as worship and survitude is incumbent on human beings. The propounders of this view are no better than the one who flees from rain and seeks refuge under a

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1. Among the early Muslims those who first spoke of free-will and human volition were known as Qadriyyah. During the last decades of Umayyad period, the Qadriyyah were absorbed by the Mu'tazilah who made the doctrine of free-will one of their cordinal principles. M.A.Q.

2. Ibid.

drain falling from above. Therefore in case of work based on wages, the labourer and the contractor legally stand on the same footing and none of the two does any favour to the other —— i.e. non-work or non-payment will amount to oppression and cruelty towards the other.[1]

Thus in this view God and man have been brought to stand at par. It becomes then unintelligible that why God should merit all greatness and praise-worthiness, and why human beings need be viewed as humble and weak. The real justice in that case would have been that both would be regarded as equal. All this indeed invalidates the very concept of reward and punishment.[2]

However, the futility of man and God being equal need no argument. It is like a man who mis-appropriates the belonging of the other and declares it also as his own property and possession. This un-reasonable view of human discretion within the precincts of divine empire, necessitate our being out of the limits also of that empire. This is be a shere self-contradiction particularly so when it has already been

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1. T.D., p.93.
2. T.D., p.94.

confirmed that there is no original or real being except God Himself as also that He is beyond and above all needfulness.

It is paradoxical that human beings, in spite of their delegated right of disposal, should become the owner of their affairs while God the Creator of every thing should not be the Master of His own creation even.

These are but a few of the arguments which reveal the futility of the view of human discretion and choice.[1]

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1. T.D., pp.94-95.

CHAPTER - XI

REASON AND FAITH

1) Basis of Faith- Perfect Reason
2) Fallacious View of Faith
3) Causes of Wrong Faith

C H A P T E R - XI

REASON AND FAITH

1. BASIS OF FAITH : PERFECT REASON:

Our discussion of beauty and ugliness is over and we have satisfactorily seen that this manifest world consists of five kinds of things which are experienced by the five human senses. It is amply clear now that all the five kinds of things do have the difference of good and evil. If things like sound, shape, taste, smell etc. are distinguishable as being good or bad, why is it then that human actions too should not have the same difference. We are now still more convinced that not only all external actions but even the inner ideas also have this difference of being beauteous or ugly, good or bad whatever degree and level.[1]

As for the degrees and levels of inherent beauty or ugliness in things, these are beyond all counting. Among the living species like human beings, in spite of the unity of species among them, the individual features of one do not correspond to the other exactly, as every moment new features keep on making their appearance.[2]

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1. Taqrir-e-Dilpazir, p.96.
2. T.D., pp.96-97.

In the same way every human individual does perform new deeds yet their continuation and uniqueness does not seem to have an end. No human being has the capacity to discover the details of all these actions and deeds. If human reason at all could be of any help in this, there would not have been the great differences and controversies which we see for example in the religious domain etc. It is certainly the result of following the defective reasoning that in spite of all unity of kind, the differences among the individuals and communities soon approach the level of hostility. Likewise, if the physical state of an individual cannot be discovered without an expert physician, the state of human actions with the implicit good or evil in them is harder still to be discovered without there being a perfect spiritual doctor.[1]

It is therefore obvious that in such things any reasoning can be acceptable only when we are satisfied in the manner of 2 x 2 = 4 or the divisibility of four or the indivisibility of three. Therefore as regards the beauty and ugliness of human actions, relying on one's reasoning in discovering the precise truth is no better than relying on one's irrationality

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1. T.D., p.97.

itself. For discovering the good and evil of actions or the details of beliefs and moral excellence is beyond all reason, as it cannot provide perfect satisfaction.[1]

Moreoever there are to be found such great differences in individual capacity to reason as is seen in the light of a candle and the light of the sun. Even more perhaps. Further for perfect trust and for total compliance, not only a perfect reason is required --- being as bright as the light of the sun --- but it must not have also any dust of desire, which often dims or blinds the best of reasons even.

Moreover if at all there should be someone having such a perfect reason, we are aware at least of the limitations of our own reason. Therefore people like us have no other way out except to follow someone whose perfect reason must be established by a perfect evidence, so that he may be fully trusted and followed. This is an important question and needs some elaboration.[2]

2. FALLACIOUS VIEW OF FAITH:

In every community there are certain persons who are known as devoted to their Faith and closely related with God.

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1. Ibid.
2. T.D., p.98.

Such people are trusted and largely followed. Every thing said by them is considered as almost said by God Himself.

As for the reality of this intimate relation with God, people speak variously. Some people consider them as most intimate to God and knowledgeable of His mysteries and claim that they are a medium through which the divine commandment are made known. Therefore they call them the prophets and messengers of God.[1]

In some communities such persons are considered as the son of God or an incarnation of God -- i.e. their relation with God is believed to be that of a body with soul. The soul is related to human body intrinsically and it affects the body in many ways such as a man becomes thinner in affliction and turns helthier in good fortune, red in anger and pale in fear as also the soul is affected by physical conditions such satisfaction in peace and distress in desease etc. According to this section of people, precisely the same kind of relation - that of body and soul - existed between such persons and God. For the same reason, the words spoken by them or the deeds done by them were all considered of divine origin and their commandments were heartily followed.[2]

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1. T.D. p. 99.
2. T.D. p. 100.

It needs no arguments to see the truth when we consider these various views that God can have with some human individuals the kind of relation of a soul with body. Where we stand in relation to God with all our limitations and neediness? Pained some times by hunger and thirst, forced at the other time by nature, exposed every moment to cold or hot weather, subjected to desease and death etc ![1] We would like to have no relation with a God who is no different from us. If this is the definition of God then we too can be God. Such a view has nothing to do with wisdom, understanding or reason at all. God must be such as to have no neediness or subordination to elements or laws of nature. He must be All-powerful and Almighty and not subject to the tune of physical forces.[2]

Whoever is in need of all these material things, he must be needy to their existence in the first place. For, all these things need existence first.

Someone who needs food in order to sustain his life will be in fact needy to the whole world. It will become then paradoxical if God Himself turns needy to the very existence of the universe rather than the other way round.[3]

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. T.D., p.101.

Obviously the one who has a borrowed existence cannot be God. God is the One who bestows existence on others and exists by Himself just like the sun which is bright in itself and gives away its light to others.[1] On the other hand in case of accepting such a religion, one will have to accept from the very start such irrational and illogical beliefs as cannot be acceptable to even a simplistic person much less to an understanding one. Thus a faith which has but basically futile and unacceptable beliefs cannot have ahead also but the same irrational and wrong direction which leads nowhere.[2]

This can be more clearly understandable by the fact that every action must have a fountain as its source which can be nothing but the knowledge of that action. For instance the fear of a lion issues forth from the knowledge of the lion's ferociousness. This implies that if someone mistakenly takes a lion for donkey, he will have no fear at all. In the same way if someone happens to attend a royal court and takes anordinary noble for the king, showing all kinds of courtly duties to him, it will not change the reality and he will be pulled and punished for his wrongly directed actions.[3]

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1. T.D., pp.101-3.
2. T.D., pp.106-7.
3. T.D., p.107.

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1. T.D., pp.101-3.
2. T.D., pp.106-7.
3. T.D., p.107.

3. CAUSES OF WRONG FAITH:

Thus the evil of an action is two-fold : one which is original as in case of theft, adultery, murder etc. the second which emerges from mis-understanding as in case of a good action done at the wrong place or time. This is still worse, as we have seen in case of the person who took the lion for a donkey or the one who directed all courtly duties to an ordinary official instead to the king. In both examples the action was right but was done at the wrong time or place ... This mis-understanding is nothing but the wrong faith.[1]

A deeper consideration with regard to the cause of a wrong faith, brings to the fore mainly two reasons.

The first is the misunderstanding leading to the belief of incarnation. This is produced mainly from certain supernatural deeds performed by those considered close to God. Here the human reason fails, not because it could not distinguish between the right and wrong for which it has been bestowed, but because it has not been simply put to use, As a result that which appears extra-ordinary gives rise to the irrational and futile belief that God has descended in human form to this

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1. T.D., pp.107-108.

earth and performed all the super-natural acts which otherwise could not have been possible.[1]

The second reason which helps lead ultimately to entertaining a wrong belief appears to be uttering of allusive words which have the implication of a claim to divity and Godhead. Moments of profound spiritual experience or ecstasy sometimes lead to utter words implying a super-human claim that cannot be explained by reason. It can be exemplified by the state of an iron which is burnt in fire to become red hot. At this moment if the iron claims to have become fire itself, it will only reflect the extreme state of a sense of identification --- where all distinction and awareness of self is eliminated. The truth however remains as it is. Iron cannot be fire.[2]

Thus if both the super-natural deeds as well as the allusive utterancesare to be found together in some person, many people will be apt to lose track of all reason, more particularly if the faith system also is devoid of reason and rational basis.[3]

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1. T.D., pp.109-11.
2. T.D., pp.111-12.
3. T.D., p.113.

It is therefore obvious that religious leaders, too, sometimes speak out such words as may have some metaphorical meaning. Certain people due to their deep reverence of priestly personages particularly the ascetics, do not fully understand the inner idea and apply the words to their literal sense only. A claim therefore which is accompanied with miraculous act is enough to distract many a person to entertain irrational beliefs and unfounded conceptions. Little wonder then if the Christian beliefs or the similar beliefs among the Hindūs do not merit to be called as rational estimations much less to seek in them any arguments. On the other hand, such a big claim as divine sonhood or incarnation essentially requires so consolidated an argument as may not have the slightest possibility of an anti-thesis.[1]

Thus if the miraculous deed of a person can prove in him divine power —— though it may equally be regarded as a divine benevolence rather than divinity itself —— even then there are innumerable human limitations which clearly deny all possibility of divinity in man. These limitations conversely speaking, are equally impossible to be found in God. The maximum that the Christian or the Hindūs can say

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1. T.D., pp.113-16.

according to reason is no more than that their religious patriarchs were but the vice-gerents of God or that they were the loved-ones to Almighty God.[1]

In fact, the metaphorical usage of words without any pointers to reality is bound to lead many people astray. For the same reason it is prohibited or disliked that a wife be called a sister --- or the servant a son, as obviously it may lead to create misunderstanding and hence conflicts. In times of prevalence of such mis-conceptions a spiritual doctor must do his best to check the improper usage of such words as have caused or many cause distortions and mis-understandings in the conception of truth.[2]

Prophecy : The Basis of Rational Faith:

In case however, we perceive certain persons as chosen by God, they still remain human beings. There remains in that case no room for any doubts of divinity in man. Thus, if we consider certain persons as chosen by God and as having attained to cognition of Truth, then any distortions introduced by the followers in the Faith, cannot be acceptable much less authentic.

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1. T.D., 116-17.
2. T.D., pp. 117-18.

But if the very basic faith of the followers has deteriorated in its fundaments and the very conception of the basic beliefs has given way to superstitions, then nothing can come out from the actions of such followers. This is because the human actions after all reflect the inner faith - be it a perfect faith or a deficient or distorted one. It is therefore only rational to assume that in such imperfect religions, law and jurisprudence which are normally almost non-existent in them do not find a suitable environment where they could be rationally developed or even understood.[1]

The belief however that the religious leaders of certain communities like Christian and Hindūs were divinely chosen persons seems to be acceptable. This is in the light of the fact that something which is considered generally an established fact and has no arguments for being considered as impossible, is not normally held wrong.[2] So far as this close relation with God and the chosenness of certain persons is concerned, the majority of those who can think with reason, concede and endorse it. It is just like the existence of a city like Calcutta which though we may not have seen, cannot be regarded as non-existent by us, for it is reported and endorsed by the whole-world and has no reason for disbelief. In the same

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1. T.D., pp.121-22.
2. T.D., p.122.

way those selected few in every community known for their righteousness, piety, selfless service and God-fearingness are regarded as having reached God or attained to the ultimate truth.[1]

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1. T.D., pp. 122-23.

CHAPTER - XII

RELATION WITH GOD

1) Meaning of Spiritual Nearness
2) Meaning of Divine Benevolence
3) Resemblence with Divine Qualities

C H A P T E R - XII

RELATION WITH GOD

1. MEANING OF SPIRITUAL NEARNESS:

This'reaching God' refers of course to a nearer relation in spiritual terms which has nothing to do with any physical relation like incarnation, sonhood of father-hood etc. This must be so as God is far and above all physical phenomena. The time and space do not reach Him. It is He who surrounds and encirles or contains everything. Compared to a physical nearness, there is indeed a spiritual nearness also which knows no bounds of either time or spcae.[1]

As for this 'spiritual nearness' it in fact implies a feeling or inclination which is the essense of all intimacy, the common observation gives us to know that individual characters of human nature in relation to one another are too different and varigated. Every one feels an inclination towards whatever appears harmonious to him. The stronger the sense of harmony the deeper the inclination or the sense of intimacy. The beautiful must appear equally beautiful

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1. Taqrir-e-Dilpazir, p.123.

to everyone but the devotion and love is confined to a few only.[1] There can be then no other explanation but that between the nature of the lover and the looks of the beloved there must be a close harmony and proportion which transforms itself ultimately into love and affection. In other words the nature of a lover fits perfectly to the looks, jestures etc. of the beloved just in the same manner as a moulded thing fits into its mould. This is the reason that two persons meet each other for a long time but once in a while it dawns upon one of them that one is in deep love with the other.[2]

This is not limited to human individuals only, But it equally applies to everything for which we have a like or dislike, inclination or disinclination. Thus if inclination or correspondence is the condition for the relation between two otherwise un-related things, the same will apply also with still greater validity to the parts and limbs of a body which are not mutually so strange. Human reason also accepts it without the slightest of any hesitation.[3]

It is therefore in the nature of things to realise that the human fetus too has been given the very same form, features,

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1. T.D., p.124.
2. Ibid.
3. T.D., pp.124-25.

height and limbs which are most proportionate to it. So is the case with other animate and non-animate things,[1]

2. DIVINE BENEVOLENCE:COMMON AND SPECIAL:

We can therefore conclude that wherever some inner or outer relation makes its appearance that must be the reflection of an inner or outer proportion i.e., suitability and aptitude. Therefore if a reflection of certain divine attributes of moral excellence is bestowed upon a human individual, he will doubtless feel a spiritual nearness with God to the extent of that bestowal's proportion. Such people will have a marked contrast or distinction from those individuals who do not have these morals. This will be then a privilege bestowed upon such an individual by God and it cannot be shared by anyone else.[2]

It can be more vividly exemplified as we have seen briefly earlier also that the light of the sun manifests itself everywhere and all distinction of black and white, good or bad looks is made possible only due to that light.

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1. T.D., p.125.

2. Ibid.

Its manifestation in every courtyard, window or ventilator appears in a different and separate form. In the same way this entire universe and all its creatures exist only due to the light of existence of the Original Being.[1]

Now the light of the sun has such a special relation with a mirror or a convex lense as is not to be found with other things which become only visible. The mirror in front of the sun not only turns bright itself but enlightens other things also. In the same way the benevolence of God also is common and special towards the creatures. This difference denotes nothing else but the ratio and proportion of receptivity and aptitude. Otherwise just as everything --- be it a mirror or a stone --- is equal for the sun, in the same way all creatures in relation to the Creator stand equal. However the capability and receptivity among the creatures themselves is never the same or equal.[2]

Thus among mankind those people who have purity of heart and conscience, are obviously as distinguished as the mirror from an iron. In other words the mirror is none other but the same iron which has been purified and cleansed to

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

to become a mirror. In the same way such persons of pure heart are no different from other human beings in so far as their human essence and spirit is concerned except that they have cleansed and purified their heart and soul from all that is dirt and filth. It is therefore only understandable that such persons in all probability receive such divine benevolence as others even do not know of.[1]

Little wonder then if certain individuals should receive the heat of divine love which is only unknown to others. Likewise they should also have the forbearance to withstand the reception of this divine heat and the patience to inflame and purify other hearts also with this heat of love much in the same way as a lense receives all the heat without being burnt up and yet is able to inflame other things too.[2]

In other words their guidance and instructions must enrich the inner and outer personalities of those individuals who devote themselves towards them in totality. Thus all the dirt of such characters having been cleansed, the innerself and conscience is gradually brightened up. This moral excellence and improvement results in good deeds.[3]

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1. T.D., p.126.
2. Ibid.
3. T.D., pp.126-27.

From the above discussions we can infer certain conclusions.

i) In the first place it is now only clear that any special manifestation of divine light is not necessary for the ultimate purification of the heart. Only total devotion towards God is needed.

There exists obviously no mirror which is diverted from the sun and still the sun should manifest itself in it. Clearly this diverted mirror must have the reflection of only those things towards which it is exposed, excluding of course the manifestation of the sun itself to which the mirror is not facing.[1]

It is not then impossible that certain individuals through their devotion and exercise, diverted though they may be, should still be able to purify their heart and cleanse themselves of desires. They may even feel to discover new things or even something which they may take as 'revelations'. Many at this stage would be easily deceived by considering themselves as divinely enlightened.

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1. T.D., p.127.

However, since their direction is not straight towards God but they are a little diverted from the right path, therefore in spite of all their efforts, they would remain deprived of divine manifestation to the extent of their diversion.[1]

(ii) In the second place whoever carries in him the divine manifestation he will not be necessarily a man of revelations. This is so because those who are originally narrow-minded and un-ambitious, are not likely to experience any revelation even though they have purified their heart and mind. This can be seen from the fact that if a particle is facing the sun, it must have the solar manifestation in it with nothing else. It will appear in fact as a broken particle of the sun itself.

On the other hand, if it is a wider mirror, instead of a small particle, which is facing the sun, it will reveal not only the full solar manifestation but also will reflect many other things. It is therefore plain that miracles and revelations are not the criteria for divine cognition or nearness to God as that requires a still broader frame-work

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1. Ibid.

of human heart and mind. What must always be acceptable to reason is moral excellence and good deeds. Normally however not everyone can understand and conclude in confirmity with reason./ But then there is no denying of the fact also that human perfection is essentially based on things and thoughts which excel in moral sense.[1]

iii) In the third place just as the light of the sun is common to every thing exposed to it but no other physical bodies save the mirrors have the perfect receptivity, similarly the divine guidance is not limited to certain individuals alone but depends on individual receptivity. Moreover just as the light of the sun in it's benevolence is general and special ---- i.e., some physical bodies like the water, the mirror etc. are brightened fully whereas many other bodies become only visible - in the same way the blessings and benevolence of God are common to everyone but the degrees and levels of it depend on individual receptivity or capabilities.[2]

It is therefore possible that, however nearer to God and desirous to guide the community one may be, the desire

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1. T.D., pp.127-28.
2. T.D., p.128.

may still not materialise, if there is inattention on the part of the community. Moreoever, even in case they turn to devote themselves to this guidance but do not have the capability needed, again they will not benefit and remain deprived of that. These differences emanate mainly from the aptitude.[1]

3. RESEMBLANCE WITH GOD:

At this juncture an explanation of what we have called so far variously as receptivity, harmony, inclination, aptitude or proportionism, seems rather necessary.

There is certainly no room of any comparison with God for the mortals, as there is none who can share in His Godhead. But that does not imply that no one can have any resemblance also with God. Had this resemblance with God not been there, all distinction between good and evil would have disappeared. The reason is that there must be some kind of model which should enable us to differentiate between the good and the evil.[2]

Correspondence or resemblance with this model is called good and non-resemblance or non-correspondence to this model

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1. Ibid.
2. T.D., pp.128-29.

is named the evil. The absolute good or absolute evil will reside then in total correspondence or total non-correspondence. In between the two extremes there are inumerable levels and degrees which will determine the proportion of human inclination this way or that way.

Thus if among the created there exists the difference of evil and good, there needs be a model for the standardisation of it. Obviously this can be none other than God himself, for, apart from the created there is none but the creator Himself.[1]

But just as the physical correspondence between things is discovered by the eyes and other senses, likewise the correspondence of things to the Creator can be discovered by human reason. Further, just as the physical resemblance can be discovered to the extent of the capacity of sight, similarly, the correspondence and resemblance of the created with the Creator can be discovered to the extent of the power of reasoning.[2]

For instance we know that God is alive. In this context we observed that human beings and animals, closely

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

resemble God whereas water, stone etc. have no resemblance. From this we learnt that the animate thing are superior to the inanimate.[1] Similarly we found that God is knowledgeable and wise and that mankind is distinguished from all living things by his knowledge and reason. This established human superiority overall others. Again, human beings in their knowledge, generosity, morality, actions, moods and manners differ from each other, then whosoever turns out greater in divine morals, like generosity, kindness, forgiveness, knowledge etc. he is regarded superior to his other fellow beings.[2]

Here, one may entertain the doubt that as far as knowledge and morality is concerned, human resemblance with God is only obvious, as there exist at least some sort of correspondence. But the same correspondence does not exist equally in case of human actions moods and manners. For instance certain human actions reflecting humility or worship are unanimously called good but these are simply absent in God.[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. T.D., p.130.

4. THE SOURCE OF ALL FINENESS & FORCE:

In order to understand this, we will have to understand this correspondence to which we have referred repeatedly in our discussion. Correspondence in fact refers to a kind of unity. For example similar origin of a few things, which spread out from that origin and therefore have a mutual relation, like children of a man who have a proportional relationship with one another as also with their parent. The love and affection for one another found among them is not to be found for others. We name this mutual correspondence as nearness of relationship or original correspondence.[1]

Since this correspondence increases or decreases depending upon the nearness or remoteness, the relation of love and affection also increases or decreases accordingly. For instance the love with parents or children is not felt equally for grand parents or grand children, or the affection of brothers and sisters is not equally felt for their descendents. For the same reason also, a stranger will have a sense of unity with another man which he will not have with animals.[2]

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1. Ibid.
2. T.D., pp.130-31.

This kind of proportional correspondence among all living beings is the means or cause of love. Thus if we think on this issue rather more deeply we will see that all creatures have this correspondence with God --- be it the souls or the bodies, the forms, the morals, the actions, the words or the meanings. For the origin of every thing is the very same God, the Creator of everything.

In spite of this, the created things so vastly and so drastically differ from one another as the day from night or the sky from the earth. The reason of this great difference is nothing else but the same nearness and remoteness. This nearness and remoteness may be due to a physical relation as in case of parents and children. It may also be due to refinement and crudeness of things.[1] For example the souls are fine whereas the bodies are crude, therefore the souls will be considered closer to the divine essence while the bodies remote. Among the bodies also, some are finer than others such as the fire is finer than the air, the air is finer than water and water being finer than earth.[2]

It is due to thisremoteness and nearness to divine perfections that the finer things, in spite of their delicate

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1. T.D., p.131.
2. Ibid.

nature, can be the source of great achievements while the crude or unrefined materials cannot. The lightning comes down to the earth and then flies back to the clouds in a fraction of a second and, in this process, it can even break through any obstruction, including a rock. On the other hand the light of the sun and moon far exceeds even the lightning in speed, for it takes almost no time to reach us here.[1]

Similarly look to your sight or the speed of sound or the access of your imagination and fancy. Thus the greater the fineness of a thing the greater the flight and power of it. The reason is that just as the origin of all creatures is the essence of God, in the same way, the origin of all perfections is the perfection of divine qualities. That is to say that every thing receives divine benevolence but the thing nearer to it receives greater share than a thing which is remote.[2]

This may be exemplified by a candle whose light spreads far and near but nearer the candle the light is greater and every object will be brighter. In short because of this inherent nearness and remoteness, the finer things receive

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1. T.D., pp.131-32.
2. T.D., p.132.

greater perfections and power than unrefined things which better serve them in subordination.

One may doubt here that if the shock of lightning can cause cracks in solid bodies like rocks, then rays and sight are even more apt to play havoc with the heavens and the earth even. Although this doubt needs no answer and the intelligent knows himself, yet we can add a few words for clarity.[1]

The Creator indeed has created every thing for a specific and different thing. The ear is meant for sound and the nose for good or bad smell, the eye for light, form and colour. Thus every thing in this world is specifically meant only for whatever it has been created; the eyes have no relation with smell and the ear has no concern with light and the nose has nothing to do with light or sound and so on. Therefore it needs no argument to say that the light rays or the human sight has no relation with physical bodies. The blind knows about the bodies but has no idea of colour and form. The sighted preceives the images and reflections in the mirror but a blind cannot, for the sense of touch has no access there.[2]

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1. Ibid.
2. T.D., pp.132-33.

Therefore although the ear can hear the sound yet is deaf towards light and form, or the eye perceives the form and colour but is blind in respect of smell. Therefore although the ear, the nose, the eyes etc. have their own different functions and have no concern with one another, yet all these things have been made to live together and complement each other.[1]

In the same way the light-rays are related with light, colour and form but are totally unconcerned or unrelated with physical bodies. Just as the light-rays get through a crowd of sounds unhindered, in the same way, these rays get equally through a crowd of physical mass and these materials do not block their passage. Do not we see that the atmosphere is full of air and in spite of it our eyes can see through the distant stars.[2]

The most distant rays of these stars reach us without hinderence. In case of any hinderence it is not unbelieveable that the rays should tear apart or ruin the sky and earth even. Thus the physical mass in terms of sounds and smells gives way to the rays in a manner that these rays pass through them unhindered and unconcerned.[3]

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1. T.D., p.133.
2. Ibid.
3. T.D., p.134.

In spite of all this the real power of the finer things can be witnessed only when they come to manifest their real force. The wind does not uproot a tree except when it turns violent. The steam-power, if directed properly, does wonders. Likewise small wonder if the sight and the rays should be having great powers within themselves, only that we do not know the devices which can bring to bear the inherent energy of rays and sight.[1]

From this discussion we can infer some important points. When a gun is exploded, those who stand near, see the gun, hear its explosion and smell its smoke. However the eye sees the shape of the gun only and knows nothing of the smell, the ear hears the sound and knows nothing of the shape or smell of the gun while thenose only smells the smoke and has no relation with the shape or sound of the gun.[2]

In other words, these senses are as near with one another as they are remote and un-related.

Little wonder then if God Almighty should be nearby the whole world and yet be remote and distant. In

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1. Ibid.
2. T.D., p.135.

the same way it should not be surprising if the divine lights should be visible to one and imperceptible to the other, or if the divine word should not be audible to every one but only to those who have ears to hear that, or that certain creatures of the finest essence should appear before one while be invisible to others. All this is neither beyond imagination nor reason. Rather it is in perfect agreement with both.[1]

In short all this does not go beyond the confines of "the possible". Therefore if a true informer with perfect reason and perfect sensibility whose such qualities are substantiated by strong evidences too, should inform us of the existence of these things, it'll be then only reasonable that his statements be accepted and verified at heart.[2]

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

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